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ABSTRACT 
Until recently, consumer policy researchers have concentrated 
almost exclusively on the competitive market, with little attention 
to the market failure scenario. This study investigates consumer 
protection behaviour of national enterprises. It does this by 
exploring the factors which determine or inf lucncc consumer policy 
decisions when the competitive market mechanism is hindered, and 
the dilemma facing management in such bounded marketing 
environments. 
Fundamentally, two basic approaches to structuring consumer 
protection have been identified. These relate to, (a) private 
enforcement, ic. market processes, and (b) public enforcement, ic. 
political processes. These perspectives were systematically collapsed 
into Hirschman's Exit/Voice theory and explored using qualitative 
methodology. 
Our findings did not broadly uphold the basic configuration of the 
Exit/Voice paradigm. It is intellectually flawed to insist that 
decisions about improving enterprises' performance on consumer 
protection should be impelled by strategies based on those 
dichotomous perspectives. Strengthening means for consumer 
advocacy or introducing and protecting competition in the hope that 
they will concomitantly protect consumers can not, in themselves, 
assure genuine consumer protection. Consumer protection came 
through as a discretionary agenda item. It is neither exclusively 
located in the political process nor in the market mechanism. It is a 
dependent variable whose behaviour is shaped by variations in 
management practices. At the enterprisc-consumer interface, 
consumer protection becomes an explicit challenge of management. 
In terms of institutional arrangements for consumer protection, we 
did not observe any optimal structure. However, we did observe 
that the differing approaches that management can adopt can be 
classified and appraised in relation to four variables. These 
variables are, (i) Sensitivity (pro-activc/reactive), (ii) Definition (consumer/company ccntrcd), (iii) Measurement (formal/informal) 
and, (iv) Implementation (tasks/responsibilitics). These variables arc 
not independent. Their interrelationships lead to a method for 
evaluating the different approaches in terms of management 
response to the challenge of consumer protection. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0. BACKGROUND 
Consumer policy in general terms and specifically, consumer protection, is not 
a straight-forward phenomenon to study. The issue becomes more complex 
when related to the dimension of the national enterprise. This is so because 
what is usually regarded as the enterprise philosophy on one hand and the 
realities of the the national enterprise market situation on the other often 
appear to be at opposite ends. The term, national enterprise, is discussed in 
detail in chapter 2. Suffice it to say, for now, that it denotes the category of 
enterprises which operate in less than effectively competitive market 
environment. They are said to be at the "service of collectivity", 
(Mazzolini, 1978), and operates in such realm where the delineation between 
public interests and private interests often seem blurred. As a result, the 
tendency is recourse, or perhaps pay more attention, to the political process 
in prcf ercnce to the market process in trying to modify the behaviour of such 
enterprises. 
Conceptually, enterprises in the open market system are presumed to be 
susceptible to the discipline of the market place. National enterprises, like 
other economic agents, will ordinarily be expected to behave in the true 
philosophy of the enterprise concept. That is, to obey the rules of the market 
place. In real life, the national enterprise appear to take a great deal of 
exception to those rules. This, perhaps, is because the circumstance of their 
market position deviates from the conceptual connotations of the enterprise 
concept. Researchers have been trying to provide answer to why such an 
aberration do exist. Explanation often given is that those enterprises operate 
in scllcr-dominatcd markets where competition is either absent or weak, in 
contrast to traditional buycr-dominatcd markets which are characterized by 
free and effective competition. When this condition exists, market failure is 
said to have occurred, (Ramsey, 1985; Bator, 1958; Mendelowitz, 1978; Abell, 
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1977; Scherer, 1980; Utton, 1986). Ramsey, (1985) argues that market failure 
occurs when there is a failure of one of the conditions necessary for the 
optimal operation of a competitive market. Bator, (1958), diagnoses this 
condition as the central economic rationale for government/public 
intervention in the market place. Mcndclowitz (1978, p. 36), identifies market 
failure with the existence of conditions such as (i) externalities, (ii) 
interdependence in natural resource use, (iii) destructive competition, (iv) 
information deficiencies, and (v) natural monopoly. 
Abell (1977), argues that the determination of conditions of market failure 
can be based on three fundamental elements: 
Market structure : referring to the number and size distribution of 
buyers and sellers, product differentiation and entry barriers. 
Market conduct : refers to the bchavioural tendencies of firms as 
they adjust to the markets in which they participate. 
Behaviour : described in functional terms, cg. pricing behaviour, 
product policy, cross adaptation of elements of the marketing mix. 
Scherer, (1980, ch. 2) postulates five possible factors that could lead to market 
failure. These factors are : 
(a) there may be lack of competition. 
(b) there may be barriers to entry. 
(C) there may exist problems with product differentiation. 
(d) there may be information gaps between buyers and sellers or in 
certain market signals e. g., seller reputation may be imperfect. 
(C) there may be third party effects which arc not costed in the market 
price 
- 
e. g., the classic problem of externalities. 
Other points have been discussed by Beckerman, (1986), such as merit goods, 
economics of density, complcmentarity, contestability, (see also Helm and 
Yarrow, 1988). 
The idea of market failure and consequences wrought by the concept tend to 
underlie the point that a great proportion of consumer protection models in 
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national enterprises may either have been developed on not-vcry-true-to-lifc 
premises or implemented out of context. This, to a great extent, has 
contributed to making consumer protection in such enterprises a more 
complex issue. It is therefore not surprising that the forces of consumerism 
have not been vigorously directed towards national enterprises in the manner 
of other competitive economic agents ( Enis & Yarwood, 1986). Major studies 
in consumer protection have concentrated on the open market situation 
- 
where enterprises engage in 'atomistic competition' for consumers' resources 
(Cunningham & Tinnion, 1980). Fundamentally, these studies have assumed 
a competitive environment. This is without regard to whether the approach 
is from a management perspective ( Maynes, 1979 ), a consumer perspective 
(Cavc, 1985; Shcth & Mammana, 1974; ) or from a political/institutional 
perspective ( Dykc & Rosenberg, 1979). Major concerns have ccntrcd on 
issues regarded as contributing to questionable behaviour of enterprises in the 
open market in a bid to gain advantage over one another. In the process, it 
has been argued, consumers' interests unwittingly suf f cr. Most of the studies 
have therefore focused on how to ensure adequate protection of consumers 
from the vagaries of the market place, given a competitive environment. 
We shall return to this aspect later but for now, suffice it to say that there 
are two major discernible perspectives upon which major consumer protection 
theories have been based. We shall briefly look at these perspectives as a lead 
to developing the theoretical framework at a narrower, definable level. 
I. I. PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMER PROTECTION THEORIES 
Basically, two broad perspectives can be identified. They revolve around the 
efficacy or otherwise of the unhindered market force as a guide to consumer 
protection. 
I. I. I. Market Processes The first view holds that the competitive market 
mechanism anchored on consumer choice is adequate to convey and enforce 
consumers' preferences. This viewpoint takes bearing from the premise that 
in the open market system, all enterprises are supposedly exposed to 
competition in such a way that none enjoys any kind of advantage over 
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another outside adroit manipulation of marketing factors. Enterprises 
compete for consumers' limited resources and the success of each depends on 
its ability to obtain a fair share of the consumer's 'vote'. This presumably 
places the consumer in a position where he dictates, not only the market trend 
but also becomes the cardinal thrust of all marketing activities. To be able to 
get the consumer's 'vote', enterprises strive to cultivate his loyalty to their 
marketing cues. This they do by trying to offer a total package of satisfaction 
as well as protection from the vagaries of the market place. This viewpoint 
therefore upholds the sovereignty of the consumer in the market place and 
the allocative efficiency of the market mechanism. 
1.1.2. Political Mechanism: An alternative view, though complementary to an 
extent, accepts that consumer protection should be an ethical philosophy of 
business. It goes further to insist that decisions in that sphere should not be 
left entirely to the market place. The argument is based on the premise that 
some enterprises operate under imperfect market conditions, which in essence 
invalidates the basic tenets of the market mechanism. If market conditions 
are imperfect, then the rules of the competitive mechanism can no longer 
apply. To ensure that consumers are protected, there would be need for some 
form of political intervention in the market processes. 
It is also argued that even when competition exists, the modern market place 
has become so complex and confusing that it could make consumers 
susceptible to willful manipulation through the mechanics of Marketing. 
There is need therefore for some sort of government intervention to ensure 
fair and free competition, equal access and opportunities, discourage 
monopoly practices, and enact rules and regulation to govern enterprise 
behaviour. 
From thcsc broad pcrspcetivcs, wc can go f urthcr to introduce six theoretical 
concepts which are of importance in the study of consumer protection. They 
arc (a) the Marketing Concept, (b) theory of competitive advantage, (c) Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty, (d) Collective Action, (c) Countervailing power, (f) 
integrated participation. They arc taken from the works of McCarthy, (1984); 
Portcr, (1985); Hirsch man, (l 97 1); Olson, (1971); Galbraith, (1956); Heckchcr, 
(1946); and Pestoff, (1984). The concepts will be related to certain basic 
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properties of markets and politics which can influence consumer protection 
strategies. At the end, we shall synthesize the concepts to evolve a common 
theoretical platform which will guide this study. 
1.2. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS AND SYSTEMIC CONSIDERATION 
1.2.1. MARKETING CONCEPT: The evolution of the Marketing concept has 
been amply treated in the literature, (McCarthy, 1984; Mckay, 1972; 
Kotlcr, 1984,1986; Bell & Emory, 1971; Houston, 1986; Dickenson, 1986). 
The essence of the Marketing concept is the conviction that enterprise 
decisions should begin with rather than end with the consumer. It holds the 
consumer as the central focus of all business activities, whose needs must be 
properly identified and addressed as a prelude to achieving success. 
The major premise of the Marketing concept is embedded in the notion of 
consumer sovereignty. According to this notion, the consumer is said to be the 
ultimate authority in deciding who produces what goods, by what means, and 
for whose benefit (Wendell, 1976). This does not imply that each consumer is 
individually a sovereign with unchecked sway in the market place, but as a 
group they collectively guide and control the marketing system. As 
Galbraith, (1967), puts it, "in response to wants which originate within himself 
or which are given to him by his environment, the consumer buys goods and 
services in the market. The opportunities that result from making more or less 
money are the message of the market to 
... 
firms. They respond to this 
message of the market and thus, ultimately, to the instructions of the 
consumcr" (p. 221). 
The supremacy of the consumer in the market place has long been 
conceptualized, starting from the classical Economists like Adam Smith who 
in 1776 proposed that "... the interest of the producer ought to be attended to 
only in so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer", 
(Smith, I 937, p. 625). Smith believed his maxim to be self evident and one of the 
early Marketing theorists, Charles Parlin 
, 
was so enthralled that in 1912, he 
declared that in the American marketing system, "the consumer is king", 
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(Bartel, 1962, p. 109). Similar views were further echoed by Converse and 
Hucgy, (1946) in their leading post-war treatise in Marketing: " business 
functions to satisfy the needs of the consumer. The first measure of success 
of any business is how well. it serves the consumer. If an operation is not in 
the interest of the consumer, it is not justified, no matter how profitable it 
may be to its owners. He profits most who serves best', (p. 2 1, emphasis mine). 
At the present time, the Marketing Concept still enjoy strong support. 
Eloquent testimonies from the works of eminent scholars bear credence to 
this, (Drucker, 1973; Levitt, 1977; Brown, 1987). At the operational level 
, 
for 
example, the chief executive of Jaguar cars, the flagship of the British 
automobile industry, was not too long ago quoted to have declared that 
business is about making money from satisfied customers. Without satisfied 
customers, there can be no future for any commercial organization, (Brown, 
1987). 
From the above 
, 
it can be seen that the hallmark of the Marketing Concept 
is customer orientation. This would suggest that consumer interest and 
protection arc inextricable parts of business philosophy. The logic of the 
concept therefore is the inherent awareness on the part of enterprises that 
it is in their own sclf interest to satisfy and protect consumers. 
However, in spite of the acclamation of the concept, it is doubtful as to what 
extent it can be applied to national enterprises. This aspect will be addressed 
later, suffice it to note that the concept forms the fundamental framework 
of consumer protection based on the market model approach. 
1.2.2. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (PORTER. 198a. Portcr's theory of 
competitive advantage is fundamentally oriented towards the market model 
approach. The core concept of competitive advantage in any industry is that 
the rules of competition are embodied in five competitive forces: 
entry of new competitors 
the threat of substitutes 
- 
the bargaining power of buyers 
- 
bargaining power of suppliers 
- 
rivalry among existing competitors. 
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The collective strength of these five competitive forces ensures industry 
stability and determines each firm's opportunities and profitability. Porter 
postulates that consumer power influences the prices which the firm can 
charge and can also influence cost and investment. In other words, each 
firm's opportunities are invariably dependent on consumers' power. To 
exploit such opportunities, it is necessary for the firm to ensure that the the 
'power base' is protected. 
Porter's reasoning 
, 
in all its 
_dctail 
and sophistication can not be repeated 
here 
. 
What is important is to note that each industry's orientation is shaped 
by competitive forces. The bottom-line is that each individual firm 
, 
desirous 
of success and aware of the competitive environment, will spare no resources 
in trying to uphold consumers' interests. If it neglects to do so, it would 
simply have created a situation of competitive advantage for other existing 
firms 
, 
and opportunities for new or potential entrants who could take 
advantage of the loophole. Porter argues that competitive strategy must grow 
out of a sophisticated understanding of industry's basic attractiveness. The 
ultimate aim is therefore to cope with and, ideally, to change those rules in 
the firm's favour. Porter believes this principle is self-evident and applies 
to any industry, domestic or international, which produces a product or a 
service. 
In the context of national enterprises, it would appear that Porter's basic 
assumptions raise a number of questions, in the manncr of other market 
models. Some of the major flaws of the model have been addressed by Miller 
(1988), Miller and Friesen (1986), Murray (1988). The model implies that an 
accurate assessment of the competitive situation is a critical factor in 
changing or enhancing the enterprise's position. Oliva, Day, and Macmillan 
(1988), argues that incorrect assessment of the constituent elements may have 
two negative effects. First, under-rcsponse in terms of relative competitive 
force could result in a deteriorating relative competitive position. Secondly, 
over-response could result in wasted resources with little gain in advantage, 
particularly in situations of high inertia with a clear competitive lead. 
Furthermore, the extent that each of the competitive forces can influence the 
behaviour of the national enterprise is very doubtful. We shall return to this 
later. 
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1.2.3. EXIT. VOICE AND LOYALTY (HIRSCHMAN. 1970) 
Hirschman looks at exit and voice as crystallization of economics and politics. 
He asserts that economist, when studying the forces that serve to correct 
decay in performance of firms in the market place 
, 
have focused almost 
exclusively on economic incentives. Economics posits that declines in sales 
and market share serve to force firms to correct their imperfections or face 
going out of business. Hirschman points out some key defects in this 
economic perspective and proposes that in conditions where suppliers of a 
product or, service hold near monopoly control of supply but where a small 
amount of competition exists, (Hirschman refers to this as a loose monopoly 
situation) those suppliers will be largely insulated from the self-policing 
mechanisms in the market place. In such circumstance, the only avenue left 
for regulating enterprise behaviour will be recourse to political processes. 
Hirschman's work developed out of his observation of the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation and the United States Post Office, both of which he then 
described as classic cases of loose monopolies. Paradigmatic exploration and 
empirical validity of Hirschman's theories have been tested by Barry, (1973); 
Birch, (1975); Laver, (1976); Andrcascn, (1984,1985); Pestoff, (1988); and 
Singh, (1990). Hirschman's theory has had a great deal of varying 
interpretations by scholars. Some have sought to explain the theory with 
economic models, (cg. Laver, 1976). Some have provided a political clout, (eg. 
Barry, 1973). Some have used the framework to achieve a synthesis between 
economics and politics, (eg. Birch, 1975). Others have applied it to aspects of 
organizational behaviour, including consumer satisf action/dissatisf action 
and complaining behaviour, (cg. Andrcasen, 1985; Spenccr, 1986; and 
Singh, 1990). 
It is pertinent to look at the fundamental configuration of the theory. 
(i) EXIT Exit falls within the realm of market models. Its basic premise 
is that a consumer who is dissatisfied with the product or service of a firm 
shifts to thatof another and uses the market to defend his welfare as a result 
of his ability to switch allegiance to a better competitor. This will set in 
motion market forces which may induce recovery on the part of the firm that 
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has declined in comparative performance, courtesy of the invisible hand 
(p. 15). Thus, a firm that fails to deliver a total package of satisfaction 
creates avenues through which consumers can exit by stopping to buy the 
firm's product. Management in such instance finds out about its failings by 
low patronage and revenue drop, which ultimately forces it to search for 
ways and means of correcting whatever faults had led to consumers' exit 
behaviour. Hirschman concludes that this is the sort of mechanism economics 
thrives on. The works of eminent economists, mostly the apostles of the free 
market system, lend credence to this conclusion. For. cxample, Friedman, 
(1962, ch. 2), strongly argues in favour of withdrawal, (exit), as a direct way 
of expressing ones unfavourablc views about an organization instead of 
resorting to "cumbrous political channels". 
(ii) VOICE Hirschman defines voice as "any attempt at all to change, rather 
than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through 
individual or collective petition to management directly incharge, through 
appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in 
management, or through various types of activities and protests, including 
those that are meant to mobilize public opinion", (p. 30). 
The voice option is an instrument of the political process, a basic function 
of a political system. This is the phenomenon Almond and Powell, (1966, ch. 4), 
referred to as "interest articulation". Hirschman proposes that " when the 
management fails to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some extent at 
least, recognize the gap, and non market social institution will arise 
attempting to bridge it", (Hirschman, 1963). 
Voice acts as an alternative, though in some cases, could as well act as a 
complement, to exit. Whenever the exit option is not available, voice option 
becomes the only way in which a dissatisfied consumer can react. Hirschman 
argues that this is the situation which obtains in basic social institutions such 
as the family, church, etc. In the realm of economics, the theoretical construct 
of pure monopoly would spcll a no-exit situation. Under this condition, the 
role of voice would increase as the opportunities for exit decline, up to a 
point where, "with exit wholly unavailable, voice must carry the entire 
burden of alerting management of its failings", (p. 34). 
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Putting this theory alongside his observations about the loose monopoly in 
Nigeria (the Nigerian Railway Corporation) Hirschman f urthcr suggests that 
voice is in a much more commanding position in less developed countries 
where one simply can not choose between as many commodities, nor between 
as many ways of traveling as in an advanced economy. Therefore, the 
atmosphere is more suffused with loud, often politically coloured protests 
against poor quality of goods and services. 
(iii) LOYALTY Loyalty is a key concept in the battle between exit and 
voice, and relates to a special attachment to an organization. Hirschman 
argues that the presence of loyalty makes exit less likely. Loyalty holds exit 
at bay and activates voice. A dissatisfied consumer simply stays on , in the 
hope that reform or improvement can be achieved. 
Loyalty is explained by the dimensions of the market mechanism, (exit), and 
the political mechanism, (voice). Organizations in a highly competitive 
environment can induce loyalty from consumers by offering a total package 
of satisfaction. If consumers perceive a comparatively better offering from 
competitors, they are bound to exhibit disloyal behaviour. In the case of 
monopolies 
, 
consumers are 'locked in' and can not exit because there arc not 
many rivals or competitors. It is like a condition of forced loyalty. When this 
happens, because the consumer has limited or no choice, he undergoes a 
striking transformation. He begins to be acutely unhappy, begins to make 
stronger attempts for change, and will intcnsif y the use of voice in its various 
forms. Thus, under conditions of no-exit possibility, consumer dissatisfaction 
will be manif estcd in high complaint behaviour. Loyalty therefore play a key 
role in the voicc/exit configuration. This will be exemplified in chapter 4. 
1.2.4. COLLECTIVE ACTION. (OLSON. 1971). Olson's theory of collective 
action has received a lot of attention from scholars and may be 
paradigmatically related to the Hirschman's theory. Olson notes that large 
groups which would benefit substantially from organizing to promote their 
common interest notoriously fail to do so, but small, narrowly defined groups 
tend to succeed in organizing and promoting their own interests, usually at 
the expense of the widc-ranging group. Pestoff, (1988), exemplifies the 
consumers as the broad group and business firms as the narrow group. 
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The crucial point of Olson's theory is that the rational self-interests of the 
consumer pose a major obstacle to mass consumer organization. Olson explains 
this dilemma in terms of individual or personal calculus. He introduces the 
problem of "free-riding" and its solution through selective incentives. 
Therefore, to check inequities of the market place, abetted by disorganized 
consumer focus, new goals corresponding to the broad interests of consumers 
must be adopted. The role of governments in this regard is crucial because 
they have to co-opt and synthesize the multiplicity of consumer interests in 
the formulation of broad consumer policy. 
Consumer protection through collective action would become a farce if based 
on assumptions that consumers would collectively work towards a unified 
common goal. In Olson's reasoning, collective action can be effective when 
small consumer organizations arc created to promote the widcr interests of 
the generality of consumers facing a common dilemma. Pcstoff, (1988) 
ebulliently tidies up the argument: "individual consumers can only obtain an 
audible and permanent voice in a seller controlled market by means of 
collective action. Since the individuals' voices arc normally too weak or 
indistinct to be heard and understood, they drown each other or disappear in 
the din. Only collective action can provide consumer voice with the necessary 
amplification to achieve permanent voice in market and politics. Thus, 
consumer organizations become as essential to the well-being of markets as 
Political parties arc to the democratic system". 
1.2.4. COUNTERVAILING POWER. ( GALBRAITH. 1956). Galbraith has 
been noted as a classic advocate of the efficacy of the political instrument 
in consumer protection in today's market place. He advanced the theory of 
countervailing power as alternative to the 'distorted' market mechanism. He 
argues that the theory of the free market system based on competition is an 
unrealistic solution to the monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies of the 
advanced capitalist economics. As concentration replaced competition, new 
restraints on private power arc inevitable on the opposite side of the market 
- 
among consumers, (p. 125). The fact that a seller enjoys a measure of 
monopoly power means that there is an inducement to those to whom he sells 
to develop the power with which they can defend themselves against 
exploitation. The existence of market power creates an incentive to the 
organization of another position of power that neutralizes it, (p. 126). 
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As Galbraith puts it, " power on one side of the market creates both the need 
for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of countervailing power from 
the other side... In the market of small number of oligopoly, the practical 
barrier to entry and the convention against price competition have eliminated 
the self-generating capacity of competition". Hence, private economic power 
is held in check by the countervailing power of those who arc subject to it. 
Galbraith therefore sees countervailing power as a necessary imperative for 
consumer protection. Hence, " if the large retail buying organizations had not 
developed the countervailing power which they have used, by proxy, on the 
behalf of the individual consumers, consumers would have been faced with 
the need to organize the equivalent of the retailers' power (p. 140). He 
illustrates that this formidable task has been achieved by consumer 
co-opcrativcs in Scandinavia. 
Galbraith expresses his awareness of the dif f icultics involved in organizing 
and welding countervailing power, and stresses that the assistance of 
government has been regularly sought in this task. " This in fact, has become 
a major function of government 
- 
perhaps the major domestic function", 
(P-141). By this statement, Galbraith accepts that the effectiveness of 
countervailing power depends on active government involvement. This 
implies that consumer policy, viz-a-viz consumer protection, is an integral 
part of public policy. This, impliedly, is the thrust of Olson's theory of 
collective action and will be further explored in chapter 3. 
1.2.6. INTEGRATED PARTICIPATION. (PESTOFF. 1984). The framework 
for enterprise participation in public policy, especially in the area of 
consumer protection, was first initiated by Hcckschcr, (1946), who 
distinguished between "totalitarian" and "democratic corporatism". The two 
concepts give insight into the enterprise's disposition to blcnd corporate 
policies with public policy issues, ic., the extent to which the enterprise allows 
public issue concerns to determine its policy direction. 
The idea of integrated participation was further developed by Pestoff, 
(1984), who suggested that business organizations, particularly those who 
show a high degree of concentration, could be integrated into public policy 
processes through formal and informal channels. He argues that " this 
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participation is often highly visible, formal and permanent owing to the 
institution of ad hoc parliamentary commissions, the remiss system 
, 
and lay 
representations on the governing boards of central administration agencies". 
The less visible, formal, and perhaps, less legitimate dimension occurs through 
co-opting the enterprise in the legislative process by way of prior consultation 
before initiating a bill or through informal lobby activities. 
This theory suggests that there arc some limitations on the market as a 
mechanism for ensuring that business organizations are responsive to 
consumer protection initiatives. As a result, political processes arc invoked to 
give vent to consumer concerns. Stone, (1976), Williamson, (1984), have argued 
that the theoretical fall-out of Hcckschcr's, (1946) work reflects an 
out-growth of studies on Organizational theory and Corporatism, (see also 
Carson, 1985) 
. 
The underlying principle is that all organizations seek to 
protect their internal technical management decision-making from disruptive 
external inf luenccs like consumerism. This may make it dif f icult f or outside 
influences to have the desired effect on internal decision making. In a seller 
dominated market, (oligopoly), management may be relatively slow in 
signalling consumer preferences to business, and in such a case it might be 
valuable to complement exit with voice through consultation and 
representation, (Ramsey, 1985). 
The essence of involving enterprises in public policy decisions is to get them 
properly oriented with consumer concerns. It has been postulated that such 
a mechanism ensures positive identification and greater co-operation, and 
eventually narrows the gap between the private interest concerns of the 
enterprises and public interest (consumer welfare) considerations of the wider 
society. The focus of consumer protection in highly concentrated enterprises 
will therefore start with getting the enterprises to allow greater consumer 
voice, through integrated participation in enterprise policies. This holds sway 
in a "negotiated economy" where major economic and social relations which 
fall outside the competitive sphere arc governed by political imperatives, 
more or less, bargaining or negotiation between divergent interests, (see 
Pcstoff, 1989). Shanks, (1983), illustrates that in Britain, for example, the 
concept of integrated participation became operationalised in the previous 
decade through the philosophy of "tripartism". During that cra, government 
21 
decisions in implementing a social contract emphasized bringing the 
Confederation of British Industrics, (CBI), more closely into policy formation, 
relying heavily on the tripartite National Economic Development Council as 
the forum for debate. 
1.3. THEORETICAL CONCERNS 
-A SYNTHESIS 
Even though various approaches have been postulated, we conclude that there 
arc basically two discernible strands of argument on consumer protection; (a) 
the market mechanism and (b) the political mechanism. Approaches might be 
different but they all narrow down to this bi-focal standpoint. 
As pointed out earlier, there seems to be a convergence of opinion about the 
dysfunctionalism of the market mechanism, particularly in situations where 
market failure exists. It is not yet clear, at least not empirically established, 
whether the market mechanism, as a basis for formulating consumer 
protection strategies, should be dismissed in totality, or could in any way 
complement the political mechanism. This aspect will be further explored. 
What is important, for now js to note that there is not yet a coherent 
theoretical framework that has come up with an appropriate balance between 
public enforcement (political processes), and private enforcement (market 
processes) of consumer protection, (Ramsey, 1985; Stewart and Sunstcin, 1982) 
However, a very tempting conclusion, perhaps inescapable, is to affirm that 
private enforcement vide the unhindered market processes can not, on a 
stand-alone basis, effectively protect the interest of consumers as far as 
national enterprises are concerned. Extensive research exist to support this 
conclusion, (National Consumer Council, 1979,1981; Andreasen, 1984,1985; 
Mitchell, 1983). The conclusion is predicated on the ground that the monopoly 
or partial monopoly position of most of the enterprises means that the 
competitive market mechanism depending on consumers' choice is often 
inadequate to convey and enforce consumer preferences. With consumers' 
choice exercised through buying power either lacking altogether or grossly 
distorted, alternative ways of providing consumer inf lucnce over policies and 
performance of these enterprises need to be found, (Mitchell, 1983, p. 177). 
In fact, the author was unequivocal in asserting that competition is 
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sufficiently imperfect for there to be serious doubt about the enterprises' 
ability 
- 
however well intcntioncd 
- 
to use market mechanisms to interpret 
consumers' preferences. In the absence of the full discipline of the 
competitive market forces, it is necessary to find effective proxies to 
safeguard the interest of the consumer. The decision on, and choice of such 
proxies is ultimately political, (see also Ramsey, 1985; Bourgoignic, 1984; 
Forbes, 1985; Trcbilock, Hartlc, Pritchard and Dewccs, 1982). 
This therefore brings us head-on with the imperatives of the' political 
mechanism 
- 
the paradigm of Hirschman's, (1970) voice concept - as the 
instrument for protecting consumers from the clutches of, enterprises 
insulated from the sclf-policing mechanism of the market place. It is 
pertinent to point out that even though the voice option has been approached 
from varying viewpoints, eg., Galbraith's Countervailing Power, Olson's 
Collective Action, Pcstoff's Integrated Participation; the basic thrust and 
fundamental orientation remains the same. It does appear that Hirschman's 
theory encompasses, in principle, the broad perspectives on the political as 
well as the market mechanisms, and would therefore seem an appropriate 
framework with which to structure research into the behaviour of national 
enterprise management on consumer protection issues. 
Major concern should therefore ccntre on how to manage the voice option 
and determine what structural arrangement it should assume for effective 
protection of consumers. This would also involve an examination of the 
conditions under which voice is likely to make an effective substitute for, 
or complement to exit. The role of voice, Hirschman hypothesized, increases 
as opportunities for exit decrease. In the absence of exit, voice must assume 
the responsibility for alerting enterprise management to its shortcomings. In 
alerting management, voice must assume the posture that gives management 
some time to respond to the pressures that have been brought to bear on it. 
Otherwise it could turn out to be so harassing that it hinders, rather than 
helps whatever recovery or remedial efforts arc being undertaken. This 
makes it incumbent on management to recognize that it is its crucial task to 
develop an appropriate response process, which accommodates challenges 
posed by the peculiar nature of their business environment. 
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1.4. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Consumer protection has been accepted as the cardinal base of consumer 
policy, (Thorclli, 1978). The other aspects of consumer policy 
- 
consumer 
information and consumer education 
- 
are often said to complement and 
strengthen consumer protection, (Lane, 1983). In spite of the importance of 
consumer protection, which incidentally is a critical part of public policy, not 
enough research effort has been directed to this area 
, 
particularly from the 
point of view of the other side of the market place - the enterprise. This lapse 
should give cause for concern 
, 
bearing in mind that enterprises are important 
and indispensable sources of information on business practices, particularly 
where the enterprise is one that dominates its market. It may be difficult 
therefore to design and implement effective consumer strategies without 
addressing the crucial position of the enterprise. 
It could also be reasoned that under a free market system with its inherent 
&atomistic' competitive structure, the relationship between the consumer on 
one hand and the enterprise on the other could be taken as direct and 
uninhibited, so that consumer protection measures do have unhindered cf f cct 
on both sides of the market place 
- 
on the consumers' side as well as the 
enterprise. This reasoning may have accounted for the concentration of 
consumer research efforts on the free market system. 
However, the shortfall of the above research orientation has not only opened 
a gaping research vacuum, but also isolated a very vital portion of the market 
structure 
-'the controlled market system', reminiscent of national enterprises. 
We use the term, 'controlled market system' to mean the direct opposite or 
aberration of the open market system. The command or controlled market 
system exemplifies the market structure of loose monopolies', (Hirschman, 
1970). The system is insensitive to market forces and blind to the market 
mechanism. Under such a structure, competition is virtually non existent or 
at best, at a very low ebb. Consumer preferences in this situation can not be 
taken as the cornerstone of Marketing practices. Hence customer orientation 
can be stretched and defined along a continuum. As a result of the imprecise 
definition of customer orientation and consequently consumer protection, it 
is compelling to suggest that any system for controlling enterprise behaviour 
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should inevitably give more vent to voice and de-emphasize exit option. But 
this is not all there is to it. It is only an aspect of the complex web. 
The core problem area emanate from the need to determine the possible ways 
of organizing the voice option so as to optimize its effect. The questions 
thcref ore arc: 
- 
How can voice be organized and structured for it be heard and respected 
by management of the loose monopolistic national enterprises ? 
- 
How does management grapple with consumer policy in less than 
cf f cctively competitive market environments, and with what cf f cct? 
- 
What does consumer protection mean to the national enterprise managers? 
What relevance do they attach to it and where do they position the 
consumer in the policy process? 
- 
What arc the levels of involvement in consumer protection, changes that 
have or are taking place in as a result of this involvement, and problems 
encountered by the enterprises 'in implementing consumer protection 
programmes? 
- 
How can the behaviour of those organizations be monitored, to 
ensure that all actions and their consequences are oriented towards 
consumer protection ? 
These are the broad research questions explored in this study. 
In addition, another problem with voice in consumer protection policy is that 
it is usually regarded as a political imperative and, therefore, subsumed in 
public policy packages. This makes it difficult to determine whether 
consumer protection in markets under reference should be taken as a political 
problem, with all the implications, since solutions are normally sought 
through a system of political processes. For example, total reliance on the 
political mechanism will likely blur the meaning of the enterprise concept, 
and thus call into play a performance measurement standard with political 
interpretation as opposed to economic interpretation. The issue that arises 
therefore will boarder on determining the appropriate mix of public 
(political) and private (market) oriented cnforccmcnts. This needs to be 
properly addressed because, as Hirschmann (1970) argues, in the realm of 
economics, the theoretical construct of pure monopoly would spell a no-cxit 
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situation, but the mixture of monopolistic and competitive elements 
characteristic of most real market situations should make it possible to 
observe the voice option in its interaction with the exit option. Therefore, 
for such organizations whose monopoly powers are less than complete but who 
arc characterized by 'sturdy survival after cxit', (p. 56); who may welcome a 
measure of competition (even though at a highly insignificant level) as a 
release from efforts and criticisms of the vocal consumer for whom an exit 
loophole have been created, it still need to be idcntif icd what complementary 
role, if at all, the exit option can play in consumer protection package. 
Furthermore, the colossal stature and role of national enterprises call into 
play a few more but yet unaddressed problems. These problem areas revolve 
around the internal dynamics of the enterprises themselves, viz., what 
discretionary role should management play to complement the voicc/exit 
mechanism. For instance, should management in a placid, enterprise- 
controlled market environment content itself with just adapting to situational 
constraints, viz-a-viz, doing what the regulation says and no more? 
Addressing this problem is crucially important and central to consumer 
protection as far as the national enterprise is concerned, taking cognizance 
of the contention by Zaltman and Jacobs, (1977), that " the greater the felt 
need among consumers for an organization's product, the less precise 
marketing practices will tend to be" (p. 404). If Zaltman and Jacobs arc 
correct, then problems associated with marketing policies and practices of 
market-dominant enterprises will have a significant effect in designing 
consumer protection policies. These problems arc the driving force behind 
this research. 
1.5. NEED FOR RESEARCH 
The need for and importance of research in consumer protection under 
circumstances of market failure can not be over emphasized. 
Marketing, as a philosophy and function of business has always emphasized 
consumer satisfaction and consumer orientation as the key to business success, 
(Kotler, 1984,1986; Stanton and Futrcll, 1987). It is ironic that in spite of this 
awareness, not enough research efforts have been directed into unveiling the 
subterranean factors which guide consumer protection policies of the 'loose 
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monopolistic' national enterprises. Feldman, (1973) unequivocally accused 
researchers in Marketing of playing shy on issues with public policy 
implications. He advanced three reasons which are responsible for the 
apparent 'research lag'. First is that the emergence of public policy issues in 
Marketing is a relatively recent phenomenon in the sense that major concerns 
(public policy issues) have related to regulatory laws and their effects on 
competition and market structure. Secondly, the issues involved usually have 
some political signif icance and thcref ore dif f cr markedly f rom those with 
which they arc accustomed to dealing. Thirdly, research in Marketing has 
been primarily concerned with issues addressing basic questions such as "how 
many people arc potential buyers; at what price should the product be sold; 
... 
In contrast, many public policy issues toward which the Marketer might 
direct his research efforts arc concerned with value systems such as those 
relating to the quality of life". After more than a decade, the substance of 
Feldman's worry with research directions in Marketing still stands. 
A considerable body of research and writing on consumer protection has been 
published over the years, (eg. Harvey, 1980; Harvey and Parry, 1987; Smith 
and Swan, 1979; Harland, 1987; Maitland, 1985; McCraw, 1984; Merciai, 1986; 
Maynes, 1979a, 1979b), but none has addressed the peculiar circumstance of 
the national enterprise. In the main, research efforts have focused on the 
6atomistic, model but not generally tied to market-wide evaluation to 
accommodate market dominant enterprises. Apart from Feldman (1973), the 
more recent and eloquent calls by Gist, (1983), Enis and Yarwood, (1986), 
underscore the need for more research cf forts in this direction. It is not at the 
moment known whether the lapse has been due to lack of adequate theoretical 
(Marketing) framework to direct the needed research. It is hoped that this 
work will contribute to opening up that vast, under-explorcd research field. 
Furthermore, if we arc to off cr concrete suggestions for improving consumer 
protection behaviour of national enterprises, or evolve viable consumer 
policy, we must consider what long-run consumer protection should consist 
of. To say that consumers want optimum protection is to consider only one 
goal 
- 
the super-ordinate goal. There are other sub-goals which, though 
embodied in the super-ordinate goal, must be identified and properly 
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addressed before a meaningful consumer protection policy can be evolved. 
For example, it is necessary to examine (i) the conditions under which voice 
can be most effatively relied upon either as a complement to exit or 
substitute for it, (ii) the institutional arrangement in terms of public policy 
support, and (iii) the desirable but discretionary enterprise behaviour when 
not directed by enforceable regulation. These are the important parts which 
must be designed and delivered as a prelude to attaining the overall goal. 
Marketing must be held accountable for the process whereby these outcomes 
are delivered, hence the need for research of this nature. 
1.6. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purposes of this research are as follows: 
(a) To examine consumer protection policies of national enterprises in broad 
perspective. 
(b) To arrive at a description of the different conditions and determinants 
of consumer protection in the national enterprise. 
(c) To determine the relative management approaches to Definition, 
Measurement, Implementation, and Sensitivity to the concept of consumer 
protection, and to compare and contrast these approaches. 
(d) To determine the conditions under which a system of political processes 
is likely to be more effective in protecting the consumer, either as a 
complement to a system of market processes or as a substitute for it. 
(c) To identify hypotheses which might be used in developing consumer 
protection policies for national enterprises in developing countries and also 
for the soon-to-be privatiscd Electricity supply industry in Britain. 
(f) To evolve a system of evaluative criteria upon which consumer protection 
efforts of national enterprises can be based. 
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1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This work is unique in the sense that it approaches the subject matter of 
consumer protection from a dual standpoint 
- 
the consumer watchdogs and 
management perspectives. One prominent factor which has been hitherto 
neglected or not adequately highlighted is the important role which 
management could play in designing and implementing mcaningf ul consumer 
policy. It stands to reason that a large amount of input, in terms of 
information system, should be expected from the enterprise management in 
the design and delivery of cf f cctive consumer protection policy. It is hoped 
that this work will provide valuable insight into the dialetics of managing 
consumer policy in general, and consumer protection in particular, when 
market performance in terms of competition is less than satisfactory. 
Another significant point for this research lies in expanding the frontiers of 
knowledge in consumer protection, both conceptually and empirically. Never 
bef orc has an integrated framework been established for studying the subject 
matter under conditions that deviate from the traditional market system. 
Hitherto, the dichotomous approaches have related to the structure of the 
enterprise, ic., consumer protection packages designed for the private 
enterprise on one hand and/or public enterprise on the other. This research, 
rather than taking either of the extreme positions 
, 
advances a general 
framework which considers consumer protection in enterprises that exhibit 
or face common market characteristics, irrespective of whether they arc 
public or private enterprises. This is more in tune with current developments 
in organizational studies. 
The timing of this study is most apt. Most of the national enterprises have in 
the recent past been run as utility firms where government stands as the 
major f inancicr and in most cases, subsidizes their operations. However, with 
increasing withdrawal by government via privatisation (f ull 
commercialization in some third world countries), the enterprises arc now 
faced with a new value system, where the emphasis is presumably more on 
return on investment than on consumer wclf arc. This poses a great dilemma 
to all concerned, consumers, the enterprises and public policy makers. The 
only way to balance and keep in perspective the multiplicity of conflicting 
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interests is through a study of this nature. More than providing the elements 
needed for comparative research, it locates the place and role of consumer 
protection as a managerial variable in national enterprises. 
1.8. POSTULATES 
Precise hypotheses will be advanced later but we would like to state some 
broad postulates upon which the hypotheses will be anchored, and thus 
constitute the cornerstone of this study. 
We postulate that: 
(a) The instrument of the political process can induce desirable enterprise 
behaviour but only when a proper mix in the structural framework has been 
achieved. 
(b) Management of the national enterprise will not ordinarily show 
'benevolence' ( managerial discretion oriented towards consumer protection) 
if the instruments of the political process arc abscnt. 
(c) The right type of 'benevolence' is a function of the structure of the 
Political process 
-a perfect instrument will induce pro-activc sensitivity and 
an imperfect instrument will induce apathetic behaviour or reactive 
sensitivity to consumer protection. 
(d) The desired enterprise behaviour can be determined, appraised and 
expressed using four constructs that bear on consumer protection, viz., 
concepts of definition, measurement, Implementation and sensitivity. 
These conccpts'can be operationalised through positive identification and 
relationships. For example, management behaviour oriented towards genuine 
consumer protection will : 
define it in consumer specific terms. 
adopt formal measurement techniques. 
adopt action oriented Implementation strategy. 
show pro-active sensitivity. 
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1.9. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Structurally, issues explored in this thesis are not compartmentalized in such 
a way that they can be decisively and conclusively dealt with in specific 
sections. Themes introduced arc systematically followed through in dif fcrent 
sections or chapters, depending on the nature of relationships or linkages and 
how they bear on the over-all subject matter. 
The thesis consists of 8 chapters, viz.: 
Chapter 1: Introduces the broad theoretical perspectives and provides a 
direction for the project. it does this by reviewing a number of concepts 
which relate to market and non market based models of consumer protection. 
These were collapsed into Hirschman's, (1970) theory to provide a theoretical 
platform to guide the study. 
Chapter 2: Establishes the contextual base of the study, more or less, 
providing a mooring. It delineates the boundaries of the national enterprise. 
Thus, provides a common platform for studying enterprises which face 
common market characteristics but may differ in terms of ownership 
structure. 
Chapter 3: Explores the broad dimension of consumerism with a view to 
locating the level at which it can be defined within the context of the 
national enterprise. Building on the concepts introduced in chapter 1, it 
provides a framework for unraveling the subject matter of consumer 
protection. 
Chapter 4: Narrows down to the dialectics of consumer protection in national 
enterprises. It offers a set of dimensions useful for describing management 
approaches and challenges, as well as exploring the basic taxonomies. 
Chapter 5: Looks at the internal dynamics, especially, management processes. 
Introduces and explains variables (and their inter-rclationships) for 
appraising management orientation. This chapter also deals with the 
methodology. 
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Chapter 6: Presents a case study of the telecom industry and subsequently, 
the field data and analyses thereof. 
Chapter 7: Synthesizes the consumer policy framework and evaluates 
hypotheses. 
Chapter 8: Reflects on issues addressed; summary, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
1.10. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
We consider it necessary to clarify a few terms used in this study to avoid the 
temptation of applying them outside the context in which they have been 
used. 
(i) Consumer We have not treated the consumer as a monolithic group, 
thereby repeating the mistakes of many a study, (Kroll and Stampf 1,1986). We 
do recognize the two broad categories of consumers 
- 
(a) the individual (final) 
consumer and (b) the institutional (industrial) consumer. Our concern is not 
with the category of consumers who find themselves in consumption process 
for the purpose of furthering the ends of production. By that exception 
, 
we 
exclude institutional consumers who may not feel the direct impact of the 
vagaries of the market place 
. 
Our concern is with the final consumer who 
bears the direct crunch of market/Marketing mishap; where consumption is 
personalized. This approach is consistent with the method adopted by the 
various regulatory agencies/consumer bodies, cg., Of tcl, Of gas, Gas Consumers 
Council, where the two categories of consumers are well delineated. 
(ii) National Enterorise National Enterprise does not refer to public 
enterprise per se. It is used to denote the class of enterprises, (loose 
monopolies), which operate where market failure conditions apply and 
where the dividing line between public and private interests is blurred. 
Understanding this concept is very important because of its susceptibility 
to varying interpretations, and because this is the first time the term is used 
in the context described here. We therefore consider a detailed discussion 
necessary, thus the subject-matter of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORY OF THE NATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
2.0. BACKGROUND 
The concept of the national enterprise as a normative framework in the study 
of organizational design and structure is an area unexplored in the business 
literature. Hithcrto,. the traditional approach has been to classify enterprise 
organizations on the 
-basis of ownership, ic. whether they arc publicly or 
privately owned. No reference has, to the best of our knowledge, been made 
to the national enterprise as a form of enterprise classification in a way that 
distinguishes it from the dual typology of the public\privatc enterprise 
model. However, Perry and Rainey (1988) acknowledges the deficiencies of 
the public\privatc classification and opines that some enterprises do overlap, 
which they refer to as 'mixed or hybrid' types. Instances in the literature 
where the national enterprise received mention were usually in the form of 
nomenclatural alternative to the public enterprise ie. using it as another 
designation or denotation of the public enterprise. For example, just as the 
British are more disposed to saying nationalized industries instead of public 
enterprises, parastatals for Nigeria, Government controlled enterprises for 
Germans, the French would settle for national enterprises (Mazzolini, 1979). 
Our submission here is that the broad dichotomy of public\private model of 
enterprise classification could be misleading and may no longer be adequate 
as a definitive criterion in the study'of enterprise structure. This perceived 
inadequacy leads us to prof fcr a tripartite model of enterprise classification 
by extending the public\private sector framework to include the national 
enterprise. We shall systematically approach the subject through charting a 
model of an enterprise, the dichotomous relationships of the public and 
private orientations within the enterprise concept, and consequently, the 
national enterprise concept. Our objective is to highlight and use some of the 
discernible factors which may distinguish a group of enterprises from the 
strictly public\private classification to build a contextual base for our main 
rcsearch study. 
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2.1. THE ENTERPRISE CONCEPT 
The concept of an enterprise could denote so many things; the consideration 
here is in the business rcalm. Even at that, it is difficult to be precise on 
what constitutes the core of an enterprise activity. 
Ramanadham (1984), approached the issue f rom two dimensions; (I)f inancial 
viability and (2) cost-price equation (p. 23). Financial viability denotes a 
conscious ef fort on the part of the enterprise towards net revenue. The goal 
in theory might be expressed in terms of profit maximization. In practice, 
several other qualifications or constraints may exist to restrain the profit 
maximizing objective. The constraining variables include price controls, 
labour relations, consumer interest articulation, powcrf ul competitive threat, 
protection of long term financial interests of the organization, etc. From this 
perspective therefore, the core of an enterprise objective must include 
element of viability. It may not necessarily mean that the enterprise must 
show viability at its inception. This may be due to the initial teething 
problems usually associated with gestation period, bad business conditions or 
managerial inefficiency, but the long-run picture must look different when 
most of the odds would have been overcome. 
The other aspect of Ramanadham's postulation is the cost-price equation 
which boarders on methods of revenue generation, a point which he 
maintains, differentiates an enterprise from non-enterprisc. The enterprise 
must generate its own resource needs, identify and exploit market 
opportunities. In other words, "the enterprise does not operate at a uniform 
fee like a Park authority. It does not levy a charge in relation to client's 
income or wealth status like a governmental hospital or house allotment 
department. It does not seek income through contributions, like museums or 
art galleries. As an enterprise, it goes by cost considerations in determining 
the payments that customers are to make". (p. 23). 
Implicitly, what can be inferred is that there ought to exist a 
cost-consumption relationship and this may suggest that a product may not 
be offered if it does not meet the cost of producing it. This may not be a true 
reflection of the varying shades of enterprise behaviour in the market place. 
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There may exist, for example, cross subsidization among different markets 
but what stands out clear is the caveat that an enterprise must be concerned 
with how it relates prices to costs for the purpose of achieving long-term 
ef f iciency. 
The element of risk usually associated with enterprise discretionary activities 
can also be considered a core feature of the enterprise concept. This may 
appear as a corollary to the viability factor. However, it should be 
emphasized that subject to internal limitations, and with the desire to 
maximize rcturns, the enterprise is characterized by the impulse to take risk 
as a strategy for containing or gaining advantage over rivals and adapting to 
the dynamics of the environment. A non-entcrprise is characteristically 
risk-avcrse and often, do not possess the right kind of decisional flexibility 
necessary for exploring the risk-return relationships. Argument has also been 
advanced in the area of legal autonomy which is regarded as essential in 
charting the enterprise concept. This accords a personality status to the 
enterprise, which can sue and be sued. Some have argued that it is the notion 
of legal autonomy that indeed makes an enterprise (Ramanadham, 1984). This 
view can not be substantive because it is doubtful to what extent it can be 
helpful in delineating an enterprise from non-cnterprise activity. There arc 
many autonomously organized governmental activities\agencics which have 
lives of their own, could sue and be sued, but not'impclled by commercial 
considerations or by calculation of financial viability (Pozcn, 1967). 
Pcllcrzi, (1974) put the point very bluntly by asserting that "at common law, 
a corporation is a legal fiction". 
Another inconclusive postulate is that an activity is enterprise when in 
industry or commerce but not when in social services. This may be a formal 
view and can draw from wide array of examples. However, care must be 
taken in pushing the argument because it might be stretched too far as to 
make the entire concept blurred and incomprehensible. For example, what 
may relatively appear to be a social service in one country may belong to 
another category in another country. Even within a country, passage of time 
can alter the definition of a social service if viewed from the perspective that 
what constitutes a social service at a time could change at another time. 
Examples can be drawn from such areas as housing, broadcasting, post and 
telecommunication services etc., 
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where in some countries, events have seen them move from social services to 
commercial organizations. 
Leibenstein (1965), suggested three tests which could establish the identity 
of a truly independent enterprise: (a) it must have the final decision on the 
use of profits, M the choice of principal activities through decisions on 
investment, (c) appointment of key management personnel. Agreeing, Thomas 
(198 1), adds that it is the power to take and implement fundamental decisions 
as to the conduct and future of their activities that explains the whole 
enterprise concept. These decision areas therefore give inkling to, and ref Icct 
the structure and style of the enterprise. The point implied in Leibenstein's 
postulate is that the enterprise must make profits. If it did not, the question 
of final decision over profits will not arise. Secondly, for the enterprise to 
make profits, it must engage in commercial transaction in a buycr-seller 
relationship. Thirdly, profit will not be possible if costs of operation outstrip 
the revenue returns. Therefore, revenue must be matched with cost. 
Shepherd's (1985) conccptualization of an enterprise is simple but rather 
confusing. He sees the enterprise as just a term for "any unit where people 
produce a good or service. The enterprise may consist of one plant (local 
factory or office) or more, or many hundreds of plants". By this definition, 
the drug store is an enterprise, the hospital, the colleges, the corporation and 
multinational. From Shepherd's position therefore, the precise meaning of an 
enterprise appear blurred and more difficult to separate enterprise activity 
from non-cnterprise. However, he uses the terms, 'firm', and enterprise 
interchangeably and we would rather agree with his subsequent definition as 
better suited, viz 
...... 
an organization with its own independent lif c, form and 
powers of decisions. It is embedded in a system of, (1) market processes (2) 
supply and customer relationships and (3) financial supervision" (p. 101). 
From the foregoing, even though it is difficult to reach an agreement on 
what constitutes the core of an enterprise, one can discern some salient points 
which are self-evident. An enterprise should be gain oriented. We have 
deliberately avoided the use of the term, 'profit maximization' because of its 
susceptibility to intellectual bashing. Acccptcdly, profit is the main index of 
an enterprise performance but profitability in itself is a highly subjective 
concept, and to some extent, a matter of degree, not absolute amounts. The 
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simple total of money profit may not be enough to show how profitable an 
enterprise has performed. Notwithstanding the perspectives on profit, what 
stands out clear is that for any activity to worth the appellation of an 
enterprise, it must strive to stand on its own f cct in terms of resourcef ulncss. 
The notion of viability therefore appears inextricably intertwined with the 
whole enterprise idea. By implication, for the enterprise to be viable, it 
should be able to relate its cost to revenue. Its products and services must not 
only be off cred at a cost to the consumer but such costs (to the consumer -and 
revenue to the enterprise) should also ref Icct the value of input requirements 
in the production of such products and services. 
Another implied condition is that trading must be a cardinal thrust of the 
enterprise activity. We consider this point a major thread running through the 
entire maze of the enterprise concept. Trading as used here focuses far 
beyond the traditional exchange theory which underlies direct transfer of 
tangible entities between two parties, to encompass all activities involving the 
'exchange', the cause and cf f cct phenomena associated with it (Bagozzi, 1975). 
For an undertaking to qualify as an enterprise, it must possess the capability 
to engage in, put bluntly, buying and selling. The services arc off crcd to the 
market on commercial consideration. There may be other considerations 
which may be dictated by environmental factors but commercial objective is 
paramount. It does appear that it is the element of commercial consideration 
that truly differentiates the enterprise from non-cntcrprisc activity. 
Traditionally, enterprises arc classif icd under two broad categories; (a) public 
enterprise and (b) private enterprise. According to this normative concept, an 
enterprise is either public or private. This is the bone of contention. Our 
position is that with a class of enterprises, the dividing line is so blurred that 
it will be deceptive to group them under the broad categorization without 
drawing out the necessary caveat. We shall briefly look at the two categories 
as a lead to developing the necessary framework. 
2.2. THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
The case of the private enterprise is self-explanatory and does not need 
belabouring. However, some crucial points need to be highlighted because 
they boarder on the distinctive features by which it is characterized. It can 
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safely be said that the idea of private enterprise revolve around two major 
factors, (a) ownership and (b) management of benefits (trade surpluses). 
2.2.1. OwncrshiD Liebcnstein's (1965) model of a true enterprise, 
- 
final 
decision on the use and application of capital and profits, choice of principal 
activities through investment decisions, appointment of key staff 
- 
aptly 
describes the private enterprise. Here the capital base is in the hands of 
private individuals who may be responsible for the day to day running of the 
enterprise or. taking strategic decisions. The private idcntif iablc owners have 
absolute discretion as to what the enterprise will produce, when to produce, 
where and how to produce it, subject to macro-cconomic conditions. 
Enterpreneurial and other decision making activities rest with the persons 
who are 
, 
in fact and law, the owners. The discretionary decision activities 
could be reflected in such core areas as investments, size, technology, 
location etc. The underlying point is that the persons enjoying the decisional 
role act on expectation that the use of enterprise machinery will accomplish 
maximization of private interests. 
2.2.2. Management of benefits: The net benefits or gains of activities 
undertaken by the enterprise go to the enrichment of private group of 
individuals standing as owners. The benefits may be of two kinds, (i) 
surpluses which represent the net revenues realized in the course of the 
operation in a given period and are available for distribution as dividends 
and (ii) capital appreciation which results from accumulation of 
undistributed profits (reserves) or from issues of bonus shares, sale of assets 
ctc. The benefits go directly to the owners because the risk of investment 
originated from them, to whom the enterprise is accountable for its 
performance. The owners of the private enterprise may be one person or 
group of persons acting as shareholders. The over-riding point of the private 
enterprise is that the organization and its management arc solely answerable 
to the owners. Management activities, as a consequence, must reflect the 
interests of shareholders 
- 
any other interest is peripheral. 
2.3. THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE Unlike the private enterprise, the 
public enterprise presents conceptual dif f icultics. The dif f icultics arise f rom 
arguments as to whether certain activities should be traditionally consigned 
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to the public enterprise, viz-a-viz, where its activities ought to end and where 
the private enterprise ought to start, what level of public involvement should 
there be before an enterprise is designated a public enterprise, the level of 
performance and public (consumer) expectations. There is also a great deal 
of disputation over the generic (universal) applicability of the concept. This 
is based on the premise that the meaning of public enterprise changes from 
country to country, from one socio-cconomic environment to another, and 
even within an economic system, passage of time could still change the 
complexion and context of the public enterprise concept. 
Above may have contributed immensely to the lack of precise definition of 
the concept. Views have been as varied as there arc writers on the subject. For 
Ramanadham (1984), public enterprise is simply a matter of natural 
evolution, more aptly, a question of synthesizing the 'public concept' with 
the 'enterprise concept'. His public concept, (we have noted the enterprise 
concept), basically reflects three things: (i) decision making is public with 
no personal interest. (ii) the enterprise is accountable to the public for its 
performance 
. 
(iii) non private accretion of net benefits. Public enterprise 
will' therefore entail either full ownership by the public through the 
machinery of government, majority ownership by government or minority 
ownership by government. Ramanadham's work reflects that of Bohm (1981), 
who, arguing that public enterprise is a syntheses of both public and 
enterprise dimensions, advances some key elements which could help in 
placing the public enterprise in proper perspective. For example, he argues 
that connotation arising f rom the public dimension involves an understanding 
of the concepts of: 
- 
public purpose 
- 
public ownership 
- 
public management 
- 
public control 
- 
public accountability 
On the enterprise dimension, the essential elements include: 
the field of activity of a business character 
the concepts of investment and returns 
marketing of goods and services produced. 
39 
One issue that remains glaring is the tacit recognition of the presence of 
government in the market place providing economic goods and services as 
monopolist or in competition with private economic agents (Coobes, 1971, 
Holland, 1972; Musolf, l 972, Mokwa&Permut, l 98 1; Enis&Yarwood, 1986). Even 
though the literature is replete with studies of government involvement in the 
market place, (cg., Posner, 1979; Hcath, 1980; Brech, 1981; Redwood & Hatch, 
1982; Ramanadham, 1986; Powell, 1987), resolution of the definitional 
difficulties remains a mirage. It is pertinent at this juncture to take a look at 
a few of the definitions of public enterprise, or by whatever name it is 
identified with, eg. state owned enterprises (World Development Report, 1983 
& 1987) or Government controlled enterprise (Mazzolini, 1979). Floyd ct al, 
(1984) define the public enterprise as "any government owned or controlled 
unit that produces and sells industrial, commercial and financial goods and 
services to the public". While acknowledging that a more rigid definition may 
be elusive and even seem undesirable in view of the variety of legal and 
organizational forms encountered in various countries, the authors are of the 
opinion that it would serve a useful purpose in distinguishing public 
enterprises from other governmental bodies to require that revenue should be 
related to output, and day to day operational autonomy should be in the 
hands of the managers of the enterprise. 
Mazzolini, (1979), argues that in the public enterprise, the ultimate formal 
authority rest in the hands of the state and this power corresponds to that of 
shareholders in private sector companies. He further argues that for 
government to have such authority, it must own substantial part of the 
company's equity-- more than 50%. Powell, (1987), concurs but adds that 
apart from primary economic objective, additional social and political 
objectives are also important features. While agreeing on the public ownership 
paradigm, Loveluck and Weinberg (1974), adds that it is not always entirely 
clear where the public elements ends and the private begins; giving examples 
of such enterprises as Amtrack, Comsat, and public transit services in the U. S, 
which are both publicly and privately financed. However, they conclude that 
where the actual ownership is in the private hands, such enterprises arc either 
closely regulated and\or receiving special tax exemption. 
Heath, (1980), approached the issue from managerial perspective. The key to 
understanding the distinctive behaviour of public and private enterprises, he 
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argues, is to understand the environment at the top. Behaviour at the top is 
strongly influenced not only by the specific factors of the enterprise (the 
market environment) but also by the political, legal and social environments 
in which managers operate. Therefore 
, 
managerial response to these 
environmental cues provide explanation as to why, and extent to which, 
public enterprise diffcrs from private enterprise. The guideline adopted by 
the National Economic Development Office, (NEDO, 1976), appear elaborate 
for the definition of public enterprise, although it contain some structural 
flaws. It sets out the public enterprise as : (a) whose assets are in public 
ownership and invested in a corporation. (b) whose boards are appointed by 
the Minister (c) whose board members and employees arc not civil servants. 
(d) which are primarily engaged in industrial or other trading activities. 
(c) which are differentiated from other public corporation by the degree to 
which they are engaged in sale of goods & services and the extent to which 
revenue is derived directly from their customers. 
Bcnn and Gaus (1983); Perry and Rainey (1988); based on syntheses drawn 
from general literature advances three criteria rooted in definition for the 
purpose of differentiating the public from the private enterprise. 
(i) Definition based on public interest: This approach distinguishes a 
category of commonweal organizations whose prime beneficiaries arc the 
public in general from those enterprises whose prime beneficiaries arc the 
owners (private enterprises). 
(ii) Definition based on public goods and market failure: It has been argued 
that enterprises that produce public goods and operate in market failure 
conditions usually arc classified as public enterprises. Proponents of 
privatisation have also argued that there arc some public enterprises that do 
not fit into the model, and the reasons given for their status can be modified 
through wider participation and competition (Savas, 1982) 
(iii) Definition based on ownership\ funding: As we have already noted, 
ownership has been regarded as a crucial distinction between public and 
private enterprises. In public enterprises, ownership rights arc not vested in 
individuals. In the private enterprise, management is treated as a productive 
input and is efficiently valued in the market. 
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However, no matter how popular this view is, it must be pointed out that 
ownership per sc does not fully capture the dimensionality of the 
public\private enterprise distinction. The assumption has been that public 
enterprises arc more inclined to the institutional control of government as 
opposed to economic market and other non governmental control processes of 
the private enterprise. Herein lies the bone of contention. The fallacy of such 
an assumption has been amply demonstrated with the situations of British 
Gas and British Telecom. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that, public enterprises have three defining 
characteristics, (a) they are government owned and controlled, (b) they are 
engaged in business activities, (c) they have socio- political objectives, outside 
the major economic imperatives. These characteristics are not precise, partly 
because it is difficult to draw a clear-cut and economically useful boundary 
around the public enterprise sector, especially as in most countries, virtually 
all enterprises are subject to some degree of control. These definitional 
complexities were particularly addressed by Jones, (1975); Bohm, (1981); 
Ramanadham, (1984), and no satisfactory option has been adopted, both 
conceptually and operationally. Ownership and control may be taken to mean 
that government is able to control management decisions by virtue of its 
ownership stake alone. This will bc true if the enterprise is directly operated 
by a government department or in case of another entity, if government 
holds a majority of its shares either directly or indirectly through another 
public enterprise. The fact is, a smaller sharc-holding may be sufficient to 
give the government effective control, (see Floyd, ct al., 1987). This point was 
recently illustrated in the take-over saga of Britoil by British Petroleum(BP) 
and Atlantic Richfield (a foreign oil firm). The Chancellor of Exchequer 
went to the Parliament to assure members that Government will use its 
'golden share' in Britoil to stop it's takc-over by a foreign firm, as long as it 
is in the national interest. Every day occurrences such as illustrated above 
and the indefinable concept of 'national interest' has created a complex 
dimension to the mechanics of market forces and apparently, exposed the 
inadequacies of enterprise classification on the basis of public/privatc model. 
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Furthermore, the question of ownership seem to be deeply susceptible to 
speculative meanings, particularly when viewed along the line of a 
continuum structure. This implies that the level of public involvement 
stretches from the wholly owned to partially owned. Irrespective of the 
proportion of public involvement, government has a 'de facto'potcntial for 
control if it wants to bring the enterprise under some form of public control. 
These complexities may have influenced Posner, (1979), to assert that the 
behaviour of public enterprises in the market place is essentially not 
different from the behaviour of the private enterprise. The assertion rests on 
the premise that in both public and private enterprise sectors, the over-riding 
objective is to maximize output, subject to given constraints. In the private 
enterprise for example, the constraint may be that the "flow of reported 
profits does not fall below that minimum level which is necessary to keep the 
share price above the threshold which staves off take-ovcr threat". This 
objective is analogous to the required rate of returns usually imposed on 
public enterprises. it might be argued that private enterprise, in trying to 
maximize the sum total of profits, might resort to unethical practices, -a 
behavioral pattern that can not be linked with the public enterprise operators. 
The market behaviour of public and private enterprise operators may seem 
to vary in theory because of the way they arc likely to react to market cues. 
This of course depends on the nature of the enterprise in question because 
some category of private enterprises exhibit the same market characteristics 
as the public enterprises. 
2.4. CONTRADICTIONS IN THE PUBLIC\PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
CLASSIFICATION 
Contrasts between public and private enterprises have received significant 
attention as evident by the increasing number of comparative studics 
published in the literature (Lindblom, 1977; Perry and Kracmcr, 1983; 
Lachman, 1985; Perry and Babitsky, 1986; Raincy, 1983; Rainey, Bcckoff, & 
Lcvine, 1976; Bcnn and Gaus, 1983). Meyer (1979,1982), argues that inspitc of 
the enormity of published works on private and public enterprises, distinctive 
characteristics still cause a stir among scholars with the result that there tend 
to be ovcr-gcneralization in organization theory. 
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Primarily, areas of contradictions lie in the expectations and value system 
associated with the dual typology of enterprise classification. There is the 
assumption that the "degree of external control by major institutions of the 
political economy, such as political authorities and economic markets, is a 
significant distinction for organizations"(Perry and Rainey, I 988, p. 184). 
Ownership and sources of funding arc organizational properties reflecting 
these sources of control. For instance, public funded enterprises are 
hypothesized to be more heavily subject to the institutional control processes 
of government. Privately owned and funded enterprises are assumed to be 
more heavily influenced by their economic markets, and more autonomous 
from government control, (Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Perry and Raincy, 1988). 
These traditional views apparently did not take cognizance of the 'hybrid' 
enterprises, more aptly, national enterprises. The controversies, to a large 
extent and in the context of structure of some enterprises like the big 
corporations and utility firms, the dividing line between public and private 
enterprises appear increasingly blurred. The blurring of the distinctive 
characteristics imply that the concepts arc multidimensional and this, in turn, 
complicates the definition 
. 
Example of multidimensionality was provided 
by Benn and Gaus (1983), who suggested that the public and private 
enterprises vary along three dimensions, viz., 
(i) Interest 
- 
whether benefits or losses are communal or restricted to 
individuals. 
(ii) Access 
- 
referring to openness of facilities, resources or information. 
(iii) Agency 
- 
referring to whether a person or an organization is acting as 
individual or as an agent for the community as a whole. 
Apart from commercial consideration which appears to characterize the 
enterprise activity 
- 
whether public or private 
- 
basically, all other 
distinguishing f eaturcs arc in some respect, contestable, contradictory and not 
generally acceptable. For example, most of the commentators use structure 
of cquity-holding and strategic control as the major distinctive feature. We 
have already noted views to the effect that, as far as the control variable is 
concerned, government is all pervasive and can extend its controlling arm to 
any form of enterprise, irrespective of ownership structure. We can stretch 
this argument a little. In the private sector, enterprises vary in scope of 
activities, size, structure, level of technology in use, level of market hold, 
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permissiveness of product offering, and some enjoy higher amount of 
visibility. There are those whose activities are closely controlled and 
regulated because not only do they play high on the factors mentioned above 
but also play strategic role in the socio-political system. In a great lot of the 
issues that effect their operations, it is not the wishes of the equity holders 
that prevail as the picture of our private enterprise concept would suggest. 
Example of such enterprises can be found in the utility sector where both the 
private and public initiatives thrive. Furthermore, in free enterprise 
economies as the West European model, it will attract more than a passing 
comment to dismiss, on the face value, the propensity of most governments 
to retain equity interest in some enterprises, the proportion of such interest 
notwithstanding. Government's interest implies an additional responsibility 
and obviously will alter the focus of the enterprise objective which 
traditionally ought to center on maximization of private interest. 
What we can say of the enterprises which fit into the picture above is that 
their activities extends to the rcalm where it is difficult to separate public 
interest from private interest. This class of enterprises arc closely monitored 
by government either through spccially tailored regulatory framework (eg. 
Of tcl, Of gas model) or direct equity participation. We designate this class of 
enterprises as 'type A'. This is the category that complicates the definition 
and classification of enterprises on the privatc/public model. They arc, 
together with public enterprises, candidates for the 'national enterprise'. On 
the other hand, 'type B' enterprises operate in areas where the dividing line 
is apparently clear, and therefore not of interest to us here. It was Nigel 
Lawson, (1981), Chancellor of the Exchequer who in the House of Parliament 
proclaimed that 6the business of Government is, not the government of 
business'. Perhaps, this perceptual statement aptly suits our 'type BI 
enterprises but applying it to 'type A' raises some philosophical 
contradictions, both conceptually and operationally. In the light of our 6typc 
A' enterprises, it is evidently clear, as will be illustrated shortly, that the 
6government of business' is also a very important 'business of Government. 
We deem it necessary to draw attention to, and emphasize the clement of 
'public interest'. In principle, we accept that the term is relative, and 
therefore open to interpretations. The notion of public interest seem to be 
notoriously difficult to define and measure. Mitnick (1980), reviewed these 
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difficulties and presented a typology showing that there are multiple, 
sometime conflicting conceptions of public interest. For instance, Britain 
privatised her national oil (petroleum) enterprise on grounds of public 
interest, while Nigeria nationalized hers also on public interest 
considerations. In both countries, the different status of the enterprises has 
not made one or the other more or less 'national enterprise'. In addition, it is 
commonplace to observe that almost all organizations exert influence on the 
public interest in some way, (Hall andQuiny, 1983). Enterprise classification 
on the dual typological model of private\public is blind to this kind of 
rcasoning. 
2.5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ENTERPRISE CONCEPT 
Government In The Market Place: Theoretically, all firms in the open market 
arc supposed to compete in such a way that none enjoy any kind of advantage 
outside the manipulation of the market factors. How successful the firm 
becomes will depend on how efficiently it applies and manages its resources. 
The hallmark of every activity is to gain consumer loyalty, usually expressed 
through the 'monetary voting rights' in the market place (purchase 
behaviour). One of the cardinal features of our enterprise concept is the issue 
of viability. Viability is achieved through the ability of the enterprise to 
offer satisfactory goods and services to the consumer. A satisfied consumer 
repeatedly endorses the operational mode of the enterprise through his buying 
pattern. Those enterprises which satisfy him ( the consumer) stays in the 
market while those that do not simply die off as a result of lack of patronage, 
bearing in mind that expenditure of consumers constitute income of the 
enterprise. This implies that less efficient enterprises will be forced to leave 
the market while the efficient ones thrives. Market forces therefore allocates 
resources through the 'invincible hand' and subjects all enterprises to the 
discipline of the market place. Much as the above might appear a truism, a 
number of externalities operate to constrain market forces and impede its 
discipline. In practice, enterprises do not, in all cases, stay or leave on 
efficiency criterion alone. Efficiency in this case is not determined by how 
adroitly the enterprise wades through the vagaries of the market place. That 
class of enterprise which enjoy a measure of exemption from the rule and 
discipline of the market place is the substance of this chapter. The State 
involvement in the market place, to a large extent, explains this phenomenon. 
46 
The State determines cxtra-cconomic objective which it intends to achieve 
through the enterprise machineries. As can be seen, the State is no 
longer limited to its ' historic' function as regulator, referee and facilitator 
of the private market economy (Walters & Monson, 1981). As elaborately put 
forward in the World Development Report, (1987), 'Government pervades 
modern society and industrialization has to be reconciled with other public 
objectives 
- 
economic, political, social and cultural'. The State has played 
important parts in providing vital economic and social infrastructure. Most 
governments provide commercial goods and services notably in areas such as 
energy, transport, communications. - ctc. For instance, in the World 
Development Report, (1987) 
- 
survey -involving a cross-national study of 
countries both in the developed and developing nations 
- 
it was reported that 
governments' involvement in the provision of telecommunication services was 
nearly total (100%) for all the countries. Involvement in other areas arc, steel 
75%, Nitrogcncous fertilizer 50%, Mining 25%, Textile and cement 0%. The 
report referred to above has one obvious implication -the propensity of State 
involvement in the market system is more in some industrial sectors than in 
others. Enterprises that operate in such an area where the propensity to 
intervene is high corresponds to 'type A' as classified earlier on. 
The reason for State intervention, (we arc not elaborating on this), are many 
and myriad usually'rcf Iccting such factors as (a)chccking the excesses of the 
market place, (b) maintaining national presence in some industrial sectors, (c) 
save threatened jobs, (d) avoid over-dcpcndence on foreign sources of supply 
in key product areas, particularly those with wide social and political 
implications, (e) check foreign dominance of the economy, (f) as a welfare 
criteria. It can reasonably be expected that where the existence of 'type A' 
enterprises arc under threat, government would readily offer rescue packages 
to stave off liquidation or cushion out the effects of market failure. The 
rcsult'of all these externalities to the market place is the difficulty'now 
posed, in trying to establish the status of some enterprises based on the 
concepts we have examined. Categorization along the line of public\private 
model apparently appears blurred particularly in 'Type A' enterprises, 
reminiscent of such sectors as energy, telecommunication, transport, aviation 
, 
mining, petroleum, automobile, ctc. For enterprises as classed in 'Type A', 
public interest can not easily be divorced from private interest, and in some 
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economies, are open to private initiatives while in some, they are operated 
as public enterprises. We classify 'Type A' enterprises as national enterprises. 
We use the term 'national enterprises' in a loose sense, without attempting to 
establish a rigidly compartmentalized enterprise class. Industries which 
ordinarily may be classified as private enterprise may qualify for inclusion 
in the national enterprise class, depending on their nature and role in the 
socio-cconomic and political framework of the nation. Their functional 
relevance could be attested to by the kind of special relationship they enjoy 
from the seat of government. Some of them are run as public enterprises and 
those found in the private sector zone may have been public enterprises in the 
past but privatiscd as a result of changing political climate. Enterprises in 
this class may have seen phases and changes in their equity base, from 
cyclical stints of privatisation, through nationalization to denationalization. 
It may look like their long term equity structure is determined by the 
ideological clout of each successive government. However, the crucial point 
is that government maintains a continued interest in their existence, 
irrespective of status. To this extent, they enjoy a measure of State protection. 
In regard of public enterprises, since government controls their equity and 
they in turn "rely on the government to act as bankcr", (Posncr, 1979), they are 
virtually national enterprises. It follows that all public enterprises 
automatically qualify for classification as national enterprises, but we see a 
fallacy if the scope of national enterprises is restricted to enterprises that 
arc publicly owned. This is because, besides the intractable controversies over 
where the public concept ends and private concept begins, and what 
proportion of equity holding qualif ics an enterprise as being publicly owned; 
we do not see how, for example, Electricity supply in Britain is more suitcd 
for public ownership than Gas when both of them arc in the same industry 
and share common market characteristics; or why British Caledonia Airways 
should' dic' while at the same time, the local routes of the British Airways is 
protected. In the case of British Gas, Prof. Well (1987) was emphatic that the 
change of ownership from public to private can not be viewed significantly 
because the market behaviour of the privatiscd British Gas does not seem 
different from that of the previous State entity. Price (1986) also argues that 
even though privatisation was supposed to introduce the discipline of the 
competitive market place, the existing monopoly power of British Gas will 
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snugly insulate it from the chill winds of competition and contcstability. 
Moreovcr, govcrnmcnt'srctcntionof the 'golden share' ensures that no f orcign 
takc-ovcr threat arises. The industry's importance makes the threat of 
bankruptcy equally implausible, " hence the size of British Gas is enough to 
ensure that any threats arc imagined rather than real", (Price, I 986, p. 1 7). 
Herein manifests the case for the national enterprise as a necessary option 
and complementary model of enterprise classification. We have in mind those 
enterprises which are considered or classified as national assets, vital to 
public service objectives and national security, insulated from takc-ovcr 
threats and bankruptcy, (Whitehead, 1983; Pricc, 1986). Examples include such 
enterprises as British Gas, British Telecom, Nigerian Airways, Nigerian 
Telecom. 
It is pertinent to point out here that a good number enterprises within the 
national enterprise concept can be found in the utility sector. However, 
utility per se does not fully explain the national enterprise concept, not only 
because it is non-encompassing, utility enterprises have functional values and 
rcsponsibili ties, cg. 
, 
universal availability, low and affordable prices, which 
make them better located within the ambit of the public enterprise system. 
This is not practically the case. Moreover, we agree with Shepherd, (1975), 
that utility concept is a passing phase. There is no permanent utility industry 
and this may perhaps explain why the provision of gas and 
telecommunication services in Britain have, in theory, been shifted to the 
private sector. 
2.6. 
,A MODEL OF THE NATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
We can not attempt a precise definition of the national enterprise because, 
as already indicated, we do not see any clear-cut compartmcntalisation for 
such a concept. However, we apply the term to institutions whose activities 
in the market system place them on a scale where they could altcr the market 
balance of the relevant industry, and they can not in the light of this, be 
regarded as mcre economic agents. Their relevance usually reflect on the 
nature of their prod u cts/services, ie. where such products are pervasive and 
touches majority of the people, cg., electricity, gas, water; or their activities 
bear on the nations political spectrum in the sense of being the national flag 
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bearer in an industrial sector, eg., Sea vessels, Airlines, etc. Primarily, the 
concern in most cases is universal availability of their scrvices/products 
where they operate under condition of natural monopoly, as in the case of 
most utility enterprises. It is believed that operational framework in such 
cases is to enhance achievement of economies of scale and for cost-bcncfit 
considerations. If the consideration is by the nature of the product they off cr, 
ie., where such products are basic essentials of living, eg., water 
, 
electricity 
etc., they arc said to be at the service of collectivity (Mazzolini, 1979). The 
purpose then would be to serve the generality of the public by providing more 
attractive and cheaper goods or services, without full recourse to the dictates 
of the free market conditions. Our model of national enterprise is thcrcf ore 
anchored in the following criteria : 
(i) If they arc publicly owned (public enterprise). 
(ii) If they were once public enterprises. 
(iii) If they are natural monopolies. 
(iv) If they arc national flag bearers. 
(V) If they dominate the sector of their activities (sectorial dominance). 
(vi) If they provide social/political goods. 
A typical national enterprise may not necessarily exhibit all six 
characteristics. We feel that ability to meet any three of the features is 
enough basis for classification as a national enterprise. We adopt this strategy 
because we realize that in whatever way any of the three features combine, 
objectives and interests other than the free market consideration would be 
called into play, thereby placing the enterprise in a class of its own, with 
special status, obligations, responsibilities and of course, special constraints. 
It is pertinent to throw more light on the characteristic features with a view 
to seeing how some of the enterprises fit into the model. 
2.6.1. Public ownershit): Enterprises showing this feature arc the type 
Posner, (1979), referred to as 'one who sells and buys in the market place, but 
who relics on the government to act as banker'. We do not need to bclabour 
this point, but subject to definitional constraints earlier highlighted, such 
enterprises where the government is the major equity holder are by their own 
very nature, national enterprises. We have already observed that categorizing 
enterprises on the basis of government equity involvement is fraught with 
complications. For example, government equity holding in BT is 48.6%, (see 
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BT Annual Report 1990). This, overwhelmingly, represent the largest single 
block-shareholding but it is not enough to change the private enterprise garb 
of the company. Moreover, inconsistency in government approach leaves 
further problems to be grappled with. This is because there may be moves to 
increase government involvement under one administration, only to be 
followed by a policy of de-involvcmcnt under successive administration. For 
instance, the Labour Party is committed to re-nationalization of both the 
British Gas and Telccom, (sce Labour Party Policy Review of 1989). The key 
test should therefore be concerned with whether the intention of the 
organization is to engage in trade and obtain the bulk or all of its resources 
from trading activities (enterprise concept), as opposed to funds through 
parliamentary appropriations. This test derives from that adopted by the 
Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, (1968). Public corporation that 
meet this test arc, by our classification, national enterprises. In Britain, 
example of such enterprises include the Electricity supply industry, Water 
supply, British Coal, British Rail and London Regional Transport. In many 
countries, major utility enterprises fall into this category. 
2.6.2. Once Publicly Owned This class of enterprises presents unique 
problem in the sense that enduring classification on the basis of their equity 
structure at any particular point in time may be deceptive. This point was 
particularly noted in the NEDO, (1976), studies (background paper no. 2), 
where in the case of France, the report asserted that a great deal of history 
and politics lie behind public enterprise classification and that it is difficult 
for any one to grasp the full variety of the forms, organizations and 
subtleties of all the differences between them. We agree because it appears 
that the crucial issue in privatisation and nationalization options touches 
on the question of history and politics. It is thcref ore no surprise to note that 
a number of enterprises in Western Europe have in their life span undergone 
phases of nationalization and de-nationalization. There is no guarantee that 
history will not run another phase. For example, a privatised enterprise in 
Britain now operating under the trade name of SEA LINK has a caveat in its 
charter 
, 
affirming that government can take over its operations in 
emergencies, (Price Waterhouse, 1987). For the fact that an enterprise was 
once a public corporation creates the impression that such an enterprise may 
have a particularly relevant and special role in the economy. Price (1986), 
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opines that the only serious threat any future government could bring to bear 
on the enterprises would be that of re-nationalization, (see also 1989 
conference resolutions of the Trade Union Congress, TUC, reported in the 
Times newspaper, September 6,1989). 
Moreover, ownership transfers alone have not succeeded in altering the 
dynamics and market characteristics of some of the enterprises. Enterprises 
that exhibit this trait arc the British Gas and the British Telecommunication. 
On the Gas industry, Well, (1987), was emphatic that the manncr and form 
of Gas privatisation in the UK left the Gas industry's rights largely 
untouched and consequently, there is no change in the market behaviour of 
the privatiscd British Gas Plc and the former State cnterprisc, thc British Gas 
corporation. Kay, (1985), made the point very succinct by insisting that as far 
as such industries arc privatised without major alteration to the status quo, 
they cannot be classified as commercial organizations like the private firm. 
To him therefore, the substantive change has not been a change in motivation 
but the f rccdom to raise capital in the private markets. We accept these views 
and hold that such enterprises conform more to the national enterprise 
concept than anything else in terms of classification. 
2.6.3. Natural Monogolics The case of natural monopoly is straight-forward. 
The term, 'natural monopoly', conveys the feeling of the sole producer or 
supplier of a product. In relative term, this is true of most of the national 
enterprises, but in absolute term, the definition has to be qualified. No 
enterprise operates under a condition of perfect monopoly. What obtains in 
reality is that some enterprises may have sole monopoly of a product or 
service line; within that product\service line, there may be no competition 
but when stretched along the product range, some elements of substutability 
begins to appear, and ultimately, some measure of competition. For example, 
British Gas plc holds monopoly supply of gas through pipe in Britain, but 
gas is a form of energy and within that energy range, one finds the 
Electricity and Coal, each of which holds monopoly of supply in the relevant 
product line, but not in the range. Hence, even though there is no competition 
in the electricity market for example, but electricity being a form of energy 
competes with other- enterprises in the industry cg. gas and coal. 
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Natural monopoly features can be found in most utility enterprises like 
Water, Rail, Coal, Electricity, Gas, etc. In many countries, they arc operated 
as public enterprises. In whatever status they operate, whether as private or 
public enterprises, the remarkable feature about them is that they are closely 
monitored and regulated by government. Issues regarding their operations 
receives attention from the highest level of government and the State's 
disposition to intervene for reason of market inadequacies can not be in 
doubt. For reasons of economics of scale, cost-bcncf it argument, creating 
place and time utility, enterprises with natural monopoly features have more 
to grapple with than f rcc 
, 
market f orccs. They arc required to strike a balance 
between public interest and private interests. 
2.6.4. National Flag Bearer Most nations of the world, through transport and 
aviation policies for example, have shipping vessels and airlines that fly the 
national flag in the international market place and governments do 
everything to protect the interest of such ficct. It may not so much matter 
whether the responsibility to fly the national flag is delegated to the public 
or private initiative. In Europe, for instance, all countries have national 
airlines and majority of them arc operated as public enterprises. Britain is an 
exception, whose national airline 
- 
the British Airways- has been privatiscd, 
with the government retaining a 'golden share'. Despite privatisation, the 
local routes of the airline arc protected and it officially bears UK flag in the 
commercial aviation market place. 
The aim of most countries 
, 
through the operation of the national f1cet, 
(airlines, shipping vessels, coaches, rails, ctc. ) may be to promote tourism, 
boost national image, maintain bilateral air, land and sea agreements and 
links with the international community. These considerations make it 
difficult to explain enterprises in this class on the public/private enterprise 
model. The functions they perform pursuant to public policy objectives arc 
without regard to status in terms of classification. 
Cases abound where governments have intervened to save such enterprises 
from consequences of market collapse, to stave off competition or enhance 
their credibility relative to competitors. In Nigeria, for example, the national 
airline, Nigerian Airways, a public enterprise, is the only airline licensed to 
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operate a scheduled flight on the domestic routes but faces stiff competition 
on the international front. The situation is not strikingly diff ere nt in Britain 
where the national airline operate as a private enterprise. During the recent 
buy-ovcr saga of the British Caledonia, (Beal. ) 
, 
by the Scandinavian Airline 
(SAS) and British Airways, the later was aided by the powers of the State 
machinery to take the advantage because it was in the national interest (see 
Financial Times, January 4,1989). The kind of situation as above render 
public/private enterprise classification model grossly inadequate, thus a 
better case for the national enterprise concept. 
2.6.5. Sectorial Dominance The extent of dominance associated with an 
enterprise in a given sector of economic activity constitutes another issue of 
substantial relevance in our model of the national enterprise. Sectorial 
dominance, as a factor, may cause some apprehensions or misunderstanding 
if taken in its ordinary meaning. We would therefore like to distinguish 
between sectorial dominance and market leadership. A market leader may 
have an advantage over competitors on the basis of innovativeness and 
shrewdness in manipulating marketing factors but faces challenge from 
competitors of comparable status. Its exit from the market may not cause 
major disruptions in the market equilibrium. In the case of sectorial 
dominance, the dominant firm simply bcstrides the industry in a colossal 
way. It need not be a monopoly in the theoretical sense of it but certainly 
controls the market in oligopolistic style. According to Shephcrd, (1985), a 
dominant firm controls over 40% of the market share and is more than twice 
the size of the next largest firm. The higher the dominant's market share, the 
closer it moves to being a monopoly. Conceptually, the firm acts like a 
monopoly even though its power over the market is less than complete. In 
practice, the markct-dominant enterprises do not exercise all discrctions in 
the market place. The more the scale tilts towards dominance, the higher the 
possibility of encountering regulatory activities which may serve either as a 
proxy for the market forces or arbiter of national interest. It may well be 
that, like Ramanadharn (1987) pointed out, this accounts for government 
participation in industrial ownership not only in public utilities but also in 
several industrial organizations. British Telecom fits well into this picture. 
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2.6.6. Provision of Social /Pol itica I goods In this context, the focus is on the 
wider, conventionally economic and non-economic functions, including social 
costs, environmental and political objectives. The additional functions are 
concerned with areas where the private and social costs and benefits 
diverge, or reducing externalities produced by the operation of the market. 
Occasion may arise where through public policy options, it may be desirable 
to extend certain services to certain areas 
, 
or deliberate design to make the 
goods/scrvices easily affordable by the generality of the populace, 
particularly where such goods/serviccs are the basics of every day life. 
Example of social goods include Water, Gas, and electricity. It may well be 
that an aspect of an enterprise operation is vital for the attainment of 
political objectives of the nation. Example of political goods are the weapon 
systems, where the automobile industry is activc, (cg. the British Aerospace 
and the nuclear enterprises). From the foregoing, we observe that national 
enterprises play very crucial role in public policy arena and could be used as 
tool for achieving strategic objectives which arc not totally impcllcd by 
market considerations. In such enterprises, equity structure, viz-a-viz, 
ownership may not so much matter, even if one disagrees with the view 
expressed by Kay, (1985) that nationalization and de-nationalization options 
are political imperatives. It is therefore not extremely correct to say, as 
Yarrow (1987) postulates, that ownership ' matters' simply by assuming that 
the transfer of a firm from public to private sector ( or vice versa) will lead 
to a change in incentive structure facing the decision makers. The falsity 
of this assumption has been amply demonstrated in the cases of British Gas 
and Telecom. The point therefore is that certain categories of enterprises 
located within the private sector framework can and do exhibit features 
characteristic of public enterprises and the only way to put them on a 
common scale is to apply the national enterprise concept 
. 
Enterprises in this 
category arc not adequately dcf incd in the realm of public\private enterprise 
model. 
2.7. BEHAVIOUR OF NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
National enterprises exhibit certain behavioral characteristics which may 
help in distinguishing them from other market oriented enterprises. Such 
distinctive characteristics include; 
55 
2.7.1. HighIV regulated behaviour: National enterprises are highly regulated, 
usually having a purposely structured institutional arrangement monitoring 
their activities. These institutional arrangements, which may be in the form 
of a regulator, (eg. Oftel, Ofgas, Electricity Council), act as watch-dog on 
their target enterprises. 
Such structural arrangement is not applicable in the open market system. 
What obtains is a system of general legal framework to which all persons 
, 
individuals and body corporate are subjected. Thus, besides the common law 
provisions of civil and tortous liability 
, 
and perhaps other incidental 
statutes, no firm, except the national enterprise is statutorily subjected to a 
regulator or consumer body as in the cases of gas, electricity and 
telecommunications enterprises. 
2.7.2. Control over marketing. In Marketing theory, some elements of the 
Marketing environment arc assumed to come within the controllable realm of 
marketing management. These elements are classified as the marketing mix 
(the oft quoted 4p's). Management in a competitive enterprise is at liberty to 
decide what price to charge for its products, in what market to sell, who to 
sell to, what distribution network to use, how to inform, educate or influence 
consumers over its offerings. For the national enterprise, the picture is 
totally different. Most national enterprises do not enjoy absolute discretion 
in areas mentioned above, hence the total concept of the marketing mix, 
viz-a-viz, its controllability by management appear illusive 
. 
2.7.3. Orientation to profit: Under a free market environment, the 
over-riding objective of individual firms is to optimize profit level. We have 
to add that all enterprises pursue profit objectives in a generic sense. 
However, they differ in how the concept of profit is operationalised. In 
national enterprises 
, 
performance is not solely evaluated on the basis of 
profit levels. It is usually reconciled to other objectives which may not be 
impcllcd by profit consideration. 
2.7.4. Obligation to surmly. Some national enterprises, particularly those that 
operate under conditions of natural monopoly, usually have injunctions in 
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their enabling statutes requiring them to ensure security of supply of their 
products. The atomistic, competitive enterprises are not subjected to such 
peculiar provisions. Hence each firm can on its own discretion decide to 
withdraw a product line or withdraw entirely from any market segment 
without breaching any regulation. 
2.7.5. Social resnonsibilitv Versus Social obliptation 
Social obligation appears to be a corollary of social responsibility - the two 
terms operate under different platforms. 
Social responsibility applies to the open market system where such acquired 
responsibilities are pursued at the firm's discretion. They can not be cnf orccd 
and can only be attended to by the enterprise only in so far as they aid the 
enterprise in attaining its objectives. On the other hand, the national 
enterprise is faced with condition of social obligation to the consumer. 
Moreover, national enterprises arc highly visible and more susceptible to 
criticism than the open market business enterprise. All or most of the factors 
mentioned above add to shape the behaviour of the national enterprise. 
2.8. PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE 
Events in todays market place give credence to the concept of national 
enterprise. The very clear evidence in most advanced economics is that 
further growth must rest largely with 
, 
and based on new technology 
(Thomas, 1981). In most industrial sectors, there is extensive automation and 
use of new technical approaches, resulting in massive reductions in labour 
which can not be regarded as a temporary consequence. At the same time, 
increased competition not only af f cct the older industries but extend to new 
high technological firms. What the picture portends is that there is growing 
possibility that the State will be over-stretched in trying to cope with the 
consequences and dynamics of the business environment by directly operating 
f ully Statc-run enterprises. Chances are that the State will increasingly lessen 
hold on such enterprises, but without shirking the responsibility of using 
57 
such key enterprises in the pursuit of extra-economic objectives. The trend 
in western Europe is already discernible, following the British example, 
(Walters & Monson, 1981); a pattern that is vigorously being pursued in 
developing countries as well, ( Aylen, 1987). Aylcn further argues that the 
paradox of privatisation in developing countries is that the publicly owned 
enterprises under market control arc likely to prove easy to privatise, yet 
transition to private ownership makes little or no difference to the 
performance of such commercially minded concern. The devolution is 
unmistakably towards the concept of national enterprises. 
It is obvious that although the evolving trend in some developed economics 
like Britain, is for government to embark on privatisation scheme, national 
enterprises will continue to receive keen attention and very unlikely to be 
left to the vagaries and dictates of the free market forces. United States did 
it with Chrysler corporation some years ago and has in the last couple of 
years subsidized two key private enterprises inthe aviation industry with over 
$10b., because the enterprises were considered vital for the nations armament 
drive, (Independent newspaper, Jan. 18,1988). In Britain, the cited cases of 
British Petroleum versus the Richfield corporation over the Britoil; the 
British Airways Vs. Scandinavian Airways over Bcal amply illustrates the 
point. For third world countries like Nigeria, the handwriting is conspicuous 
on the wall. The world economic quagmire has virtually striped the 
governments of enough liquidity to attend to the public services. The 
enormous foreign debts of these countries and increasing economic recession 
does not suggest any likelihood that the governments will be further disposed 
to invest directly in enterprises, particularly in areas where the private 
economic agents can be encouraged to explore. In Nigeria 
, 
for example, 
government has completely withdrawn from making subvcntions to some 
State enterprises. The budget statements, since the past 5 years have 
continually but unmistakably stated that public enterprises must be viable not 
only to the extent of being self financing but must contribute to the public 
coffers. It is therefore no surprise that for 1988 fiscal year, the Nigerian 
government has ear-marked 49 parastatals for full privatisation, 20 for 
partial privatisation, 9 for full commercialization and 18 for partial 
commercialization, (United Bank For Af rica, Monthly Business and Economic 
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Digest, Jan. 1988). It is worthy of note that most of the enterprises conform 
to 'Type A' earlier identified. 
Notwithstanding whatever structure they assume in terms of ecluity base, they 
will continue, for obvious reasons, to reflect the national enterprise status. 
By way of recapitulation, we have tried in this chapter to provide the 
contextual base for the study by delineating the boundaries of the national 
enterprise. In a way, we have tried to 'root' the study. This will be very 
hclpf ul in trying to explore the determinants of management orientation and 
response behaviour towards consumer protection, (we should be dealing with 
this aspect later). As a prelude to that, we would look at the paradigms of 
consumerism, taking cognizance of the fact that consumerism by and large is 
about consumer protection. This is the subject-matter of the next chapter. 
k 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSUMERISM 
-A REVIEW 
3.0. OVER-VIEW 
Consumerism, with its emphasis on the rights of the consumer, has become a 
topic of immense concern for business, government and consumers. Basically, 
consumerism expresses itself in efforts to bring pressure on business 
enterprises, as well as government to correct market imperfections. Its main 
thrust encompasses a multitude of group actions 
, 
concern with problems 
associated with product and price information, fraudulent and deceptive 
business practices, product safety, and in fact, the entire gamut of consumer 
protection laws. 
Consumerism has over the years succeeded in asserting itself as a powcrf ul 
and pervasive influence on business decision making with implications 
virtually spanning across all types of business organizations. The phenomenal 
growth and relevance of the concept undcr-scores the point that issues which 
it addresses have long been of primary concern to people, be they individuals 
or groups. The focus have been on the wide area of efforts to redress the 
perceived inequities of the market place by way of obtaining fair deals for 
the consumer; fair prices, safety from harzardous products, improved quality 
of service, adequate and factual product information to enable consumers 
make, informed purchasing decisions. These issues arc the fundamental 
substance of consumer protection, whether in the open competitive or 
controlled market place. The hall-mark of consumerism is thcref ore to ensure 
better consumer protection. As Mann and Thornton, (1978) argues, 
consumerism, regardless of the plethora of definitions, has always been, and 
continues to be about consumer protection. 
In, this chapter, we shall cndcavour to explore the realm, ramifications and 
repercussions of consumerism as a framework for unraveling the 
subjcct-mattcr of consumer protection at a defined level. Thus, analysis of 
the origin of consumerism, assessment of its nature and scope will provide the 
foundation for developing an objective perspective of the concept. Such a 
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perspective 'will include examination of goals, parties involved, their 
inter-relationships and identification of emerging issues. This review will 
therefore not only help to determine the level at which consumerism in 
national enterprises can be determined, it will offer insight into the dialetics 
of the present consumerist organizations, efforts made through time by 
individuals and groups to ameliorate the lot of consumers, pattern of 
development, changing concerns of people and issues involved. It may be 
pertinent to note that present consumerist organizations did not just emerge 
without the bend it of hindsight. Perhaps, better understanding and proper 
assessment of the past may provide a better framework for appraising the 
present, and also, vital input for shaping up to the future. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Consumerism, like the concept of Marketing, has evolved over time, reflecting 
different meanings at various stages, (Keith, 1960; Bartel, 1962). As a product 
of economic evolution, consumerism has been construed as an aspect of 
transition from a producer economy to a consumer economy; from an 
economy of scarcity to one of plenty; and from a seller's market to a buyer's 
market (Dameron, 1939). Even though the origin and precise meaning of 
consumerism is shrouded in controversy, (Herrman, 1982; Nader, 1982; 
Greyser, 1973; Buskirk and Rothe, 1970; Kotler, 1972), one of the earliest 
adopters of the term was Vance Packard who in the early sixties linked it 
with strategies for persuading consumers to expand their needs and wants 
(Aaker & Day, 1971). Some researchers have tried to trace the evolution to the 
post-war United States, (eg. Hendon, 1975; Carlson & Kangun 1988). This can 
not go unchallenged because consumerism is not a new phenomenon. It dates 
back to the stormy and historic era of the 'Reformation' when reformers like 
John Calvin, Martin Luther, St. Thomas Aquinas etc. engaged in consumerist 
activities by attacking deceptive selling practices of the period and 
consequently, advanced the concept of 'just price' rather than 'what the 
market can bear'. To buttress this standpoint, it has been argued that under 
the medieval economic theory, sellers were not allowed absolute discretion in 
pricing policies. In order to check possible extortion, ' economic speculation 
was frowned at. Consumerism was therefore well under-way even in the 
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medieval time. Perhaps, its wave possibly led Karl Max to propound the 
'labour theory of value', (Garry, 1973). As evidence of consumerism before 
the modern era, one can point to consumer laws such as the Sale of Goods 
Act, the English statute of 1893, which incidentally became part of the 
'Statute of General Application' extended to erstwhile British colonies and 
protectorates. 
Hcrrman (1982); Anthony & Hayncs(1975), who chronicled the evolution of 
consumerism notes that there arc three distinct epochs marking its historical 
development. The first era, the pre 1900 era, witnessed a variety of local 
reform organizations concerned with social problems. The era saw the birth 
of the first consumer organization in 1891 
- 
the Consumer League of New 
York 
- 
which between 1893 to 1903 metamorphosed into a national consumer 
organization. The first fruit of consumerist activities of the era was 
manif cstcd in the passage of the Pure Food Bill and subsequently, Food, Drug 
& Cosmetic Act of 1906. This was a sequel to the publication of the 
hcll-raising expositions in Upton Sinclairc's book in 1904 entitled "the 
Junglc", (Murray, 1973, p. 78). 
The second era began in the 1930's, following the publication by Stuart Chase 
and F. J. Schlink in 1927 of the book entitled "Your Money's Worth", 
sub-titled, " A Study in the Waste of Consumer Dollars". The book vehemently 
attacked advertising and high pressure salesmanship, called for scientific 
testing of product standards to provide the consumer with technical 
information needed for making purchasing decisions. It gave expression to 
widclk felt concerns of the period, and also proposed a consumer sponsored 
organization. The acid test was provided by the marketing in 1937 of 'Elixir 
sulfanilamide', a devastatingly lethal drug. This provided the impetus for the 
promulgation of a wide-ranging consumer protection regulations. In the 
Gallup poll, (1940), which was aimed at gauging the impact of consumer 
organization on public opinion, it was revealed that more than half of the 
respondents favourcd stricter regulation of the market place and 
establishment of a formal department in government to represent the interest 
of consumers. Gallup research concluded that consumer movement had made 
a head-way and likely to continue to grow because of its strength among 
influential groups. 
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The term, consumerism, was not widely used until the 1950's and early 1960's, 
which in essence marked the third and the present phase. In its modern sense, 
the usage reflects concerns with declining quality and poor services in the 
saturated consumer goods market, planned obsolescence, externalities, and 
consumer rights in seller-dominated markets. Consumerism began to be seen 
as a concept that ought to be -operationally defined rather than consumer 
flair-ups, (Hutt ct al, 1986; Harris, 1978; Preston &, Bloom, 1983; Bourgeois & 
Barnes 1979). The present consumerism orientation has been shaped by the 
works of people like vance Packard (the Hidden Persuaders); Rachel Cason 
(Silent spring); Raph Nader ( Unsafe at any Speed); John Kennedy (the 
Consumcr Chartcr of Rights); ctc. 
In the opinion of Bloom & Greyser (1981a), consumerism concerns under the 
present dispensation is different from those of the old in the sense that the 
primary concern in the old was economic while that of the present is social 
as well as economic. Cravcns & Hill (1970), argues that a pervasive force 
underlying the social issues that emerged in the sixties 
, 
particularly 
consumerism, was a general atmosphere of questioning on the part of many 
groups, environment and quality of life became important issues. Much of the 
criticism directed at big businesses alleged misuse of power, lack of social 
responsibility, and adherence to questionable goals. Consumerism began to be 
seen as an inevitable response to the increasing complexity and impersonality 
of the modern society. Hitherto, the focus has been with obtaining the desired 
goods and services but when the supply of these became plentiful, other 
factors began to inf luencc consumer behaviour in the market place, (Craven 
& Hill, 1970; Richardson, 1986). Consumers became more aware of their rights, 
and more than ever before, prepared to assert those rights. 
The changing trend in consumer orientation has been attributed to the fact 
that consumers from the sixties were better educated generally, more 
affluent, had more leisure time, and faced more complex assortment of goods 
and services. Mass communication, particularly television, made them more 
aware of the proliferation of economic goods as well as existence of problems 
related to products and services, (Weiss 1967; 1968a; 1968b; Hcrrman 1970). 
Thus, high level of demand, combined with highly efficient productive 
processes introduced and established the Mass Marketing Concept. Attention 
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of firms became focused on increasing production and in moving goods in 
unprecedented volume. Marketing institutions became less labour intensive 
and impersonal. Integrated consumer oriented Marketing effort was not 
implemented. While the consumer was acknowledged as the focal point of 
Marketing thrust, not enough research was directed at understanding his 
behaviour as a guide to Marketing strategy, (Craven & Hill, 1970). Carlson & 
Kangun (1988) also argues that demographic changes as a result of greater 
labour mobility provides the basic rationale for the scale of the latest wave 
of consumerism, thus adding to the multi-dimensionality of the concept 
approach. 
It should also be mentioned that classical economic thinking contributed to 
the galvanization of consumerism prior to the present cra. Adam Smith, for 
instance, pictured consumption as the goal of economic activities, an 
understanding that economic theory should rest upon an analysis of 
consumption, (see Gill, 1978, ch. 2; Samuclson, 1970, ch. 3; Polanyi, 1944). The 
basic assumptions were: 
a. that the consumer guides production. 
b. consumption is the end purpose of production. 
c. Consumers arc rational and alive to their own interests. 
d. Competition is an adequate safeguard of the consumer interest. 
While these postulates made sense during the early days, the challenges and 
dynamics of the growing marketplace rendered void the basic assumptions. 
As Lynd, (1936) puts it, "... the consumer has never been so free to chose as he 
is today and at the same time so little free, so completely bound as he is upon 
the wheel of an administered market and a commercially controlled standard 
of living. The consumer is free to take or leave under a system in which free 
competition is becoming increasingly unreal". The message thcref ore was, and 
perhaps remains for the consumer to find a substitute for the direct action 
of the marketplace. It is therefore arguable that classical economic theory 
laid the foundation for present day consumerism. It only remained for 
consumer advocates to popularize it by dramatizing the weaknesses of 
consumers in buying, thereby giving impetus to modern consumer movement. 
For instance, Chase & Schlink 
- 
notable consumer advocates 
- 
pictured the 
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consumer as the 'Alice in wonderland' of conflicting claims, bright promises, 
fancy packages, soaring words and almost impenetrable ignorance. In place 
of facts about the merchandise, the consumer was showered with meaningless 
phrases and victimized by the manipulation of demand through the channels 
of advertising, salesmanship and sales promotion, ( Dameron, 1939). Theref ore, 
the stage was set for an assessment of consumer problems. Consumerism 
developed rapidly and its structures became institutionalized. 
3.2. SCOPE 
Consumerism has grown tremendously since inception and has continued to 
show changes in emphasis, focus and orientation. As already stated, emphasis 
at the early stages were directed at dangcrous/unhcalthy products and 
questionable business practices. In the present time, the emphasis is broader, 
encompassing not only the flaws in the marketing system but also the 
inequities in the economic environment, and the quality of physical 
environment. Concerns over inequity in the economic environment have been 
manif cstly expressed through regulations aimed at ensuring competition, price 
controls, fair income distribution through cross-subsidization between 
markets, check on restrictive business practices, and also 
, 
economic and 
social role of advertising have been questioned. On the quality of the physical 
environment, the problems of air, water, and noise pollution 
, 
and other forms 
of externalities are increasingly eliciting sensitive reactions from the public. 
Further more, such areas as institutional reforms, consumer representation, 
redress assistance, consumer education and vigorous enforcement of the new 
consumer protection laws have gained prominence. 
in a generalized form, the present day consumerism is moored in the 
consumer charter of rights as enunciated in the United States by John 
Kennedy in the famous 1962 presidential address, (see Consumer Advisor 
Council, First Report, Executive Officc of* the President, Oct. 1963). The 
consumer charter of rights include- 
a. right to be informed. 
b. right to safety. 
c. right to choose. 
d. right to be heard. 
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The case for the inclusion of the f if th right to the charter has been made by 
Preston (1974), 
- 
right to redress. This entails the right to fair settlement of 
just claims. The fifth right as proposed by Preston, appear to be a 
complement to the fourth right, 
- 
the right to be heard. Taken together, they 
seek to establish that consumers will not only have a right to protest unethical 
marketing practices, but should be provided with the channel through which 
such protests can be registered, listened to, and appropriate or satisfactory 
remedy provided. 
In their opinion, Aarker & Day, (1982), feels that the charter has not gone far 
enough. They argue that the list should be further expanded to include the 
'right to a physical environment that will enhance quality of life'. They rest 
their argument on the premise that consumerism can broadly be seen as an 
organized expression for improved quality of life. However, Holsworth 
(1980), thinks that concern for the quality of physical environment should 
more appropriately be dealt with under the aegis of another facet of social 
movement known as environmentalism. Failure to draw a proper boundary 
between consumerism and environmentalism will result to dissipation of 
consumerism effort and engender a conflict situation between the two 
movements. Mitchell, (I 986) disagrees, arguing that there is no basis to justify 
a potential conflict situation because the two movements have some basic 
commonalities such as shared ideology, common constituencies, broad public 
support, and common enemy. These commonalities will more or less promote 
co-operation rather than conflict. 
Perhaps, the changing orientation of consumerism accounts for the varying 
perspectives on the part of consumerism researchers. While it could be said 
that there is some measure of agreement on the philosophy of the movement, 
there is no such consensus on its definition or mode of operation. 
3.3. DEFINITION AND FOCUS 
There is no doubting the fact that the term, consumerism, has gained 
prominence in Marketing literature. However, its definition has been as 
varied as there arc researchers in the subject. Most of the definitions have 
tried to highlight the various actions and concerns associated with the 
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concept. These actions and concerns have not shown any constancy, rather, 
they tend to be reflective of the developmental processes. It therefore appears 
that concern/action relationship bear on the varying standpoints from which 
the concept has been defined. Due to the dynamic elements of the 
relationship, likelihood of further variations is possible because of the 
changing goals and positions of the forces behind the movement. 
Granzin & Grikscheit (1976), in their empirical study, addressed the 
dcf initional issues in consumerism, the focus of their study geared towards 
answering the question, 'what is consumerism '?. They conclude that 
"consumerism emerges as a cluster of issues. However, most salient appear to 
be the concern for consumer protection. Peripheral are concerns for how this 
protection may be gained" (p. 72). This conclusion positively correlates with 
the views expressed by many a researcher, ( Foxall, 1978; Mann & Thornton, 
1978; Lazer, 1973; Kroll & Stampfl 1986). 
It may not be necessary to examine each individual definition, suffice it to 
say that the variations have been amply represented in the works of Drucker, 
(1969); Buskirk & Rothe, (1970); Cravens & Hill, (1970); Kotler, (1972); Moss & 
Richardson, (1984); Forbes, (1985); Sheth & Mammana. (1974); Greyser & 
Diamond, (1978). The varied viewpoints expressed by these authors give 
insight into the phenomenon referred to as consumerism. However, we 
identify two basic approaches to the definition of the concept. The first 
approach views consumerism in terms of power relationship between the 
consumer and the seller. This has its emphasis on power equalization within 
the marketing system. It sees the consumer as disadvantaged, (Andreasen, 1976), 
cheated, mistreated, a pawn the the chess-board of corporate schernmings, 
who lacks the power to help himself and therefore must be helped, (Drucker, 
1969). 
The second approach looks at the dimension of consumer dissatisfaction. For 
the proponents of this school, consumerism is all about expression of 
frustration with the marketing system, unrealised expectation remedics, 
restitution, and redress for perceived injustices, (Buskirk & Rothe, 1970; 
Craven & Hill, 1970). 
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A synthesis of the above could be discussed from a three dimensional 
perspective: 
(a) consumer charter approach, (b) confrontation approach, and 
(c) market failure approach. 
3.3.1. Consumer Charter Aimroach 
This approach sees consumerism in terms of trying to ameliorate the lot of the 
consumer by giving him more power viz-a-viz, the seller. The framework is 
based on the 1962 declaration in the U. S. Generally, there seem to be a 
measure of consensus over the basic rights of the consumer. However, some 
proponents have tried to expand the scope of the charter almost to a level of 
trivialiality. On the whole, the core issues remain unmistakable, such as those 
addressed by Pctcrson, 1974; International Labour Organization, 1975; 
National Consumer Council, 1977; European Economic Community, 1975. 
Trying to explain consumerism from the perspective of consumer charter of 
rights, though this has been the traditional view, tends to under-rate the 
unfolding complexities of the modern marketing system. For consumerism to 
be meaningful and alivc, it must brace up to the challenges of the market 
place. Some of these challenges have gone beyond the traditional scope and 
inevitably, calls for some kind of rc-orientation. Morris, (1980), is of the 
opinion that most of the current debates on consumer protection is not about 
the basic rights of consumers but rather about the activities which should be 
undertaken to ensure those rights and how far those rights go. This 
understanding may have necessitated the emergence of the school of thought 
which sees consumerism from the point of view of confrontation with 
business. 
3.3.2. The Confrontation At)i)Eoach 
The confrontation approach corresponds to what we earlier idcntif ied as the 
6powcr equalization doctrine'. The maxim here is 'caveat vcnditor' (seller 
beware), as opposed to the traditional 'caveat emptor', (buyer beware). The 
adoption of confrontational stance is based in the belief that consumers are 
impetuously exploited. It has been argued that the enterprise uses its power 
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over resources to induce the naive and disorganized consumers to buyer, 
of ten times, on their (sellers) own terms. It has also been argued that business 
has a virtual monopoly of -the resources available for informing and 
persuading consumers. For instance, Maynes, (1976), posits that in the United 
States, seller-controlled resources for information and persuasion exceed 
consumer controlled resources for the same purpose by a ratio of 5000 to 1. 
The extent of same disparity in the UK has been addressed by Morris, (1980; 
see also Maycr, 1988). These seller controlled resources are paid for by the 
consumer since they are transferred to the market in the form of costs and 
prices. 
Equally, it-is also argued that sellers are relatively few, sharing a common 
aim which is to exploit all opportunities in the market place 
, 
including 
consumers, for the purpose of maximizing profit returns. On the other hand, 
consumers arc numerically much greater in number, individually weak and 
poorly informed. Consequently, consumerist activities are seen to centre on 
reducing the gap between the consumer and the seller, enabling consumer 
organizations to exert countervailing power 
, 
redress the, information 
imbalance, and fight battles on behalf of consumers. The activities of the 
'Nader Raiders' in the United States and some consumer advocates like Raph 
Nader himself represent the driving force behind the confrontation approach. 
3.3.3. The Market Failure ADDroach: 
This approach is based on the fundamental premise that the real market 
situation diverges from the conceptual norms of the perfect market, hence 
the consumer can neither signal the direction of market forces nor 'exit', as 
Hirschman, (1970) postulated. 
We have in chapter I noted conditions necessitating market failure 
. 
Classic 
issues with which consumerists are concerned include cases of natural or loose 
monopolies. Consumerism at this level is of immense importance and has 
great relevance to the management of national enterprises. The philosophy 
guiding the definition of consumerism based on market failure 
considerations could serve as a guide in understanding where the movement 
is directed. This approach sees consumerism more in the political realm than 
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in economic or social, drawing heavily from such treatise as 'countervailing 
power' (Galbraith, 1956), 'collective action' (Olson, 1971), etc. For instance, 
consumerism has been conceptualized as a movement that builds on collective 
action of consumers to provide the countervailing power against the market 
power, in particular of large oligopolistic industries, (Straver, 1977). 
The three perspectives or levels examined above are reflections of the broad 
ramifications of consumerism. Jensen (1986), identifies five levels, 
dichotomized into functional (levels 1-3), and structural (levels 4& 5); all of 
which can be accommodated in the tripartite approach we have adopted. 
Consumerism at the first level operationally focuses on consumcr-seller 
relationship in terms of the Marketing mix. Stravcr, (1977), elaborately builds 
the concerns around the four elements of the marketing mix, the oft quoted 
4p's, (price, place, product and promotions), and of course, Packaging, which 
has been proposed as a candidate for the fifth P, (Jolson 1978, p. 398), (see 
table 3.0). 
At the second level, consumerism expands and focuses on examination of the 
inter-dependcncies between the first level relationships and the social system. 
The tone of the relationship is more of perceived threat, consumers anxiety 
is put in total societal context. The drive to even higher levels of consumption 
is seen as sup-optimization of the quality of life; the imperfections and 
fraudulent occurrences in the social system are seen as eroding the standard 
of living, (Stravcr, 1977). 
At the third level, consumerist actions becomes a tool for political aýtivism. 
A system of political processes arc invoked, often backed by the machinery 
of government. This is the level that should be of serious concern to the 
national enterprise management, and central to this study. 
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Table 3.0: CONSUMERIST CONCERNS AT LEVEL 1: ACCUSATION 
AGAINST THE MARKETING MIX. 
1. PRODUCT: 
-product proliferation. 
-false innovation 
-artificial differentiation. 
-dangerous, defective & marginal. 
11. PRICE: 
-profit maximizing. 
-psychological and fictitious 
pricing strategies. 
-bad price/quality relation. 
-unfair credit terms. 
false price/quantity relation. 
III. PLACE (DISTRIBUTION): 
-cross subsidization. 
-high pressure selling. 
-little in-store service. 
-aggressive merchandising 
techniques. 
-does not weed out bad products. 
-high value added for little 
effort. 
IV. PROMOTION, 
-manipulation & subliminal 
seduction. 
-promote planned obsolescence. 
-causes mental pollution. 
-bad taste and morality. 
-pushes mass consumption society 
to excessive materialism. 
-contributes to inflation. 
-give false values to society. 
-lack of adequate information. 
-increases costs to oligopolistic 
competitors. 
-pushes psychology and not perf orma ncc 
characteristics of products. 
V. PACKAGING 
-causes pollution, dangerous and 
adds to cost. 
-deceitful and avoids comparison. 
-lacks adequate information, 
warranties and service contracts. 
-inadequate description of 
ingredients. 
-product dating. 
SOURCE Adapted from Straver, (1977). 
3.4. ORGANIZATION 
Patterns of consumerism organization are varied, such as those reported by 
Nelles, (1983), in his study of wide array of groups. The major distinctive 
features of consumerist organizations are that their main activities are 
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organized towards lobbying for consumer interests either to or within 
government, or to business. As watchdog of consumer interests, 'one would 
ordinarily presume that they would become active and strong under 
conditions of real or perceived dissatisfaction among consumers, ie., when 
consumer interests relapses or perceived to have suffered reverses. 
Arguments have been advanced to suggest that mass discontent and support 
for social change*do not necessarily produce an active and viable social 
organization like consumerism, ( Bloom & Greyser, 1981b; Zald & 
McCarthy, 1979). For such organizations to maintain viability, they must be 
properly structured to mobilize resources and support, ( McCarthy & Zald, 
1977). Smith & Bloom, (1989) argues that the existence of discontent can not 
be denied. "It is a factor that udcrlics long-term trends and needs, but 
discontent alone is not enough to bring about change". The argument seem 
tenable because discontent alone can not explain the 'cyclical nature of 
consumerism. Consumer discontent was not substantially greater in the late 
1960's and early 1970's than throughout much of the late 1970's and 1980's 
when consumerism was perceived as having declined, or rather stagnated. 
What seem obvious therefore is that having consumer discontent and general 
support for consumerism is one thing, funneling those feelings into actions 
that will create better deals for consumers is another thing. 
Marketing literature is replete with identification and comparison of 
demographic characteristics of consumer organizations in terms of 
membership population, activists relative to age, income, education, social 
class, and consumer activist motivation, ( Bourgcous & Barncs, 1979; Chandon 
& Strazzieri, 1980; Joliber & Baumgartncr, 1981; Thorelli, Beckcr & Englcdow, 
1975; Forbes & Punnctt, 1985). Forbcs, (1985), in a separate study has argued 
that knowledge of why and how interest groups form is fragmentary. This 
could not be a generalized statement because there is a body of theory which 
provides insight into the general motivation of such groups. For instance 
Olson, (1971), developed a compelling set of hypotheses to explain the 
evolution of interest groups. He observed that small groups of individuals 
with special 'interest' band together to provide themselves with collective 
goods ; those goods which individuals not acting collectively arc unlikely to 
obtain. Moe, (1980), and Bcrry, (1977; 1978) built on Olson's hypotheses to 
establish the basis for non economic as well as economic motivations. 
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However, Forbcs, (1985), identified four patterns of formation, viz., (a) 
disturbance, (b) entrepreneurship, (c) purposive, (d) historical; all of which 
could be used to describe the organizational dimensions of consumer pressure 
groups. 
a. Disturbance theory holds that consumer pressure groups form as a direct 
result of an event or' series of events, (Berry, 1977, p. 23). It could mean an 
eruption of concern by persons facing common dilemma. Thus early 
consumerism movements, which organized in response to the vagaries of the 
market place, accumulated dissatisfaction with market and marketing system 
could be explained under the ambit of the disturbance theory. 
b. Entrepreneurship theory holds that a successful, service oriented consumer 
organization , depends on the drive, dedication, selfless service, and 
organizational ability of a particular individual or individuals. Raph Nadcr 
is widely acclaimed as an entrcprcneur, ( Berry, I 977, p. 25). Prof. Carsberg, the 
Director-General of the Office of Telecom meets substantial parts of the 
entrepreneur characteristics as enunciated by Moe, (1980), and Berry, (1977). 
c. Purposive group, as used by Forbes, (1985), describes a group created by 
design to represent interests, often the outcome of interaction among 
consumer groups and governments, the latter being under pressure from the 
electorate or consumer pressure groups to install an institution to represent 
consumer interest in the policy process. Examples include the Norwegian 
consumer council (Rosc, 1981), the 'Bureau European des Unions de 
Consommateurs', (B EU C) 
- 
an association of consumer groups in the 
European Community, (Mitchcll, 1978, pp. 272-273; Shanks, 1983). We feel that 
such consumer groups as the Gas Consumer's Council, Electricity Consumer's 
Council, ctc., meet Forbes (1985) criterion and should therefore be classified 
as such. 
d. The historical groups, according to Forbes, applies to those organizations 
whose existence can not be explained by the theories considered. It has been 
observed that consumer groups emerge and organize in a variety of ways. It 
is widely acknowledged that the environment in which the consumer 
organization functions has a great influence on its structures and operations. 
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Many consumer organizations have the dual functions of influencing both 
business and government on behalf of the consumer. In discussing and 
evaluating consumer organizations and their approaches, Bloom and Greyscr, 
(1981a), builds on the framework of McCarthy and Zald, (1971), to advance 
eight typologics of consumerist organizations. It should be noted that their 
work was based on the environment prevalent in the United States, where 
consumerism is much more pervasive than in most other developed economics 
of the world. Therefore, some of the typologies identified may not apply to 
other environments and do, in some instances, overlap. However, the broad 
categorization accommodates virtually all shades of consumerist 
organizations, and constitutes a very useful platform for performance 
appraisal. The classifications arc as follows: 
i) The Nationals: As the name implies, these include broad-based consumer 
organizations and national special interest groups. Bloomand Greyser, (1981a), 
idcntif ies as nationals some consumer organizations in the United States such 
as the Consumer Federation of America, National Consumers' League, Raph 
Nader's Public Citizen, etc. In Britain, we can say that consumer 
organizations like the National Consumers Council, and the Citizen Advice 
Bureaux belong to this category. Bloom and Grcyser also argue that national 
consumer organizations can be "generally characterized as ranging from 
moderates to liberals in terms of the amount of social change they seek to 
achieve". They typically focus on legislative and institutional reforms; 
consumer representation, enforcement of consumer protection laws and 
consumer education. It is understandable why the orientation of the 
6nationals' should be liberal, or moderate. The sheer size, enormity and 
complexity of interests they represent, and limitations on sources of funds 
could 
, 
to a large extent, be responsible for that. 1ý 
ii) The Fcdcrals: This category has, as its major concern, promotion of 
consumer protection law enforcement, consumer education and redress 
assistance. They arc the central agencies with programmes designed to 
enhance consumer welfare. Examples of 'federal' consumer organization in 
the United States include the Federal Trade Commission, Food & Drug 
Administration, Consumer Safety Commission, Office of Consumer Affairs, 
Office of Consumer Education, etc. British examples will include such 
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organizations as Of f ice of Fair Trading, Monopolies & Mergers Commission, 
Of f ice of Telecommunication, Of f ice of Gas Supplies. 
iii) The Deregulators: The deregulators are regarded as the most conservative 
competitors in the consumerism industry because the structural reforms they 
seek are such that would entail less interference with the market system. The 
belief here is that regulation, more than adding to costs, constitutes undue 
hindrance to corporate initiatives, and that consumer interests would be 
better protected under an atmosphere of free competition. 
iv) The Locals: This category include public and private organizations that 
focus on local issues and relatively serve small constituencies or membership. 
The 'locals' arc assumed to be successful in their endcavours because the 
problems they face arc narrow in focus and often, more clearly defined than 
what obtains in heterogeneous market. In Britain, we prof f cr as example of 
'local' such consumer organizations as Electricity Consultative Councils, 
Regional Gas Consumers' Council, London Regional Passengers Committee, 
etc. 
v) The Co-operativcs: The co-opcrativcs, notwithstanding their legal status, 
generally serve to provide the framework through which consumers can pull 
their resources together to enhance their bargaining position in the intcr-play 
of market power. While some co-operativcs arc actively concerned with 
improving the competitive environment, such as those involved in retail 
selling activities, others promote it as a vehicle for circumventing or 
challenging the powers of big businesses. This is the type of consumer 
organization which Galbraith, (1956, p. 140) says could have organized the 
equivalent of retailers power had large retail buying organizations not 
developed the countervailing power which they have used 
, 
by proxy, on the 
behalf of the individual consumers. Tclecommu ni cations Advisory 
Committees, which arc voluntary consumer associations in Britain whose aim 
is to provide collective voice for the purpose of obtaining better deals in 
tclccom services fit well into this category. 
vi) The Corporates: The corporates reflect a new impetus in the consumerism 
phenomenon. Under the aegies of the corporates, the forces of consumerist 
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activities emanate from within business enterprises. Marketing literature is 
gorged with indictment of corporate behaviour as the source of consumer 
dissatisfaction and consequently, consumerism. In this light, there have been 
research results urging business not only to respond thoughtfully to 
consumerism but also affirming that consumerism could, after all, be 
beneficial and pro-Marketing, (Kotier, 1972). The efforts of the 'corporates' 
therefore appear to indicate business preparedness to compete in the 
consumerism industry. Thus, it is no surprise to note that most big businesses 
now have Consumer Af fairs Departments with employees working within the 
enterprise on behalf of consumers. Of interest in such strategy is the desire 
to provide a form of internal self-rcgulation, resolve consumer complaints, 
conduct consumer education and represent consumers' interests to the 
company and vice versa. 
vii) Anti-Industrialists: The interest of this group centre on obtaining more 
than lower prices safe products, increased consumer information, 
representation, and sometimes, challenging the basic premise of the industrial 
or economic system, and seeking to change the basic structural elements of 
government and economy, (Bloom & Stcrn, 1978). However, notwithstanding 
the approach usually adopted by the group, the name, 'anti industrialist', may 
be a misnomcr, ý contestable, more or less, a matter of value judgment. For 
instance, the consumerist instinct of Raph Nader, during the early stages was 
a subject of abject misrepresentation and was even referred to as a 
Communist, (Evcrs, l 983). It thercf ore becomes a matter of subjective judgment 
to draw a line between genuine consumerist actions and anti business 
activities. 
viii) Re-Industrialists: Cardinal emphasis of this group is the deregulation 
of business and advanced production facilities. The formation and 
organization is based on the 'entrepreneurship' theory already examined. 
From the above classification, irrespective of whether or not one agrees with 
the nomenclature, a very important inferencc can be ý drawn. That is, 
consumerist activities can be formed, organized, and directed from three 
cardinal standpoints. The tripartite structure arc, (a) government, (b) 
consumer and (c) business. 
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3.4.1. Govcrnment-led Consumerism: In this realm, consumerism manifests 
as a political attempt by government to ef f ectuate the doctrine of the 'Social 
contract', (the 'nationals' and 'f ederals' typologies f cature prominently at this 
level). Government recognizes that it owes a duty of care to the citizens who 
arc, one way or the other, the consumers. This forms the philosophical 
premise of a system of political processes in the consumer protection strategy, 
as highlighted in chapter 1. The political machinery therefore aims at 
initiating, formulating and implementing, rules and regulations for an 
ordered, disciplined, and responsible market place. Efficacy here lies with the 
use of paraphernalia of government to achieve results. 
3.4.2. Consumer-led Consumerism: This is exemplified by such organizational 
types as the 'co-operatives' and the 'locals'. A hybrid of factors lie behind 
their formation, which could either be, or a combination of the 'disturbance' 
and 'purposive' theories. The driving force isýthc recognition by the 
consumer that he can do something to help himself, or complement other 
initiatives taken, on his behalf for the purpose of giving him a voice in the 
operation of the market system. More often, the organizations rcly. on the 
ancillary support from government in the areas of funding and 
inf rastructural facilities. Much as they tend to have very audible voice, they 
lack the teeth to bite, and ultimately, make referrals or rely on the f irst realm 
for effective and affirmative actions. This trend does not in any way 
obliterate the potency of their collective voice on consumer policy matters. 
Some of them do in fact exert considerable pressure on business as well as 
government, particularly when they have the staying power. Together with 
the first realm, organizational types in this category manifest the 'voicc' 
paradigm in the consumer protection strategy. 
3.4.3. Business-led Consumerism: In the third realm, we identify 
business-directed consumerist activities. Such activities are manifested in the 
operations of organizations like the 'corporates', the 'deregulators', and the 
tre-industrialists'. ' The sole aim is to compete in the consumerism industry. 
The genuineness inherent in such competition, in terms of protecting the 
consumer interest has been an object of disputation by researchers, (Fornell, 
1976; Hise et al, 1978). Central to the bone of contention is the lack of clarity 
as to whose interests are being protected - the consumers' or those of business. 
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A number of studies have indicated that consumers do not trust business to 
engage in genuine consumer protection efforts on their own, (cg. Louis Harris 
Survey, 1983), and has been accused of 'cosmetic consumerism', (Bloom & 
Grcyser, 1981b), to underplay the real issues. It is pertinent to elaborate on 
the strategies which businesses have adopted to cope with consumerism. 
Three broad strategic options can be identified, viz., (i) actions directed at 
reducing demand for consumerism, (ii) competing in the consumerism 
industry, and (iii) co-operating with the forces of consumerism. The first 
option is consistent with the philosophy of the Marketing concept because 
such actions arc aimed at improving the total package of off crings, taking all 
necessary measures to reduce the causes of consumer dissatisfaction. In that 
regard, business relies on the good intentions and efforts of its marketing 
programme. The second option sees business adopting active consumer af fairs 
department to offer redress assistance and consumer education, or, it can 
embark on funding and co-ordinating activities designed to promote 
deregulation of business and other pro-business programmes. If business 
choses- the third option, it embarks on unrelenting assistance to 
regulatory/consumcr agencies in promoting consumerist offerings. Inspite of 
doubts over busincss-directcd consumerist organizations, it must be 
acknowledged that such initiatives have become inevitable in today's 
marketplace. This understanding makes the role of business in consumerism 
efforts very crucial 
. 
Besides reflecting business sensitivity to the forces of 
consumerism, viz-a-viz consumer protection, it indicates the pattern and 
extent of discretionary management orientation when not statutorily directed. 
It also reflects the effectiveness of the moderating impact of the political 
processes and consumers' collective voice 
, 
as evidenced through corporate 
behaviour. The interrelationships between the three levels of consumerist 
activities identified are central to this study and will thercf ore constitute the 
substance of the next chapter. 
3.5. CONSUMERISM IN MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENT 
A number of research studies have addressed the subject matter of 
consumerism in different political and socio-economic environments, 
(Kaynak & Wiksrom, 1985; Barnhill, Barksdale & Pcrrcaut, 1981; Gacdcke & 
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Udo-Aka, 1974; Peterson, 1986; Barksdale et al, 1982; Perreaut & 
Rodner, 1978; Stanton, Chandran & Lowenhar, 1986). These studies have 
contributed substantially to the empirical information about consumers, 
marketing practices and consumerism in multiple environment. Some of the 
studies, (eg. Kaynak & Wikstrom, 1985; Barnhill et al, 1981; Barksdale et 
al, 1982), have described the relationships of members of the marketing system 
with consumers, consumer representatives or government agencies seeking to 
protect consumers. Strong opinions have been expressed with regard to the 
divergence in Marketing practices and consumerism between developed and 
developing nations. This aspect is of interest to us because our study spans 
across the two divides, the developed and developing nations. 
In the developed economics of Britain, United States, etc., consumerism is 
seen as a challenge in the marketing system. In the developing countries of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, there is lack of solid research of direct 
relevance to the needs of those countries. There can not be any meaningful 
consumer policy without adequate research. 
One question that has not been comprehensively answered is determining the 
relevance of consumerism to developing countries. While some scholars say 
that the development of consumerism is slow in such countries, (Kaynak & 
Wikstrom, 1985), some say it is non existent, (Shcth & Mammana, 1974). For 
example, Sheth & Mammana, aligns consumerism to the promotion of 
consumption welfare in a mass-consumption technological society. They hold 
that consumerism is less applicable to agrarian and less developed economies. 
Consequently, the type of threats from which consumers need protection is 
largely a function of mass production and mass consumption, which is only 
possible in an industrial society. Stravcr, (1977), in like manner links 
consumerism to factors such as the level of economic development or 
variations in economic activity, psychological variables in terms of higher 
order/lower order needs, education, political/lcgal climate, and variables 
relating to the country's marketing system. 
The approach adopted by Stravcr undoubtedly supports the notion that 
consumerism is a non issue in developing countries. Traditional assumptions 
have been that such countries arc still enmeshed with basic needs, low level 
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of economic development, volatile political/legal environment, and 
undcr-developed marketing system. This picture provided the impetus to 
Barksdale ct at studies, (1982), 
-a joint research study by seven Professors, 
with data collected from six countries in the developed and developing 
regions. They anticipated that opinions expressed by consumers in each 
country would reflect 
, 
in a general way, the stage of development of 
consumer movement. Empirical findings did not support the hypothesis. 
While it appears that some countries are generally less critical of business, 
there was close agreement, across board, on many other issues. They conclude 
that " no clear patterns of opinion emerge that would suggest that any 
particular nation would fit ncatly into a particular stage of the consumer 
movement life cycle. Consumers in all countries express similar opinions on 
all topics", (p. 85). However, they note that even though consumers in all 
countries studied show similar concerns, and no clear-cut 
compartmentalization in the consumerism lif e cycle, some countries have over 
the years developed more elaborate consumerist organizations. Kaynak & 
Wikstrorn study, (1985), supports this conclusion. Mayncs, (1979) emphasized 
that no country is exempt from the forces giving rise to the demand for 
consumer protection such as the monopoly problem, inf ormationally impcrf cct 
markets, consumer grievances, under-rcprcscntation of consumers, ctc. In 
response, all countries have taken steps to assure consumer protection, thus, 
" the world may be viewed as a 'laboratory' in which national experiments 
arc taking place as various countries test the effectiveness of their particular 
approaches", (p. 208). 
What should be borne in mind is that 
, 
as Greyser and Diamond study (1974) 
unveils, there is need to recognise that socio-economic conditions could be 
favourable to the development of consumerism. Developed countries with 
improved conditions arc naturally expected to experience a more concerted 
consumerist activities. But, lack of comparable socio-economic environment 
in the third world does not indicate that consumerism in those countries is 
disoriented and consequently, a non issue. The force of consumerism can 
vary with the stage of economic development but to suggest that consumerism 
and consumer protection are luxuries which developing countries can not 
afford (Gacdeke & Udo-Aka, 1974) simply misrepresents the substantial 
issues. For cxample, Hcndon, (1975), adduccscvidcncc to suggest that recent 
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consumerism movements actually began in undcr-dcvclopcd nations which 
have endured more consumer injustices. Disagreeing with the generally 
peddled notion that consumerism started in the United States, he argues that 
" the foreign beginning was not publicized because of the disproportionate 
amount of publicity the United States receives. The US movement focuses on 
more sophisticated issues, and sophistication can not be confused with 
Icadcrship", (p. 23). Joining issues with those who argue that developing nations 
arc still enmeshed with basic needs, hence less relevance of consumerism, 
Hendon posits that it'is actually those basic needs that constitute potential 
catalyst to consumerism, 
- 
" under-developed nations, with their traditions of 
violent protests, have focused on different kind of consumer issues, not the 
sophisticated bait-and-switch that concern the more affluent US movement, 
but instead, on the most basic aspects of consumer concern", (p. 23). 
On a macro level, a lot of developments at the international arena have added 
impetus towards the globalisation of consumerism. The United Nations 
addressed the issues, and the result led to the adoption in April, 1985, of a 
general guideline for consumer protection, (U. N. 0,1985). The guidelines 
represents an internationally recognized set of minimum standards, taking 
particular account of the needs of the developing nations, ( Harland, 1987, - 
Mericai, 1986). Maynes, (1979), identifies four cardinal roles which the UN 
plays in the globalisation of consumerism. They are: 
i) acts as agency for the collection and sharing of consumer protection 
experience 
- 
by maintaining a complete central library of consumer protection 
measures in force in various countries of the world, publications and research 
articles relating to consumerism and similar topics. 
ii) sponsors conferences on consumer protection for legislators and 
government officials involved in consumer protection and consumer 
organized groups. 
iii) sponsors research on consumer protection with special emphasis on 
comparative research, drawing on the differential experience of different 
countries, research important to consumer interest that is not being 
undertaken in particular countries, or research that would benefit many 
countries, cg., less developed countries as a whole. 
iv) sponsors product testing, especially those of multinational corporations. 
Other organizations active in the internationalisation of consumerism include 
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the International Organization for Standardisation, (ISO); International 
Co-Opcrative Alliance, (ICA); International Organization of Consumer 
Unions, (IOCU). Through the efforts of these and many other international 
consumerist organizations, grassroot consumer groups have been formed in 
developing countries, and they are burgeoning, placing political pressure on 
national governments for more aggressive consumer protection, ( Post, 1986). 
What these developments portend is that consumer policy makers in 
developing countries arc looking across national frontiers, to the developed 
nations which they regard as role models for the development of consumerist 
activities in the home countries. Of significance also is the extent to which 
the precursor policy is transferable to the emergent environment. Typically, 
one would expect varying degrees of adaptation in the transfer process 
, 
even 
among developed nations. The level of adaptation can be explained with the 
'life cycle' concept as enunciated in the works of Bloom & Grcyser, (1981a); 
Downs, (1972); Mauss, (1975); Hendon, (1975); and Kotler, (1971); 
-(see table 3.1 
below). Bloom & Grcyscr adopted the product-lifc-cycle model to explore the 
dimensions of consumerism growth, from the introduction stage, through 
growth and maturity, to the decline stage. They are of the opinion that 
consumerism in the US is at the maturity stage. 
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Table 3.1: CONSUMERISM LIFE CYCLE MODELS 
----------------- STAGE 
-------------------- 
DOWN'S 
------------------ 
MAUSS' 
------------------- 
HENDON'S 
------------------- 
KOTLER'S 
------------- 
BLOOM& 
Model Model Model Model GREYSER 
----------------- 
(1972) 
-------------------- 
(1975) 
----------------- 
(1975) 
-------------------- 
(1971) 
------------------- 
(1981) 
------------- 
1. Pre-problem Incipiency The Seller Crusading Introduc- 
stage market phase tion 
2. Alarmed Coalescene The repeat Popular Growth 
discovery, business movement 
_ Euphoric phase 
enthusiasm 
3. Realizing Institution- The reaction Managerial Maturity 
the cost of alization phase 
signif icant 
progress 
4. Gradual Fragmcnta- Bureaucracy Decline 
decline of tion 
intense 
public 
interest 
5. Post problem Demise 
stage 
Straver, (1977) and Barksdale ct al (1982) adopted Kotler's (1971) model in 
their respective studies. Straver placed France and Germany in the first 
phase, (crusading stage); UK in the second; USA in the third; and Sweden 
in the fourth. Barksdale et al, (1982), placed Israel in phase one, England and 
Australia in phase two, United States and Canada in phase three, and Norway 
in phase four. Recognizing the realities in economic and social 
environments, it does not appear that the models, as applied by Straver , 
Barksdale & co., are adequately global in orientation. We have noted that 
consumer concerns are basically the same everywhere, though with variations 
in emphasis and the means available to articulate those concerns. This 
understanding would necessitate that most of the developing countries, 
particularly Africa, Latin America, and South East Asia would be placed at 
the first phase, (crusading, incipiency or introductory stage). Using Kotler's 
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model for instance, which appears to be very popular among researchers, it 
would make no sense placing developing countries from regions mentioned 
above in the same level with France and Germany which Barksdale & co. 
grouped in the first phase. This is a major handicap in the model's application 
and to correct this anomaly, we prof f cr a phase to be known as the 'emergent 
stage'. This phase will reflect the realities of consumerism in-road in 
developing countries. Our revised chain will look like this : stage 
1, (cmcrgent); stage 2, (crusading); stage 3, (maturity); stage 4, (f ragmcntation); 
stage 5, (stagnation & rejuvenation). 
The emergent stage relate to those environments in which consumerism may 
not yet be institutionaliscd, but nevertheless, operational. This is reminiscent 
of most of the undcr-developed economics. At the 'crusading' stage, the 
movement grows rapidly to change business focus from 'buyer beware' 
orientation to 'sellcr beware'. Third world countries belonging here are the 
rapidly growing ones such as Israel, Brazil, Nigeria, Egypt. At 'maturity, the 
movement becomes 'institutionaliscd with business developing elaborate 
structures to compete in the consumerism industry. Countries which in our 
opinion belong here arc Britain, France, Germany, Italy. At I ragmcntation', 
the movement dissipates into smaller interest groups, with sharper focus, 
reminiscent of the situation in the United States, and the Scandinavian 
countries which' arc reported to experience high level of consumerist 
activities. The final phase, according to our model, sees the movement 
showing apparent lull, which may lead some researchers to conclude that it 
is at the declining stage. Decline does not occur in the right sense of it. 
Stagnation might appear imminent but will ultimately lead to rejuvenation. 
At 'stagnation', business will either start to take a lot of things for granted 
or the complex wave of technological developments mayyct again evoke the 
trappings of prod uct-orientcd mass marketing, or new information and better 
intelligence from the marketplace could rc-activatc a new cycle of 
consumerism. Ultimately, consumerism tends to grow in sophistication over 
time 
, 
accelerating as a nation becomes more economically developed. This 
view might be repugnant to some researchers who believe that consumerism 
is generally on a steady 
, 
slow process of decline. Hcndon, (l 975), for instance 
argues that " too much economic development tends to decelerate the 
movement to some dcgrce", (p. 21). We disagree with this view for reasons 
af orc-mentioned. 
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The popularity of Kotler's model perhaps hinges on the fact that it reflects 
current thinking in the literature and research in consumerism. While other 
models talked about decline or demise, Kotler did not foresee any such trend 
because in another paper, he argues that consumerism is inevitable, 
beneficial, pro-marketing, profitable and enduring, (Kotler, 1972). A good 
number of works have adduced evidence to support parts of the propositions, 
(McGuire, 1982; Molitor, 1982; Smith & Bloom, 1986; Metzen, 1986; Richardson, 
1986). Some have argued that the general lull in consumerist activities being 
experienced in developed countries could not indicate decline but 
fragmentation or stagnation because of the multiplicity of consumerist 
interests. 
Greyser and Diamond, (1983), adduces four reasons responsible for the 
apparent lull of consumerism in the United States: 
i) government and business alike have worked and implemented consumer 
protection laws. ii) many companies have established consumer affairs 
departments, and some have added consumer perspectives to their decision 
making process. Over time, these have had an impact on both processes and 
policies. iii) manufacturers, retailers and service firms have made great 
strides in their complaint handling and redress practices. iv) company 
guarantee and warranty provisions have been expanded and clarified for a 
wide range of product and services. 
Whatever the contention, it has to be recognized that consumerism movement 
has not maintained a steady tempo. While it is seen as waxing stronger in the 
developing countries, it is no longer on the offensive in the developed 
economics. The reasons could be that it has become institutionalised within 
government and within business, (Greyser & Diamond, 1983), and business is 
not only adapting to it, (Grcyser & Diamond, 1974), but have developed 
structures to compete, co-opcratc, or seek to reduce its force through the 
mechanics of Marketing, (Bloom & Grcyscr, 1981b). 
The controversy surrounding the state of consumerism has managed to focus 
attention of researchers on the 'why' and 'whcretofore' of the movement. 
Research cf forts have been directed towards unveiling whether consumerism 
is indicative that Marketing concept did faltcr, (Bell & Emory, 1971). There 
are still so many unanswered questions, revolving around whether Marketing 
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did betray its basic philosophy. If it not, some have argued, why was there 
consumerism? Arc the two concepts compatible or opposing forces? 
3.6. CONSUMERISM VERSUS MARKETING CONCEPT 
As indicated above, there is a great deal of controversy in the marketing 
literature as to whether the existence of consumerism implies an indictment 
of the marketing concept or whether the two concepts bear no 
rclationship, (Kotlcr, 1972,1982; Shruptrin & Osmanski, 1975; Sheth & 
Mammana, 1974; Houston, 1986; Benett & Coopcr, 1979,1981). 
The philosophical basis of the marketing concept has been discussed in 
chapter 1. For years, the concept has become so popular and heralded by 
researchers as well as practitioners that its acceptance as the optimal 
marketing management philosophy is almost universal. However, the 
emergence of consumerism has raised doubts over its opcrationality. For 
instance, while Jolson, (1978, p. 81), mildly casts doubts by arguing that 
"marketing concept is so ubiquitous in the marketing classroom that the naive 
student of marketing is generally led to believe that firms who fail to employ 
this philosophy are business criminals", Sachs and Benson, (1978, p. 74), put the 
question more unequivocal, " is it not yet time to discard the marketing 
concept"? What is not yet clear is whether the changing focus could be 
accepted as part of the process of marketing rcvolution, (Kcith, 1960), or a 
reflection of a desire for new value system in the market place, 
(Sandbach, 1971). 
In the class of the dysfunctional proponents, Drucker, (1973), posits that a ftcr 
twenty years of marketing rhctorics and consumerism could become a very 
powerful popular movement, there is reason to suggest that not enough 
marketing has been practiced. He conclude that consumerism is indeed the 
"shame of marketing". Earlier, Business Week had argued that in a very broad 
sense, consumerism can be defined as the bankruptcy of the marketing 
concept. Indicators that the concept has faltered to the point where it is no 
longer an adequate statement were exemplified by the organizational stress, 
excessive costs, and high product failure rate which some companies incurred 
as a result of trying to implement it, (Bcrg, 1970). Taking Drucker's position, 
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Sheth and Mammana, (1974), argue that if marketing is considered as " the 
process of identifying and satisfying customer needs and wants, and the 
desire to make profit, consumerism can exist only if the marketing' concept 
has either not worked or, more probably, not been fully utilized by 
management". Buskirk and Rothe, (1971), opines that marketing concept and 
consumerism are incompatible and that if consumerism existed, then 
marketing concept has not worked. However, they caution about the danger 
of over-generalization, suggesting that consumerism may actually be a result 
of the prostitution of the marketing concept rather than a malfunction of it. 
Kaldor, (l 97 I, p. 19), was a bit philosophical by arguing that marketing concept 
is not an adequate prescription for marketing strategy because it virtually 
ignores a vital input of marketing strategy 
- 
the creative abilities of the firm. 
Kaldor's opinion is not critical as such, rather he appears to be making a case 
for those who believe that if the concept has faltered, it must have been 
applied out of context. 
Bell and Emory, (1971), claim that the concept is entirely operational, although 
the statement on customer o'ricntation touches, on elements that arc 
philosophical in a different context. In their view, the purpose of customer 
orientation is to improve the firm's selling effectiveness, " providing 
customer satisfaction is a means to achieving a company profit objective and 
does not imply 'Protection of the consumer's welfare". Houston, (1986), whose 
research ef fort was aimed at restating marketing concept in a way that more 
clearly shows what it is and what it is not, provides the following 
comprehensive statement of what he concludes the concept is, its purpose and 
how it is, bounded: " the marketing concept is a managerial prescription 
relating to an entity's goals. For certain well defined but restrictive market 
conditions, and for exchange determined goals which are not product related, 
the marketing concept is a prescription showing how an entity can achieve 
these goals most effectively. The marketing coriccpustatcs that an entity 
achieves it exchange determined goals most effectively through a thorough 
understanding of potential exchange partners and their needs and wants, 
through a thorough understanding of the costs associated with satisfying 
those needs and wants, and then designing, producing and offering products 
in light of this understanding", (p. 85). 
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Notice that Houston emphasizes an understanding of the market, but does not 
suggest that products be designed to satisfy market needs. Therefore, 
satisfaction of market demand is important only when doing so yields profit. 
The author concludes that many Marketers have taken marketing concept to 
mean that they should take their lead from the expressed needs and wants 
, of consumers. Consequently, when the limitations of doing so are recognized, 
the marketing concept is criticized, when it would be more appropriate to 
criticize the way in which the concept has been implemented. The author's 
views are consistent with those of Kaldor, (1971); Kotler, (1972,1982); 
Kerby, (1972). 
Kotler's view on this is important because of its centrality to the whole 
atmosphere of questioning regarding the orientation and focus of Marketing 
as a field of study. He argues that even if the Marketing Concept, understood 
from 
--philosophical standpoint of consumer orientation, were widely 
implemented, there would still be consumerist movement. His conclusion is 
that " consumerism is a clarion call for a revised marketing concept" because 
catering to consumer satisfaction does not necessarily create satisfied 
consumers, (Kotler, 1972). This understanding guided his restatement of the 
conventional marketing axioms to societal marketing axioms, emphasizing 
that the objectives of the marketing system is not to maximize consumption, 
consumer satisfaction, or consumer choice, but to maximize the quality of 
life. " Life quality is made up of a person's satisfaction of his basic natural 
needs, his satisfaction with the average quality and availability of goods, his 
satisfaction with his physical environment and surroundings, and his 
satisfaction with his cultural cnvironmcnt", (Kotlcr, 1982, p. 85). Kaldor, (1972), 
had earlier opined that the consumer in many instances does not know what 
is 'needed'. He gave an example of doctor/patient relationship, where the 
patient is highly constrained by his knowledge horizon and consequently, 
dependent on the doctor for expert information and sometimes, decision 
making. Kotlcr, (1972), agrees to some extent because the dilemma of the 
marketer, forced into the open by consumerism 
, 
is that he can not go on 
giving the consumer what pleases him without considering the cf f ect on the 
consumer and the society's well-being. The problem therefore ccntrcs on how 
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to reconcile corporate profitability, consumer desire, and consumer's long-run 
interests. The panacea was to broaden the original marketing concept to 
societal marketing concept 
, 
which " calls for a customer orientation backed 
by integrated marketing aimed at generating customer satisfaction and 
long-run consumer welfare as the key to attaining long-run profit volume". 
Therefore, the message of consumerism can not be seen as a setback for 
marketing, but rather, acts as a pointer to the next phase in the evolution of 
enlightened marketing. " Just as the sales concept said that sales were all 
important, and the original marketing concept said that consumer satisfaction 
was also important, the societal marketing concept has emerged to say that 
long-run consumcr wclfarc is also important, (Kotler, 1972). 
Those views, being revolutionary, have not gone without challenge as well as 
support. The Societal Marketing axiom is a result of collaborative ef f orts, (cg., 
Kotler & Levy, 1969a; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971). The most vigorous challenge, 
particularly to the broadened marketing conccpt, (Kotler & Levy, 1969a), was 
launched by Luck, (1969), 
- 
whose disagreement prompted a rejoinder from the 
authors accusing their critic of relishing in what they referred to as 'a new 
form of marketing myopia, (Kotlcr & Lcvy, 1969b). Prominent works which 
have contributed in shaping up the controversy include those of Lazcr, (1969); 
Dawson, (1971); Fcldman, (1971); Kclly, (1971). 
A casual observer may pass the whole maze of the controversy as mere 
academic rhetorics. The f undamcntal issues go far more than that, with wide 
ranging implications for Marketing. Central to the controversy is the whole 
question of consumer protection, a question which decades of research and 
writing in Marketing have not been able to resolve convincingly, and 
therefore, remains as valid today as it has ever been. The strands of argument 
examined can be put in perspective from three dimensional standpoint. The 
first, hereby referred to as the 'fundamentalists, are the believers in the 
marketing concept, whose basic orientation ccntrc on integrated approach 
with consumer satisfaction as the guiding philosophy. The assumption is that 
marketing programme which is based on promoting consumer satisfaction 
invariably promotes consumer welfare, and consequently, consumer 
protection. 
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The second school of thought, hereby classified as the 'moderates', tries to 
reconcile the objectives of structuring marketing programmes to provide 
consumer satisfaction, with the objective of meeting other of the society's 
implicit demands. The question is not just what will satisf y the consumer but 
also, whether it will be socially desirable. The third class, hereby referred to 
as the 'iconoclasts'. relate marketing to consumer satisfaction as well as the 
entire gamut of social and environmental factors. Here the issue is, if it will 
satisfy the consumer, and it is socially desirable, will it be compatible with 
corporate objectives? To what extent does it accommodate environmental 
interests which will help the enterprise to achieve stability and therefore 
better able to serve the consumer and company's interests, as well as those of 
the wider society? 
From all of the above, it could be seen that the issue of consumer protection 
is far from settled in terms of adequate theoretical or philosophical 
framework. If marketing concept 
, 
for instance, is accepted to have been 
extended to deal with dissatisfactions in the marketing system and consequent 
consumerism, events indicates that there might be some flaws. While the 
perspectives may have provided a somewhat philosophical foundation for 
structuring consumer protection under a competitive market environment, 
there is lack of consideration to the monopolistic environment. Herein lies the 
real deficiency of the marketing concept. Apparently, marketing literature 
has failed to give any indication about the relevance of the marketing 
concept to enterprises that operate in market failure environments. , 
One startling discovery made while foraging the literature is that most of the 
serious papers on the philosophy of Marketing were written before or during 
the 1970's. It would seem as if researchers are giving up on exploring the 
philosophical directions of the discipline, particularly as they relate to the 
application of basic concepts beyond the traditional framework. This aspect 
is outside the scope of our present study. At issue here is determination of the 
extent to which marketing concept can be extended or applied to national 
enterprises. It may well be that lack of desired guideline hinge on dif f icultics 
in defining what constitutes consumer interests. The question is 
, 
do we 
define consumer interests on individual's specific terms, relate it to the 
individual in society 
, 
or the totality of his macro environment? The 
- 
90 
literature at the moment appear unable to provide an answer, hence we 
re-cxamine the fundamental premise of the concept. 
The marketing concept has its base in the concept of consumer sovereignty, 
which in essence is the bedrock of all market-oriented models of consumer 
protection. As a market based model, it is built on a number of 
assumptions, (Rothenbcrg, 1973; Birmingham, 1973). It signif ics that production 
in a market economy is ultimately oriented towards meeting the wants of 
consumers, production is the mean and consumption the end. More 
particularly, market performance is responsive to consumer demand, and 
performance of the economy is evaluated on the basis of the degree to which 
it fulfills the wants of consumers, (Rothenberg, 1973). Despite the fact that 
consumer sovereignty has been associated with a belief in the optimality of 
the free market, its responsiveness to market demands have been found to be 
less than ideal, especially where monopolistic practices exist. Rothenberg 
therefore argues that the concept is " highly ambiguous, incomplete, lacks 
independence, and in order to apply it with precision, a variety of decisions 
must be made which arc ultimately complicatcd", (p. 1 1). These decisions may 
seem to be the bone of contention in all market-bascd models of consumer 
protection, the marketing concept inclusive. Also, if we recall Portcr's, (1985), 
competitive advantage, for example, more decisions would need to be taken 
on the five competitive elements if they should apply to national enterprises. 
In the market structure of the monopolistic national enterprise, competition 
or rivalry among enterprises, if it exists, is at the lowest ebb. Entry into the 
market is highly restricted. Bargaining powers of consumers arc structured 
not on the basis of consumer sovereignty imperatives but on 
collectivc/countervailing actions embedded in political proccsscs, (Olson, 197 1; 
Galbraith, 1956; Hirschman, 1970). 
it is therefore becoming clear that in the market situation of the national 
enterprise, political mechanism, (Voice), will become more crucial than the 
market mechanism, (exit). This is a restatement of the Hirschman theory as 
truism. However, a caveat must be drawn at this juncture. To completely 
accept the above line of reasoning, in all its entirety might be fraught with 
danger, because that tends to suggest that the enterprise per sc would have no 
role in consumer policy arena, other than reliance on directives through the 
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political system. Enterprise discretionary roles, when not directed or 
manipulated through political processes, are as important as the 
institutionallsed collective voice or other regulatory instruments in the design 
and delivery of consumer protection policies. This is a major thesis which 
should be explored in the next chapter. 
3.7. CONSUMERISM : CHALLENGE FOR THE NATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE 
The scope of consumerism is widening, focusing on spheres where hitherto 
less attention has been paid. As already noted, inattention of the full force 
of consumerism phenomenon to the national enterprise is understandable. 
At dif f crent points in time during which consumer upheavals occurred, most 
of the national enterprises were operated as government corporations or 
utility enterprises in virtually all countries of the world with possible 
exception of the United States in some respects. For the fact that these 
enterprises came under the ambit of the State machinery, they were seen as 
partners in progress because of the collective ownership structure. 
Impressions were that the services which they provide can not be provided 
more cheaply or viably without government support. Little attention was paid 
to the fact that these enterprises were propped up on consumers taxes, though 
impressions about their excessive bureaucracy and inefficiency were 
widespread, (Hirschman, 1970, referred to them as 'lazy monopolies'). As 
consumerism grew, and maturcd, (Bloorn & Grcyscr, 1981a), and of course 
became fragmcntcd, (Kotlcr, 1972), people started to question a number of 
practices associated with the enterprises. The resulting effects arc the tight 
regulatory framework in which most of them now operate. 
While the argument rages on as to whether consumerism is declining or 
growing, it is clear that as far as national enterprises arc concerned, 
consumerism is only beginning and the signs are ominous. With steady 
disinvestment by governments, a phenomenon that is following a worldwide 
pattern including hitherto Communist states, consumers arc likely to get 
more wary, and consequently be on guard more than ever before. A new 
realization will dawn on them that the enterprises are no longer symbols of 
collective investment, but now attuned towards serving narrow interests. A 
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new standard of judgment will emerge which will set consumers expecting 
more in terms of efficiency and quality of service. Monopolistic powers of 
the enterprises will also become major issues. Consumers may be driven to 
expect that services can improve if off crcd on competitive basis, hence more 
pressure and more regulation could become possibilities. For example, in the 
Union Carbide study, (1979), it was revealed that American consumers see the 
market place as dominantly ' buyer beware', and expressed great concern 
about corporate powers. They believe these will have important implications 
for the future of consumerism. The views were complimented and upheld in 
the Greyser and Diamond study, (1983); Louis Harris survcy, (1983), - all of 
which contradicted the conclusions reached by Stravcr (1977) who, basing his 
analysis on the works of Diamond, Ward & Fabcr, (1976); Grcyscr & 
Diamonds, (1974); Kangun, Cox & Higginbotham, (1975), ironically inferred 
that : 
i) consumerist organizations operating at the political level are of little 
practical interest to the consumer. 
ii) if consumerists and businessmen arc to arrive at concertation and action 
programmc, they must agree to define consumerism in a non political 
levcl, (p. 95). 
Straver's conclusions show lack of proper appreciation of consumerism 
dimensions and market realities in terms of monopolistic characteristics of 
national enterprises. It can also be said that his conclusions were drawn f rom 
a wrong premise because the studies referred to merely came up with a basket 
of issues which are of concern to consumerists, eg., consumer information, 
health and safety, repairs and servicing, product quality, ctc. These issues are 
as pertinent to the highly competitive market environment as they are to the 
less competitive national enterprise. Besides, the stature, market position, and 
over all circumstances of the national enterprise will make it imperative that 
consumerism at that level should primarily have a political definition. As 
Kotler, (1972), rightly pointed out, " while consumers buy as consumers, they 
increasingly express their discontent as voters. They use the political system 
to correct the abuses that they can not resist through the economic system". 
Even in the atomistic market structure, major milestones in consumerism have 
been achieved through political machineries as evident by the celebrated 
"consumer charter of rights". Therefore, public policy connotations and 
possible consequences of wide consumer discontent poses enormous challenge 
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to the management of national enterprises. The creative, marketing oriented 
management will have to develop programmes or a set of solutions and 
approaches which are salable in the public policy marketplace. 
Consumerism in the national enterprise market place will exert considerable 
force because of some factors which arc deeply rooted and very crucial for 
its success. These factors are: 
a. widespread attention or awareness. 
b. media access. 
c. salable ideas in the public policy arena. That is, shared perception that the 
issues arc an appropriate concern for the government and falls within the 
bounds of its authority. 
d. a believable claim to consumer authenticity, ie., consumer representation 
and support. 
These factors will make it easier for consumerists to muster enormous 
pressure on target enterprises. The result could manifcst through public 
policy initiatives and reviews or more regulation for the enterprises. 
We would not have done justice to this aspect of the discussion if we tidy up 
without reminiscing and casting a retrospective glance at the 'charter of 
rights'. We feel that a lacuna exist, which can be f illcd by addressing the need 
to ensure steady and continuous availability of the prod ucts/scrvices of the 
enterprises in question. We therefore propose that the 'right to SCCUTitV Of 
sut)Dlv, be added to the existing charter of rights. This injunction might not 
be entirely new because some of the enterprises have got such requirement in 
their enabling statutes, eg., Gas Act, (1986); Telecommunication Act, (1984), as 
applicable in Britain. 
3.8. CONSUMERTSM: CONSUME SATISFACTIONMISSATISFACTION 
AND COMPLATNING BEHAVIOUR 
3.8.1. Over-view The dimensions of consumer satisf action/dissatisf action 
and complaining behaviour are certainly intricate aspects of consumerism. 
The first two concepts, consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction, refer to 
consumers' post consumption evaluation and the third refer to the 
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behavioural or action tendencies associated with the process. They belong to 
relatively new and emerging field of research in Marketing. Interfaces with 
consumerism, though at present under critical scrutiny, have not been fully 
established. What is known at the moment is that consumer dissatisfaction 
instigatcs consumerism, hcnce research evidence suggests a positive 
correlation between consumer dissatisfaction and consumerism, ( Kaynak & 
Wikstrom, 1985; Wikstrom, 1979; Barksdale & Pcrrcault, 1980). 
Conceptually, an exchange relationship which exists between business and 
consumer leads to a post consumption state of either satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction on the part of the consumer. Where the consumer is 
dissatisfied, he expresses his dissatisfaction through a myriad of bchavioural 
patterns such as personal persuasion by way of claims, threats of 
unfavourable word-of mouth, termination of patronage, collective pressure 
as in consumer action groups or institutional coercion involving government 
agency investigation. Consumers who can not obtain redress through any of 
these means pushes further into the realm of political process by invoking the 
intervention of some type of legislative body. As a consumer voter, he will be 
quite willing to support any legislative initiatives designed to correct those 
factors perceived as causing dissatisfaction. Consumers' recourse to political 
activism can result to regulatory intervention, increased satisfaction based on 
improved corporate behaviour, or it can fail to accomplish anything, thereby 
adding to his dissatisfaction particularly if business chooses to mount a 
counter attack through 'cosmetic consumcrism', (Bloom & Greyscr, 1981a; 
Rcnoux, 1983). 
From the above, we can see that consumerism has two dimensions, marketing 
challenge dimension and political activism dimension. Both arc oricntcd 
towards reducing sources of dissatisfaction. It should also be noted that these 
two dimensions are in keeping with the premise developed in chapter I- the 
broad theoretical framework guiding marketing decisions on consumer 
protection policies. It would therefore appear that enterprise management 
which is desirous of avoiding confrontation with consumer groups must take 
steps to either diminish consumer dissatisfaction or promote consumer 
satisfaction, using the elements of the marketing mix. The difficulty, as 
pointed out, is that some dissatisfactions have their origin from outside the 
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marketing system 
- 
such as those arising from conditions involving the 
economy, social problems, ecology, politics, philosophy, etc., (Renoux, 1983). 
Bearing in mind that these arc uncontrollable factors of the marketing mix, 
the question that ariscs is whether enterprise management should target 
consumer protection strategies at reducing consumer dissatisfaction or 
promoting consumer satisfaction. Could the pursuit of one objcctivc, (eg. 
reducing dissatisfaction) lead to the attainment of the other, (promoting 
satisfaction) ? Answer to this question is important because the concepts are 
much entangled with the concept of consumer protection. This is true because 
whatever strategy management comes up with, it must be result-oricnted 
communicated and felt as such by consumers. Moreover, management must 
be sure that it goes about it the right way hcncc the need to make a 
determination as to whether it is dissatisfaction minimization or satisfaction 
maximization that could optimize management efforts. 
What is not in doubt among researchers is a recognition that recent interest 
in measuring consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction appear to be largely 
a direct result of the dramatic growth in consumerism movement. The 
increased militancy and yearnings for better consumer protection have made 
all the parties in the market place more aware of the existence of wide 
spread dissatisfaction with goods and services. The enormity of data 
reflecting specific consumer concerns have provided major input to policy 
initiatives and programme design by governmental agencies involved with 
consumer protection. 
3.8.2. CONCEPTUALISATION From available literature on consumer 
satisf action/dissatisf action, we notice that major approaches have been to 
view the concepts as two extremes on the consumer evaluation scale, ic., 
consumption experience evaluated on the basis of whether the consumer is 
satisfied or not satisfied, ( Hunt, 1977; Aillo, Czcpiel & Roscnbcrg, 1977; 
Singh, 1988; Warland, Hcrman, & Willits, 1975; Gilly, 1987; Jacoby & Jaccard, 
198 1; Fornell &Westbrook, 1984). There is one major flaw in adopting such an 
approach. Catering to consumer satisfaction may not necessarily create a 
satisfied consumer, if satisfaction is taken to mean the direct opposite of 
dissatisfaction. We have noted earlier that there could exist possibilities of 
dissatisfaction arising from factors outside the marketing mix and some of 
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these factors may not readily be under the control of management, at least in 
the short-run. While advancing the axioms of societal marketing concept, 
Kotler, (1982, p85), argues that the objective of the marketing system is not to 
maximize consumption, consumer choice or consumer satisfaction, but to 
maximize quality of lif c., By this reasoning, quality of lif c is maximized when 
those factors militating against it arc minimizcd. By implication, ' quality of 
life is value-ladcn, much as consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction. 
To explore this strand of argument, we can relate consumer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction to aspects of organizational theory, particularly, the Herzberg 
ct al (1959) 'two factor' theories. Applied in the manner of the two factor 
theories 
- 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, (hygicne factors) 
- 
it could be 
argued that the two concepts are mutually exclusive, ic., somewhat 
independent of each other. Those factors that cause dissatisfaction would be 
regarded as different from those that result to satisfaction. Hencc, 
satisfaction may not mean absence of dissatisfaction 
- 
one can feel no 
dissatisfaction and yet not satisfied. This is the basis of our second thesis. 
Herzberg's model is basically a motivational one, applied to job satisfaction 
and job enrichment. Even though research efforts in consumer satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction and complaining behaviour arc still in their infancy stage 
, 
it 
would be interesting to see how appropriately the model can apply in 
consumer research. For instance, Herzberg, (pp. 143-146), idcntif ics two group 
of factors which could contribute to employee dissatisfaction and those that 
arc satisficrs. They include such factors as company policy, pay, working 
conditions, relation with supervisors and peers (for dissatisf icrs 
- 
the hygiene 
factors); and achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility (for 
satisfiers 
- 
motivators). The argument is that while it is possible that the 
hygiene factors may not directly motivate, they must be present otherwise a 
state of tension leading to dissatisfaction will arise. It is conceivable that 
within the marketing system, such measures could apply. The groundwork has 
been initiated with the conccptualisation of the index of consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisf action measures developed by Pfaff, (1972). The author 
acknowledged that consumerism could be a manifestation of consumer 
dissatisfaction and that the index will therefore serve as a monitor of 
9consurner restlessness or outright revolt', (p. 713). 
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In the context of the national enterprise marketplace, we can think of the 
index of consumer dissatisfaction to include such factors as complaint 
handling, consumer representation, consumer information, consumer 
education, corporate accessibility, redress assistance. Satisfaction index will 
basically include elements of the marketing mix such as product quality, 
availability, price and those elements that go into the creation of place and 
time utility. 
3.8.3. CONSUMER SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION AS CORRELATES 
OF EXPECTATION CONFIRMATION /DISCONFI R MATT ON 
A considerable amount of empirical research on consumer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction havedealtwith the two concepts in terms of confirmation and 
disconfirmation of expectations, ( Cardozo, 1965; Olshavsky & Millcr, 1972, - 
Anderson, 1973; Andrcascn, 1977; Wcstbrook, Ncwman, & Taylor, 1978; Bearden 
& Tccl, 1983; Day, 1976,1984). Consumer's level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction is related, to the extent to wfiich he feels that his prior 
expectations have been confirmed or disconfirmcd in the consumption 
process. The strength of, those feelings relate to the magnitude of the 
difference between perceived performance of the product and the level of 
expectation with which the consumer entered the consumption process. Thus, 
the outcome of evaluation process could be one of a three dimensional 
possibility, that is : 
i) the performance of the product is exactly as expected. 
ii) better than expected. 
iii) worse than expected. 
Performance may not only be evaluated on the basis of the core product 
alone, but the total product concept, including the delivery process. If result 
of the evaluation process tilts in favour of (i) or (ii) above, it indicates a 
favourablc feeling but if the experience leads towards (iii), it indicates 
unfavourablc feeling or dissatisfaction, (Day & Landon, 1977). 
Howard and Sheth, (1969), suggest that the costs or sacrifices provide a frame 
of reference for evaluating any gap between expectation and perceived 
performance, and therefore defines consumer satisfaction as the " state of 
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being adequately or inadequately rewarded in a buying situation for the 
sacrifices he has undergone", (p. 145). Conceptualizing consumer satisfaction 
in terms of confirmation or disconfirmation of expectation leaves 
unanswered a number of questions, particularly in regard of expectation 
levels. Cardozo, (1965), one of the leading researchers in the field, contends 
that effort is a key determinant in predicting consumer's reaction to 
dif f crences between expectation and pcrf ormancc. If ef f ort expended in a 
consumption process is low, evaluation of possible reward will be low, ic., low 
expectation and vice vcrsa. This view does not appear to be very helpful in 
designing corporate strategies. Measures of expectation could vary with time 
and environmental factors. For instance, expectation measured or gauged 
retrospectively will draw a lot from consumer's subconscious and such 
variables that may not have much to do with the present purchase than 
expectation measured post-purchasc. Precisely how expectation inf luencc the 
evaluation process is not yet well articulated as efforts so far made, 
(Cardozo, 1965; Andcrson, 1973; Day & Landon, 1977), have tcnded to draw 
more from Psychological realm. 
One of the most comprehensive approaches have, bccn advanced by Day & 
Landon, (1973), drawing from the Psychological theories of (i) cognitive 
dissonance, (ii) contrast, and (iii) assimilation contrast. Cognitive dissonance 
predicts that when expectations arc disconfirmcd, a state of psychological 
tcnsion will arise which leads the consumer to adjust his perception to 
conf orm with his expectation. The 'contrast' theory suggest that a discrepancy 
between expectation and performance will be magnif icd such that deviation 
from expectation level will tend to show greater intensity on the positive or 
negative side 
, 
depending on the actual level of performance. The 'contrast' 
theory is at the opposite end of cognitive dissonance. The third, 'assimilation 
contrast' stirs a middle, course between the two contrasting theories. It 
predicts that at moderate levels of disconfirmation of expectation, the 
difference will be assimilated, but at higher levels the difference will be 
magnificd, (Day & Landon, I 977, p. 427). This brings into focus the notion of 
'latitude of acceptance' and 'latitude of rejection'. The difference between 
expectation and performance could be assimilated only when it falls within 
the consumer's latitude of acceptance, outside of which the consumer is more 
likely to magnify it, thus leading to intense dissatisfaction. Once a negative, 
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disconfirmation of expectation falls below the consumer's latitude of 
acceptance and consequently a feeling of dissatisfaction, some kind of 
behavioural patterns may be observable, ( complaint behavioury. 
Before delving into aspects of complaining behaviour, we would like to point 
out an alternative paradigm for explaining consumer satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction paradox, based on utility theory and welfare economics, 
(Andcrson, 1973; Warland ct al, 1975; Pfaff, 1972). The consumer is viewed as 
a rational decision maker whose objective is to maximize his total utility or 
overall satisfaction. This approach accepts the consumer's own perception of 
his degree of satisfaction as the appropriate measure of his utility. " Since no 
convenient aggregate measure of utility exists that provides an easy and 
reasonably unambiguous measure of satisfaction, consumer's opinion had to 
be pursued on the subject. An index or a profile of indices has to be based on 
their own avowed satisfaction", (Pfaff, 1972, p. 715). The approach proposes a 
basket of indices which may be used in monitoring and evaluating the 
dynamics of consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction. For studies utilizing 
this approach, the difficulties in opcrationalising and assessing 'utility' have 
been avoided by measuring the subjective surrogates of consumers avowed 
satisfaction, (Day & Landon, 1977). Warland ct al, (1975) argues that " neither 
verbal expression nor complaint actions by themselves arc sufficient as 
measures of consumer satisfaction. It is important to know not only who has 
negative attitude towards business practices, but also whether they take any 
action as a result of their displeasure", (p. 150). They conclude that consumers 
who are dissatisfied may not complain, and even those who complain arc 
probably not the only ones who arc dissatisf icd. Thcrcf ore, consideration or 
both attitude and behaviour are necessary to provide a more complete prof ilc 
of dissatisfied consumers, which of course will also expand the scope of 
consumerism. What emerges so far is the realization that the causes, cure or 
alleviation of consumer dissatisfaction onone hand, and credible, empirically 
validated strategies for attainment of optimum satisfaction on the other hand 
have remained issues far from settled. The trend among consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction researchers is to work from outside the market 
place for plausible solutions. Following the tradition of Cardozo, (1965), and 
Anderson, (1973); Shcrf, (1977) advances the 'need hierarchies' perspective 
-a 
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combination of Maslowls, (1943), thcory of needs and Aldcrfcr's, (1969), E. R. G. 
theory, (ic., Existence, Relatedness, and Growth), to propose that a 
dissatisf icd need remains a powcrf ul motivator for both desire and behaviour. 
Thus, the less the need is satisfied, the stronger will be the desire or greater 
craving in terms of means for its gratification. Therefore, an anchoring 
point for very practical and concrete countcr-actions to halt the otherwise 
growing movement of dissatisfaction is to approach the issue from 
consumer's need level because "a dissatisfied person is a symbol of a 
dissatisfied socicty", (Schcrf, 1977, p. 107). Schcrf concludes that consumerism's 
past concern with economic welfare have been somewhat successful in 
providing 'better deals' but none of the present cndcavours have yet had any 
noticeable impact on the general level of satisfaction among consumers. The 
panacea therefore will be to "expand the activities of various consumer 
oriented institutions and organizations into new, hitherto unexplored areas 
of interpersonal relationships", (p. 107). 
Scherf's propositions have not gone without challenge. lmkamp, (1977), for 
example, argues that Scherf presents as a paradoxical fact what is so far 
nothing more than a general assumption; and that there is no basis for 
empirical tests because of inherent methodological difficulties. There have 
been objections also regarding the idea that higher level of consumer 
satisfaction should be the main goal of consumer policy. This perspective 
would tcmpt one to ask what should be the primary goal of consumer policy. 
If it is not higher consumer satisfaction, then it should be diminishcd 
consumer dissatisfaction. Perhaps, a clearer perspective could be obtained 
when considered alongside the aspect of consumer complaining behaviour. 
Understanding what happens af ter consumption experience is as f undamcntal 
as understanding the process that leads to satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
, 
all 
of which arc vital ingredients in the design and delivery of appropriate 
consumer policy. 
3.8.4. INTER-RELATIONS"IP WITH CONSUMER COMPLAINING 
BEHAVIOUR 
The study of consumer complaint and complaining behaviour have in the 
recent past emerged as a very crucial field of research in Marketing, and 
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have been receiving increasing attention from both researchers as well as 
practitioners, (Bearden & Tcel, 1983; Business Week, 1984; Resnik & 
Harmond, 1983; Richins, 1983; Day, 1984). A wide array of topics have 
elaborately been researched, such as those who complain, (Barnhardt, 1981; 
Forncll & Wcstbrook, 1979; Lieficld, Edgecomb & Wolfc, 1975), what they 
complain about, ( Day & Ash, 1979; Kclly, 1979), how they express their 
dissatisfaction, ( Best & Andrcascn, 1977; Mason & Himcs, 1973; Warland & 
Othcrs, 1975), what factors cause consumers to complain, (Landon, 1977; 
Granbois, Summcrs & Frazier, 1977; Langmcycr & Langmeycr, 1980); what 
happens after complaint, how organizations respond to complaints and how 
complainant's subsequent attitude and behaviour are affected, (Gilly, 
1979,1987; Kendall & Russ, 1975). 
Inspite of the amount of literature available on consumer complaining 
behaviour, its dcf inition is still shrouded in controversy. We shall not concern 
ourself with the definitional or taxonomical issues. They have been 
elaborately addressed in the works of Day, (1980); Landon, (1980); Day & 
Landon, (1979); Jacoby & Jaccard, (1981). There is however across-the-board 
consensus that consumer complaining behaviour is triggered off by some 
feelings or emotions of perceived dissatisfaction, (Day, 1984; Landon, 1980; 
Singh, 1988). Without perceived sense of dissatisfaction, consumer's response 
can not qualif y as complaint, (Jacoby & Jaccard, l 98 1). It is common place f or 
people to assume that defects associated with products arc the main sources 
of complaints. Jacoby and Jaccard, (1981), explains that complaining 
behaviour is a function of more than just perceived product defect. It is a 
complex function of many variables, including product dissatisfaction, 
reputation of the manufacturer or retailer, case of access, willingness to 
provide redress 
, 
perceived intcnsionality 
, 
personality characteristics of the 
consumer, consumers attitude and motives, value of item, consumers level of 
information, socio-dcmographic factors, importance of the situation and 
prevailing social norms, (p. 1 8). Ultimately, if consumer complaining behaviour 
conveys an expression of dissatisfaction, it is a manif cstation of consumerism. 
Complaint behaviour enables the organization to assess its consumer policy 
package and provide the opportunity to satisfy unhappy consumers. To be 
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able to provide solution to consumer problems, the organization will bear in 
mind that complaint actions by themselves may not be an adequate gaugc of 
the extent of dissatisfaction. It is important that the types of action 
consumers take as a result of displeasure be kept in perspective. Warland ct 
al, (1975), delineates three consumer dissatisfaction-action groups: (a) upset 
- 
action group, (b) upset no 
- 
action group, and, (c) not upset group. Groups (a) 
and (b) arc of great relevance to an organization because they constitute the 
driving force behind consumerism. 
The distinctive characteristics of consumer action groups have been profiled 
by Millcr, (1970); Liefield et al, (1975); Anderson et al, (1972). Thus, by 
classifying consumers on the basis of negative reactions to treatment in the 
market place and their subsequent actions, a new profile of dissatisfied 
consumers emerges: the dissatisfied consumcr-activists and dissatisf icd passivc 
consumers. They differ in methods employed to express consumption 
displeasure. For instance, while the dissatisfied activist consumer will engage 
in pervasive consumerism, the dissatisfied passive consumers will adopt a 
fatalistic attitude towards their plight. and in frustration, they direct their 
anger towards the system, viewing both the business and government in very 
negative terms. Ilowevcr, despite variations in strategies for expressing 
dissatisfaction, the groups are similar in their perception of consumers' 
problems and needs. " Both of these groups are significantly more interested 
in consumerism, are more likely to believe that consumcrs need morc 
protection and are more negative about busincss, (Warland ct al, 1975, p. 155). 
Thus, the negative perception appear to be part of the broader pattern of 
dissatisfaction with the marketing system and interest in consumerism. 
Of importance therefore is a determination of what business should do to 
show that it is genuinely concerned with consumer protection, particularly in 
the not-too-compctitive market environment where the consumer is deemed 
incapable of protecting himself as an individual. Should it be more 
appropriate for the enterprises to promote consumer interest by pursuing 
maximization of consumer satisfaction objective or alternatively, minimizing 
consumer dissatisfaction objcctivc? 
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3.8.5. SATISFACTION MAXTMTZATION OR DISSATISFACTION 
MINIMIZATION 
From what has been said about consumer satisfaction, it does appear that 
satisfaction maximization strategy concentrates on dealing with consumer 
complaints, particularly the voiced complaints communicated to business. 
There is a lot or pcrcimism regarding how much business knows about 
variations in consumer complaints and techniques for handling them, in spite 
of the fact that in Kendall and Russ study, (1975), Resnik ct al (1977), it was 
revealed that very high proportion of complaints communicated to business 
were responded to. Strategies that promote maximization of consumer 
satisfaction objective deals with manifested problems. On the other hand, 
dissatisfaction minimization strategies tend to look at the subtcrrancan 
sources of the problem and tries to nick them in the bud. This is the substance 
of our third thesis which should be explored further. 
One important finding of Warland ct al study, (1975), is that the volume of 
complaints received by the enterprise can not be regarded as a true measure 
of consumer dissatisfaction. A good number of research findings have also 
provided empirical evidence suggesting that the proportion of voiced 
complaint, particularly those communicated to business is just a tip of the 
iceberg because overwhelming majority of consumers belong to the 
upsct-no-action group, (Gilly, 1987; Jacoby & Jaccard, 1981; Singh, 1988; Day & 
Landon, 1977; Furnel & Wcstbrook, 1984). As pointed out earlier, this group 
tend to carry their dissatisfaction from a particular situation to a general. 
Hence Schcrf, (1977) conclude that a dissatisfied consumer is, more or less, a 
reflection of a dissatisfied society. This has wide implication for business, 
especially the national enterprise because such feeling call into play so many 
factors with public policy undcr-pinnings. This is a truism if the role of 
government is construed primarily as the promotion of the citizens' welfare, 
who arc in another word, the consumers. The situation gets more glaring 
where the market structure is such that consumer's choice is highly restricted. 
As Robin and Rcidcnback, (1987) argues, business is a subset of a wider social 
activity and depends on prevailing social morality in order to exist. "Society 
created the concept of the corporation and has the capacity, and apparently 
the will, to change it in any way it deems suitable. If moral consideration do 
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not become a greater part of business practice, society, through its 
legislations, is likely to continue to impose corrective mcasures", (p. 48). Thus, 
the issue of consumer dissatisfaction has to be of great concern to the 
management of national enterprises, otherwise, the price will be too high in 
terms of consumerist legislations. It would seem appropriate therefore for the 
enterprises to develop methods to make themselves more accessible to 
consumers, and encourage them to register their complaints 
, 
especially the 
passive consumers who arc potentially untapped source of support for those 
involved in consumer activism, (Warland & Othcrs, 1975). 
Andreasen, (1977), argues that the choice between maximization of 
satisfaction and minimization of dissatisfaction depends on philosophical 
issues, particularly where government agencies arc involved. In such a casc, 
the objective or consumer policy may be to carry out a role that minimizcs 
abuses in the marketplace, and protect consumers who can not realistically 
protect themselves. Minimization objective may be chosen for the practical 
reason that consumer satisfaction objective is an elusive goal because 
individual aspiration and expectations vary and constantly changing, hence 
it may be difficult to try to conceive making all consumers fully satisfied. 
Another set of problems associated with the maximization objective lics with 
measurement of what consumer satisfaction consists or should consist of. It 
is not settled whether the measures should be targeted at consumers subjective 
appraisal of their state of 'well off' 
, 
or develop measures of purchase 
performance, which in any case may still largely rest on personal 
idiosyncrasies. Judgment is affected by individual standards and 
expectations, which arc too personal to each individual. 
As opposed to the concept of satisfaction, dissatisfaction occur because the 
consumer believes that there could be flaws with the design or delivery of the 
offerings. Anderson, (1977), demonstrates that this initial reaction could be 
scaled. This therefore suggest that measures of dissatisfaction may be more 
objective than those of satisfaction. However, the choice between the 
strategies involve some philosophical and practical issues which each 
enterprise is at best to assess. For enterprises that arc at the 'service of 
collcctivity', (Mazzolini, 1979), it would appear that genuine consumer 
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protection could be anchored on the objective of minimizing dissatisfactions, 
rather than maximizing satisfaction. This strand of argument will be f urthcr 
explored. 
In summary, this chapter explored the broad ramifications of consumerism 
and tried to locate the level at which it can be defined in the national 
enterprise. By and large, it was clear that the hall-mark of consumerism is to 
ensure better consumer protection, whether in the competitive or monopolistic 
market situations. Pursuant to achieving better protection for consumers in 
less than effectively competitive market environment, a number of decisions 
have to be made, such as strategies to adopt, framework upon which the 
strategies can be based, objectives guiding those strategies, etc. These decision 
areas need to be more closely examined in order to evolve an action oriented 
model of consumer protection 
- 
this is the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IN NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
4.0. OVER-VIEW 
In this chapter, we shall attempt to develop a model that captures the 
fundamental configuration of Hirschman's (1970) theory. The model will be 
used to explore more succinctly the taxonomy of consumer protection in the 
national enterprise and intcr-relationships between market and political 
processes. The purpose is to explain how they bear on management decisions. 
Ostensibly. research studies of this nature should aim at improving 
managerial practices and consequently, management cf f ectiveness. 
Incidentally. researchers who have studied the subject matter of consumer 
protection have not provided any guide for management, particularly in the 
realm of the national enterprise. Therefore, action oriented theory of 
consumer protection is not only long over-duc but will provide the vital 
framework upon which management decisions can be based. 
Our concern here is to look at consumer protection as a management variable. 
It is a variable that 
, 
if properly understood, management could manipulate 
to achieve different goals such as establishing corporate credibility, mold 
consumer confidence in the enterprise objectives, achieve stability, attract 
less regulation, etc. From earlier discussions, it would be inferred that 
consumer protection is a dependent variable, whose behaviour is affected by 
variations in management practices and a myriad of other factors external to 
the organization. This makes it imperative that in order to design or evolve 
a viable consumer policy, certain decisional areas must be addressed, such as 
ascertaining what the concept means to managers, how it is measured, their 
level of sensitivity to it, and what managerial actions demonstrate such 
sensitivity. 
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4.1 DEFINITION 
A sound consumer protection policy, given the circumstances of the national 
enterprise, will evolve from proper evaluation of what it should comprise of 
and what it should seek to achieve. This is necessary because, as attested to 
by Harvey and Parry, (1987), consumer protection is a vast field, much wider 
perhaps than is generally realized. 
The starting point would require placing the consumer in proper perspective. 
Consumers can be variously categorized, such as those explained in chapter 
1. It follows therefore that determination of the relevant consumer class is 
absolutely vital for an operational definition of consumer protection. The 
issues that will need to be addressed will hinge on providing answers to such 
questions as 'what protection, for whom, why, how, and with what effect'. 
If one adopts the definition of the consumer as proposed by the Moloney 
Committee on consumer protcction, (1963), we regard the consumer as one who 
purchases goods for private use or consumption. The private consumer of 
services is equally a consumer as the Committee admitted. Recently, it has 
been argued that the definition of 'the consumer' should be broadened to 
include any one who consumes goods or services at the end of the chain of 
production, (Harvey and Parry, 1987). If one accepts the definition as 
proposed by Harvey and Parry, it might be difficult to target consumers more 
precisely with integrated marketing strategies. They seem to assume that 
consumers can be classified as homogeneous and unscgmentcd unit. Such 
perspective may not be very helpful in the design- and application of 
purposeful consumer policy, which is why consumer organizations and 
regulatory institutions usually make distinctions between private and 
institutional consumers. This is more in line with the classification adopted 
in the opening chapter, with all the exclusions thereto. 
Having determined the relevant class of consumers, we venture into aspects 
of what protection should consist of. We have in the previous chapter 
elaborated on some of the irksome issues often raised for demanding 
protection for consumers. Consumer protection, broadly defined 
, 
would 
include an examination of consumers' civil rights with respect to quality of 
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goods and services, and also 
,a 
large number of statutes imposing liability on 
the producers or sellers for conduct detrimental to consumers. According to 
Mayncs, (1979a), consumer protection should consist of policies and actions, 
usually involving government intervention, designed to ensure that all 
consumers obtain what they really want, subject to the limitations of their 
income. Government intervention, as implied in the above definition 
underscores the inadequacies of the national enterprise market place. In the 
competitive market, it may be enough to rely on the civil rights of the 
consumer. Direct government intervention may be unnecessary because of the 
market's inherent regulatory controls, vide the market mechanism. Under this 
setting, consumer protection could be achieved to a large extent without 
direct intervention by the government, other than structuring the general 
legal system. As Henderson and Quant (1980, pp. 287-304) argues, the 
micro-cconomic model requires an omniscient, rational, sovereign consumer 
with perfect information, costlcss transactions, frictionless and perfectly 
competitive markets with no externalities in production or consumption. If 
these assumptions hold, the authors argue, it would be difficult to provide 
justification for government intervention to protect consumers. 
While it may be said that Henderson and Quant have largely built their 
argument on the theoretical constructs of the Economist's notion of perfect 
market, which may not be very useful or of practical relevance in explaining 
enterprise behaviour even under competitive market environments, the case 
of the national enterprise comes out more glaring. This is because consumers 
act less in accord with the Economist's axioms of preference; they are far 
from being sovereign, scilcrs/produccrs influence what they buy, how they 
buy it and determine what is available to the market at any particular time. 
Therefore, the quantity of consumer protection deemed requisite for social 
welfare can not be provided by the model. The case for government 
intervention largely rests on the lack of realism of the model's assumptions. 
Lane, (1983), appear to have captured the public policy dimensions of the 
national enterprise marketplace by arguing that consumer protection is a 
public good, and like many other public goods, it can not be provided in 
socially optimal quantities in the absence of government intervention. The 
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author goes further, (p. 420), to outline requirements which could create the 
boundaries for public goods, cg.: 
i) it be considered by those acting on behalf of the public, (cg. legislators, 
regulators ctc. ), as requisite to the public welfare. 
ii) it is jointly supplied to the community through legislation and one 
individual availing himself of this commodity in no way diminishes the 
supply available to others. 
iii) it can not be appropriated by an individual. 
iv) it can not be feasibly packaged in individual units, bought or sold by 
individual firm. 
v) it is not in the private interest of producers to provide it so as to make it 
available to all. 
In Lane's view, consumer protection meet these requirements and therefore 
must be provided by government if optimum quantity is to be available. 
Box (1979), opines that consumer protection consists of measures made by 
others, for instance by government or by consumer organizations in 
co-operation with business to ensure the rights of the consumer. By this 
definition, consumer protection covers a vast field such as all measures that 
seek to promote competition, price regulation, regulation for products and 
supply conditions, mandatory information, improvement in the legal position 
of the consumer, handling of complaints, etc. By inference, a common thread 
running right through all the viewpoints focus on public policy involvement. 
This is understandable because, as pointed out earlier, consumer protection 
in the national enterprise marketplace is not the exclusive preserve of 
management or market processes. Public interest connotations make it a 
public good. Mcrciai (1986), tidies up by arguing that over the years, 
consumer protection has been regarded by a growing number of governments 
and interest groups as central to the promotion of qualitative'development 
based on collective and individual well-being. The author concludes that " 
the synergy among so many issues has identifieil consumer protection as a 
focal point in international programmes towards economic and social 
devclopments", (p. 206). 
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Some have taken a generalized view of consumer protection. For example, the 
International Labour Organization, (1975), sees it as efforts to ensure that " 
consumers are not exposed to safety and health risks or unfair commercial 
practices against which they have no defense". This more traditional 
definition emphasizes the negative aspects of the marketplace. It is felt that 
even though the issues addressed are the rallying point of consumerism, they 
are more complex than that especially with the national enterprise market 
place. Of course, it should be borne in mind that due to operational reasons, 
governments and such bodies as the ILO normally adopt a broad-bascd 
platformin addressing consumer issues. This perhaps rationalizcsthc position 
taken by the Moloney Report which says that consumer protection consists of 
"those measures which contribute, directly or indirectly, to the consumer's 
assurance that he will buy goods of suitable quality, appropriate to his 
purpose, that they will give him reasonable use, and that if he has just 
complaint there will be means of rcdrcss", (p. 8). 
It should be noted that the concept of consumer protection involves a great 
deal of value judgment. The national cnterprise'dimcnsion makes it more 
imprecise. It is possible to come up with a basket of issues over which 
consumer do show a lot of worry, but the extent and intensity of such worry 
varies among consumers. For instance, because of the peculiar circumstance 
of the national enterprise marketplace, most consumers as well as consumer 
organizations have the impression that consumer interests do not receive the 
genuine emphasis they deserves in the formulation and implementation of 
corporate strategies. This may explain the pervasive feeling of threat and 
suspicion which the enterprises are associated with. The implication is that 
the definition of consumer protection, not what constitutes consumer 
protection, is normally imprecise and less than succinct. Consequently, ef forts 
to dcf ine 
, the concept have ccntred on appraising key aspects of, consumer 
interest, which in itself is as ambiguous and amorphous as the concept it seeks 
to explain. Although Richardson, (1977), idcntif icd some basic characteristics 
of consumer interest. it was confirmed that the concept defies objective 
definition. The reasoning is that while all persons are consumers, their 
individual values, resources and environmental circumstances vary greatly. 
Therefore. * the problems of defining general consumer interest on a 
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particular issue can be resolved by a combination of science and/or political 
processes in addition to the market place mechanisms", (Richardson, 1977, 
p. 417). The author concludes that the responsibility of government extends to 
balancing consumer interests against other interests. This is the basic premise 
of Lane's (1983) hypothesis. 
It is pertinent to point out that the recurrent contention in the national 
enterprise market-place is that market mechanism can not be divorced from 
political mechanism, hence the crucial role of consumer protection as a public 
policy instrument. It will therefore be interesting, and important too, to see 
how management grapples with the issue. The premise is that the pattern of 
definition underlies management orientation and sensitivity to the concept 
and also very crucial in the formulation and implementation of consumer 
policy. 
4.2. BASIS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTTON 
Studies in consumer protection, over the years, have been able to idcntif ya 
number of issues over which consumers have shown considerable concern. 
They include the quality of prod ucts/services, quantity, rigged prices, 
deceptive or misleading advertising, quality of physical environment, 
corporate insensitivity to general consumer welfare, and other aspects of 
perceived fraudulent practices associated with business. 
Much as the relevance of these issues would seem all encompassing, they 
apply to the national enterprise in a very different dimension 
- 
the dimension 
that has not been properly and succinctly brought into research focus. For 
example, in the national enterprise market place, management has no absolute 
control over the basic elements of the marketing mix, (ic., those traditionally 
controllable variables, typified by the 4p's), as the case under the 
competitive market. The duty to ensure continuity in the provision of 
product/service is of ten statutory, usually accompanied with price regulation 
which leaves management with little room for maneuvering. Furthermore, as 
a result of the sheer size of the enterprises, they enjoy a large amount of 
visibility, and therefore, perpetually under public purview. Thus, because the 
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enterprises operate under circumstances that keep them continually under 
journalistic inquisitions, those of the professional and consumer bodies, 
politicians and specialized government agencies, they are not likely to get 
away with most of the market slips which may be unnoticeable or disregarded 
if associated with the open market enterprise. 
Above picture may tend to suggest that with the existence of such enormous 
public and private appurtuanccs acting on behalf the consumer, the need for 
consumer protection would be less than essential. On the contrary, they only 
add to show how complex the issue is, more or less, reinforcing the 
proposition that consumer protection is an inescapable necessity. The picture 
could be clearer if we highlight the variations and bases upon which the 
policies are anchored. 
4.2.1. POLITICAL BASTS 
Theoretically, political processes have been accepted as providing the 
principal corner-stone for structuring consumer protection policy in less than 
effectively competitive markets. This aspect should be elaborated upon 
because of its attraction in the consumer policy arena. Consumer protection 
claims political support on the basis of democratic ideals. An effectively 
competitive market provides means for representation and participation of 
consumers through their decision processes in the market place. When the 
market is not completely effective, then democratic idcals calls for 
representation of consumers through effective advocacy before legislature, 
regulatory and administrative agencies. 
Retrospectively, political undcr-pinnings of consumer protection could be 
traced to the doctrine of the 'social contract'. According to Diamond, (1951), 
any responsible government owes a duty to its citizens who have surrendered 
their individual sovereignty in return for corporate and individual protection 
which the state of fcrs. This binding relationship between the individual and 
the state is what has been known as the 'social contract'. It is originally 
applied to the theory of the origin of society, and associated with the works 
of philosophers like John Lock, (Treatise on Government); Thomas 
Hobbcs, (Lcviathan); Jcan Rousscau, (social Contract), 
- 
(see Schumpeter, 1950, 
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part 1; Heilbroner, 1980, ch. 3; Jeaning, 1959, ch. 3; Fitzgerald, 1966). According 
to these accounts, man originally lived under a condition governed by the 
laws of nature, with no recognized criteria for judging what was wrong or 
right. Each man took to himself all that he could, (survival of the f ittcst), and 
"life was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short", (Hobbcs' Leviathan). That 
state of nature was ended by man agreeing to put his individual liberties 
into the hands of a sovercign, (formation of nation states), who thenceforward 
became obligated to providing individual protection. After the emergence of 
the civil state, the laws of nature became supplemented by the civil laws 
whose maintenance fell on the force of the organized community, (Locke's 
Treatise On Government). This marked an important epoch in constitutional 
development and consequently, the political imperatives of consumer 
protection. The primary purpose of providing mutual protection became the 
central focus of government. 
In the modern time, the political basis of consumer protection has received 
added impetus because or the awareness that consumers' interest will suf f er 
if they are not represented, particularly where they can not influence the 
market processes. As Mayncs, (1979a), argues, " the consumer interest lacks 
obvious political constituency " because of its dispersed nature and public 
good connotations. it is therefore incumbent on the State's political 
institution, ie., the government, to act as the custodian of consumers' interest. 
4.2.2. ECONOMIC BASTS 
Economic rationale for consumer protection in the national enterprise has 
been based on the notion of market failure, some of which arise from the 
natural monopoly position of the enterprises. It has been argued that what arc 
usually regarded as consumer protection measures, cg. utility regulation, 
public ownership, independent watch-dogs, are corrective measures against 
natural monopoly powers. As long as there is ef fectivc competition, there will 
be no need for elaborate consumer protection measures as the competition's 
'invisible hand'will safeguard consumers'intcrcst, (Mayncs, 1979a). But as long 
as the market is not ef fcctivcly competitive, the need for consumer protection 
will remain a topical issue. Aspects of market failure and the dilemma of the 
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national enterprise economic environment have been amply discussed in the 
preceding chapter. 
4.2.3. MORAUSOCIAL BASIS 
While it has been held that the direct result of market imperfections and the 
consequent political fall-outs have provided the cardinal thrust for consumer 
protection in the national enterprise market-placc, the widespread feelings 
associated with these factors provides the emotional steam behind consumer 
movement and drive for protection. These feelings have led to the assertions 
of basic consumer rights which in essence constitute the moral foundation for 
consumer protection, especially since they are statutorily non enforceable 
rights. They, (consumer rights), have been repeatedly and widely invoked as 
justification for various consumer protection measures. 
Furthermore, there is growing recognition that regulation, no matter how well 
intcntioned, could prove to be antithetical and thcref ore fail to achieve the 
desired result, (Stigier, 1971). Although emphasis on regulatory measures 
differs from country to country, it is widely recognized that governments 
have over- estimated the ability of legislative instrument to solve many a 
social problem, (Koopman, 1986). There is thcrcf ore increasing expectation that 
business should come out with discretionary strategies which could promote 
consumer protection objective rather than rclying on statutory injunctions. 
They could do this by tampering business values with social values, 
recognizing that business derives lif ef rom the society and must therefore live 
up to the values which the society cherishes. Moreover, because of the 'public 
good' nature of some of the products of the national enterprises, their 
provision and efficiency constitute very important index for gauging a 
society's developmental stage and standard of living. Well-being of business 
must also reflect the well-being of the consumer, hence the moral/social 
rationale for consumer protection. In the effectively competitive market 
environment, the clarion call is corporate social responsibility while as in the 
national enterprise market environment, the strategy is corporate social 
obligation. Management dimension highlighted here obviously require that it 
should be accommodated in any meaningful framcwork'for structuring 
consumer protection ovcr-vicw. 
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4.3. HIRSCHMAN. 0970) REVISITED 
It is necessary to attention a sign-post to warn about the draw-backs inherent 
in the Hirschman's constructs. This is important as we venture to structure a 
management based approach, using the framework. 
Hirschman's theory is simple but at the same time has an unlimited range of 
application. In a nut-shell, the theory states that there arc two alternative 
responses to the decline in organizations' performance, namely exit and voice. 
Exit simply means leaving. Voice means trying to get the managers to reverse 
the decline by complaining or protesting. Loyalty affects the individual 
calculus by making voice, as against exit, more probable than it would 
otherwise have been. Hirschman says that exit and voice, ic., economic and 
political mechanisms (market and non market forces) are two principal actors 
of equal importance in shaping organizations' behaviour. This also implies 
that exit and voice arc alternatives. This can not be an absolute statement as 
will be illustrated shortly. Barry, (1974) on a general note, accuses Hirschman 
of drawing together a number of apparently disparate phenomena. The theory 
therefore is as "useful for what it fails to explain as for what it explains 
successfully, since such failures point to phenomena which requires 
explanation of a different kind". Barry takes exception to the "development 
of economic approach to political analysis". There does not seem to be any axe 
to grind in that because the cra of any discipline having a core intellectual 
possessions is gone. For example, Marketing as a field of study has been 
greatly enriched by inroad made through the application of a wide array of 
concepts borrowed from Psychology, Sociology, Mathematics, etc. 
However, on the voice exit interface, approach to the modification of 
enterprise behaviour may not be as straightforward as given by Hirschman. 
In market situation where competition is less than effective, usually 
characterized by no or low exit behaviour, conception of voice may begin to 
show other manifestations. A great majority of consumers who arc 
dissatisfied do not complain, (voicc). They keep their misfortunes to 
thcmsclvcs, (silcncc). This therefore go beyond the dichotomy identified by 
Hirschman and introduces a third option. silent non-cxit, (Barry, 1974). The 
basic model is presented below; fig. 4.0. 
116 1 
Fig. 4.0: Basic Voice/Exit Model 
Loyalty 
--------- 
> Voice (while 
staying) I 
Decline in quality 
No Loyalty 
-------- 
) Exit (in 
silence) 2 
Source: Birch, 1975. 
Barry's criticisms, if accepted, will modify the above model. First, Barry 
criticizes the concept of loyalty on the ground that it is an "ad hoc equation 
filler" and therefore not a significant phenomenon. It can not be recognized 
in itself but is merely invoked as an assumed explanation of why some people 
who could be expected to exit do not in fact do so. Secondly, Barry points out 
that a decline in in the quality of performance is not a necessary condition 
to believe that the organization might do better 
, 
but only one of the reasons 
why people might form this belief. The crucial factor should not be decline 
but belief in the possibility of improvement. Thirdly, Barry observes that 
Hirschman has collapsed two separate choices into one. There is a choice 
between exit and non-exit and a further choice between voice and silence. It 
follows that Barry offers us an amended version fig. 4.0 which is depicted in 
fig. 4.1 below. 
FigAl: Modified Voice/Exit Model 
Silcncc. I 
Non Exit. < 
Voicc. 2 
Belief in the 
possibility of 
improvement. 
Silence. 3 
Exit. 
Voice. 4 
Above model can be illustrated. In the case of tclccom, consumers who arc not 
satisfied with the status-quo (which is dominated by BT) may decide to try 
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Mercury in the hope the they will get better services. They might opt for 
Mercury's services and yet remain critical of BT because of past 
dissatisfactions or may decide to let by-gonc be by-gonc. However, for the 
generality of telecom users, there arc a few decisions to gnaw at. Is an 
alternative available to them, (ic. can they be linked to Mercury's circuit)? If 
an alternative is available? What about transfer costs involved in switching? 
These constraints may restrain exit behaviour so that the majority who can 
not exit (because of limited exit opportunities and constraints) will intensify 
cf f ort f or improvement or remain silent (paternalism). The no-exit behaviour 
will not therefore be conf used with loyalty. What this means is that it would 
be preposterous for British Gas, for example, to regard its over 17 million 
customers as loyal. This obviously has a lot of implications for customer 
managemcnt., 
Another important area in the hirschman's logic is the ef f ect of voice. There 
is a 'so what' question to be addressedje. do organizations respond, can voice 
give ef f ective signal to management when decline in pcrf ormance is observed 
given the ineffective competitive environment? Hirschman did not of fer any 
insight in this area. He seem to have accepted the criticism that his logic was 
developed from the point of view of consumers as victims of deteriorating 
quality, and not "treated from the point of view of top management", 
(Hirschman, 1973). In his own words, "I admit that I had not addressed myself 
directly and systematically to the possible manipulation of exit and voice as 
management tool", (P. 15). 
The unresolved issue is the type of response to voice which occurs in 
situations where management actions arc not totally impelled by the 
discipline of the marketplace. Has voice a hope? The consumer can of course 
use his voice to threaten exit, but this would lead to an inverse of 
Olson's, (1971) hypothesis 
- 
theory of collective action already cited. Such 
threat will only be heeded if the consumer can inflict losses on the 
organization by ceasing patronage. Voice in the circumstance of market 
failure may be of little use to the individual consumer, but can be effective 
if it is collectively organized, can scare, embarrass or elicit public policy 
response to correct the firm's failings. This is where the role of consumer 
organizations, crusaders, or pressure groups are important. Once, we admit 
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the existence of consumer watch-dogs in the model's assumption. Consumer 
watch-dogs arc very important to an understanding of voice because they can 
make firms wary of quality decline and more responsive to weak voice since 
they can alert consumers to previously unnoticed deterioration. They work as 
alarm bells which amplify consumers' voice, being both highly responsive to 
it and in possession of sufficient resources to make it effective. As 
Laver, (1976) argucs, "they move the collectivity of atomized consumers (whom 
they service) closer towards being a single, important consumer". The net 
effect of consumer watch-dog provides additional positive feedback 
subsystems which produces a further 'heating up' of the overall system. We 
present the overall configuration below, from the point of view of how 
management actions arc directed. 
4.4. A MODEL OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
REGULATORY 
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Fig. 4.2: A MODEL FOR THE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
TO CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE NATIONAL ENTERPRISE MARKET PLACE. 
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The model above offers a set of dimensions useful for broadly describing the 
management challenge of consumer protection in the national enterprise 
market place, from its fundamental orientation to market behaviour. The 
model builds on the basic premise of Hirschman's thcories, (1970), the 
voicc/cxit configuration 
- 
which has been accepted as capturing and 
reflective of major approaches to consumer protection. 
Ordinarily, enterprise behaviour in the market place is shaped and directed 
by a system of core beliefs. The core beliefs arc manifestations of basic 
enterprise values, those values which guide the rudimentary orientation of 
the enterprise such as protection of invested capital, viability, pricc-cost 
equation, protection of internal decision making processes. These values arc 
as pertinent to the cf f cctivcly competitive enterprise as they are to the 'loosc 
monopolistic' national enterprises, though in varying degrees. Therefore, 
management attitude to consumer protection will be dictated by the values 
which it holds central to the survival of the enterprise. Where free 
competition exists, there arc normally no cyc-brows raised as the market 
would exhibit in-built system of protecting the consumer through the 'exit' 
behaviour. Under a market failure situation, a number of questions arc 
raised. Some of these boarder on the assumption that enterprises' core beliefs 
and value systems, if unchecked, will work against consumers' interests, who 
may lack the means for scif protection. Therefore, management initiatives 
based on such value systems arc likely to relegate consumers' interest to the 
background. Hence the emphasis on political as opposed to market processes. 
As depicted in fig. 4.2, consumers can not directly guide managerial actions 
on consumer policy because of structural deficiencies already examined. 
Consumcrinflucncciscxcrtcd through an institutionalized framework for, (i) 
collective action, (consumcr organization), and (ii) countervailing power, (the 
regulatory agencies). These intervening structures arc designated the 
6situational constraints'(SC2 and SM ) facing the enterprise and they 
constitute the fundamental premise of the voice paradigm. Widely held 
notions arc that management can not be entrusted with the responsibility for 
consumer protection on the basis of orientation to market values. Protection 
can only be achieved through intervention vide political processes. Thus, 
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voice option must play a dominant role in shaping management approach to 
consumer protection, viz-a-viz, marketing decisions. Ultimately, the structure 
of, the situational constraints, (SC2 and SM ), which ramifics the voice 
concept, not only influence but as well determine Management approach to 
the definition. measurement. imMementation. and sensitivitv to consumer 
protection. This is the foundation of our fourth thesis. 
It must be pointed out however, that the relationship between the consumer 
and the enterprise is not a strictly one-way affair. As the model shows, the 
enterprise is open to a measure of input from the consumer, usually in the 
form of market intelligence, hence the dropping arrow which indicate weak 
influence. It is assumed that where there arc flaws in the situational 
constraints, either functional or structural, such could be remedied by 
recourse to the elements of the wider environment, cg., the political, economic 
and social institutions. These elements of the wider environment arc the basic 
institutions of the society which could exert pressure on behalf of the 
consumer by either restructuring and strengthening the constraining 
variables, or altering the enterprise values in such a way that they arc 
brought under effective purview of the constraining factors. These should 
be discussed further when we rc-dcfine the theses in the subsequent chapter. 
4.5. TAXONOMY OF CONSUMER PROTECTIO. N 
We have along the line, unwittingly though, dealt with the basic taxonomies 
of consumer protection in national enterprises. What we shall be dealing with 
in this section is to delineate and discuss the principal structures based on 
those taxonornical issues. 
Structural framework for consumer protection can be based on one or 
combination of the following: 
a. the political processes. 
b. the market processes. 
c. Management benevolence 
d. extra organizational discipline. 
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4.5.1. Protcction through the political mcchanism 
The rationale for consumer protection based on political imperatives have 
been examined. Once such a base is obvious, one of a number of options, 
sometimes complementary, can be used as framework for opera tiona liza t ion. 
Possible options are: -i 
(i) Government Direct Intervention 
This is the most fundamental, more aptly, rudimentary form of consumer 
protection. Unlike the open market where the government may simply invoke 
the general legal system to govern enterprise behaviour, the national 
enterprise offers a set of dimensions different from this. Government 
recognizes that civil laws alone, even in their wide ramifications, can not 
effectively protect consumers because enterprises from which consumers 
seek protection arc big national institutions which in most instances enjoy a 
measure of statutory protection. What the government does in such a case is 
to mediate on behalf of the consumer through formal use of the State 
machincry. 
This type of regulation is more pronounced in developing countries. in most 
developed nations, particularly Western Europe and America, governments, 
because of ideological reasons, try to distance themselves from direct 
intervention in the market place, hence less recourse to this form of 
protection strategy. However, in many third world countries, government 
ministries/dcpa rt men ts arc the major regulators of the national enterprise 
marketplace. For example, the Nigerian Telecom Limited is ef f cctivcly under 
the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Communication, just in the same 
way the Nigerian Airways and Railways arc under the Transport Ministry. 
The same pattern applies to most developing nations. What is involved is that 
government directly acts as the consumer watch-dog by periodically 
reviewing the activities of the enterprises, handing down spccif ic regulations 
as to price, distribution or manner of provision of prod ucts/scrviccs, and 
of tcntimes, appoint key executives to the directorate level to ensure cf fcctivc 
implementation of government directives. 
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(ii) Repulatory-Framcwork Independent of Formal State Control 
Another dimension of consumer protection under the aegis of the political 
mechanism is effectuated through a regulatory framework which is not 
subject to or part of the formal machinery of government. Even though the 
government may try to divorce itself from the day to day intervention as 
evident from the example in (i) above, it sets up regulatory institutions in 
addition to the State's legal system, to direct the activities as well as provide 
countervailing power to the domineering powers of the national enterprise. 
Each regulatory institution is specifically structured according to the 
exigencies of the particular enterprise market environment. The regulatory 
institution then assume direct responsibility for monitoring and regulating 
the activities of its captive enterprise. 
This form of protection is most versatile in developed economics, examples 
include the Office of Telecom, Office of Gas Supply in Britain; Public 
Utilities Commission in the United States of America. 
Structurally, the regulatory institutions show discernible patterns of 
organization. They could be aggrcgative or disaggrcgativc in structure. Both 
terms rcfcrý to the management and the nature of relationship between the 
regulatory authority and the consumer representative organization. For 
instance, some regulatory institutions are structured in such a way that the 
regulatory functions as well as those of representing consumers' interests arc 
delineated and carried out independently. In in some, they are seen as one end 
purpose and function of the regulatory authority. Where the two activities arc 
carried out independently, the structure is designated disaggrcgativc. 
Aggrcgative structure refer to those situations where the two functions arc 
jointly carried out by one body, (cg. OFTEL). Of f ice of Gas Supply, (OFGAS), 
in its relationship with Gas Consumcrs'Council, (GCC), typif ics a structurally 
disaggrcgativc rcgulatory institution. 
(iii) Institutional ised Collective Voice 
This pattern of consumer protection materializes in the form of consumer 
representative body, either acting in conjunction with the regulatory body or 
acting alone to further the ends of defined consumer interests. Its purpose is 
to present a unif icd, purposcf ul and articulate collective voice of consumers 
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in such a way that it should not only be heard by the captive enterprise but 
also respected as such. 
it must be pointed out that this type of organization is highly partisan 
because of its well defined focus 
- 
which is guarding against possible 
infringements of consumers' interest. As in the case of regulatory institution 
considered in (ii) above, the domain of the consumer body is 
characteristically narrow, usually structured to protect the interests of a class 
of consumers in their consumption experience related to a product category 
cg., tclecom, Gas, Water, Electricity, Rail services, ctc. In other to exert 
meaningful pressure and uphold its credibility, consumer organizations try 
to abstain from having too close ties with both government and the business. 
it is normally felt that having very close ties with the government or the 
enterprise would be incompatible with the independence needed to perform 
the function of an effective pressure group. Each consumer body tend to 
have a specialist knowledge of the activities of its captive enterprise just like 
the regulatory institutions, but quite unlike the regulatory agencies, they do 
not possess the enforcement powers. This means that their purpose is to 
closely monitor the activities of their captive enterprises as they relate to 
consumer interests and make organized representation to the enterprise or 
make referrals to other facets of the political mechanism if breaches of 
consumer interests arc felt or perceived. 
4.5.2. Protection Through Market Processes 
Paradoxically, there seem to be a consensus of opinion to the effect that 
consumer rights are highly susceptible to violation under any market 
structure that does not guarantee free and effective competition. It has been 
argued that where market failure exists, such as the case with the national 
enterprise, market processes becomes less effective as a guide to consumer 
protection. This is based on the presumption that market forces under such 
circumstances can not be responsive to consumer wishes, and the norms of the 
market mechanism can not therefore be invoked to guard against violations 
of consumer interests. Ultimately, consumer protection has to be sought from 
outside the market place. 
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Theoretical under-pinnings of the market system have been earlier addressed, 
and the philosophical basis of its dysfunctionalism explored. However, 
opinions have started to emerge in the recent times to contend that in spite 
of the denigrations of the market mechanism, it still remain a vital tool for 
consumer protection, and should not therefore be jettisoned for the'cumbrous 
political process', (Friedman, 1962). Undoubtedly, the cf f icacy of competitive 
forces to induce behavioural modifications in the market-place is not the 
issue. Doubts arises over whether the level of competition, real or potential, 
can be developed to such an appreciable level where management actions will 
be cued to it,, and consequently, consumer protection. 
It should be mentioned, that notwithstanding the controversies over the 
market mechanism, there is still the recognition that enterprises can rise 
beyond the handicap of both market and political processes to evolve some 
discretionary strategies for consumer protection. Standing up to this type of 
challenge is an integral part of management process 
- 
reconciling the 
enterprise to its environment. Identifiable dimensions for the pursuit of this 
objective are considered below. 
4.5.3. Protection Through 'Management-Benevolence' 
By the above 
, 
we refer to consumer protection packages which are rooted in 
managerial discretion or initiatives. These initiatives are such that can not be 
directly induced by legislation and/or independent of any enforceable 
injunctions. As a result of problems associated with both market and political 
processes, cg., where consumers' market powers are ineffective and an 
uncanny management can sabotage political maneuvers, it can be argued that 
the key to genuine consumer protection lics with what management can come 
up with when not overtly directed. This option has not been given due 
consideration because of general feeling of skepticism and distrust with 
which the market powers of national enterprises are viewed by consumers as 
well as public policy makers. Perhaps, much of the skepticism could be 
attributed to the tendency to adjudge management initiated packages under 
the platform of the much maligned notion of self regulation, which critics 
have argued does not work effectively in the open market environment, much 
less under imperfect conditions. This is basically why we have opted for a 
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change in nomenclature 
- 
'management benevolence' as against 
self-regulation. 
Arguments urging management intervention through a system of 
discretionary strategies have been built on the basis that there are limits to 
which socially desirable behaviour can be ordered by law. Maitland, (1985), 
has argued that beyond a certain point, the cost of expanding the apparatus 
of political control becomes prohibitive in terms of abridged liberties, 
bureaucratic hypertrophy and sheer inefficiency. This fact probably accounts 
for the appeal of management self-regulatory behaviour - ie., the idea that 
consumers may be better off if they rely on the promptings of a 'corporate 
conscience' to regulate corporate behaviour instead of the heavy hands of 
government regulation. 
While this approach may entail a radical break with the way managers have 
hitherto conceive&their roles, it is simply a clarion call for enterprises to 
behave, in their own enlightened self interest. It is a call for moral 
reconstruction of the enterprise value system. Expectations are that such a 
strategy will give managers the confidence they deserve to prove or disprove 
the good intentions of the enterprise to the society. The task would therefore 
be that of proseltyzing managers into a broader definition of their roles and 
carve a blue-print for a consumer oriented and obligated enterprise values. 
Critics would argue that managers can not be trusted with the task of 
consumer protection as that would entail an impossible and contradictory 
demand on them. More so, they have been heaped with a wide array of 
accusations such as nurturing the enterprise that dictates to consumers rather 
than being dictated to, insularity, failure to keep up with changing values, 
inability to see their role in a systcm-wide perspective, and an attachment to 
an outmoded ideology which defines public interest as the unintended 
outcome of the pursuit of self intcrcst, (Maitland, 1985; Garvin, 1983, 
Molitor, 1982). They argue that enterprise behaviour is traditionally a 
function of market imperatives, real or proxy, rather than of managers 
values. The crux of this is a recognition that the core interests of the 
enterprise, even as a competitor, more of ten diverge from its interests as part 
of the wider society. Maitland, (1985), exemplifies that the enterprise may 
likely welcome a cleaner environment but as a competitor in the market place, 
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it has an interest in minimizing its own pollution abatement costs. . It may 
philosophically favour a free market but will probably lobby in favour of 
protection foritself", (p. 133). Olson, (1971), also demonstrates that in a rational 
world, " it is certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there 
is coercion or some outside inducement". Of course, Lane, (1983), has 
postulated that consumer protection is a public good. 
4.6. LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT DISCRETIONARY STRATEGIES 
The reason why there are doubts about good intentions and genuineness of 
management self regulation may lie in inadequate appreciation of the 
dimensions and how they can be applied. Many researchers have adopted a 
somewhat blanket platform in the study of business self regulation strategies. 
The result is that often, 'the fall-outs from such an analytical framework 
based on a false premise tend to be over generalized and over dramatized. To 
present a clearer perspective, and consequently, build an appropriate platform 
on which management discretionary activities for consumer protection can 
be based, we identify three level of self regulation: (i) business level, (ii) 
industry-wide level, and (iii) the enterprise level. 
(i) Business Level 
At this level, self regulatory activities are all encompassing, bringing all 
enterprises under a common umbrella. Strategies based on this platform could 
be advantageous because enterprises will be less vulnerable to charges of 
collusion since strategies arc evolved by a common management which cuts 
across board., Also, because of diversity of its mcmbcrship, thcre could be 
inhibitions against the encompassing management aligning itself with 
sectional interests of a particular market or industry. This type of 
arrangement conform with what Maitland, (1985), referred to as 'peak 
organization'; the type Olson, (1982), suggested would be constrained to adopt 
a pro-compctitive posture. 
Example of structures conforming to our idea of encompassing management 
are offered by the Confederation of British Industrics, (CBI), Nigerian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The encompassing management serve 
as the decision making unit 
- 
making ethical judgments, setting common 
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standards and codes which will enable co-ordination of enterprise behaviour. 
A common code which would serve as a standard against which enterprise 
behaviour could be judged on individual basis, even if only morally binding, 
could exert a powerful constraining inf luencc. It is assumed that where there 
is a multiplicity of standards, there is effectively no standards. 
An encompassing management could also help dif f use some contentious issues 
in top management relations with enterprise stakeholders. A very 
sophisticated attempt has been made by Preston and Post, (1975), to supply an 
objective, external standards, located in the public'policy process. They argue 
that management would be greatly relieved of the task of making subjective 
judgments about enterprise obligations to various stakeholders, permit them 
to heed society's demands that enterprise behave responsibly, and at the same 
time protect them from the charge that their generosity or benevolence may 
jeopardize the enterprise competitive position. 
The glowing advantages of this framework also provide its greatest setbacks. 
It assumes that all enterprises would submit to the encompassing management. 
This in practice may be far off the mark. It also assumes the presence of 
multiplicity of enterprises in a given market, thereby rendering itself 
oblivious of the fact that the national enterprise market place may consist of 
just one or two firms who may not face any threat from competition. 
Furthermore, the constitution of the encompassing management may be too 
bogus to effectively monitor market place compliance behaviour. It is not 
likely that this type of arrangement can adequately take cognizance of the 
peculiarities oNhe national enterprise market environment, and therefore, 
may not be suitable for structuring management discretionary strategies for 
consumer protection. 
(ii) Industry Level 
The attraction in structuring management response to consumer protection on 
industry-wide basis lics in the understanding that market environment of the 
national enterprise is highly restricted, often, with limited number of 
enterprises in contrast to the atomistic markets. It is therefore hoped that 
co-operation within the industry, with a view to evolving, upholding and 
implementing strategies which cut across the industry would be lot more 
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easier because of the highly limited numerical strength of firms in the 
industry. For instance, public gas supply through pipe in Britain is under the 
effective control of one enterprise, British Gas Plc. The same applies to the 
electricity market, while the tclecom industry can boast of one f irm with over 
90% of the market share and two other public operators with a collective 
strength of less than 10%. The underlying belief is that if management in a 
given industry could work together on consumer policy, viz-a-viz, consumer 
protection as it relates to the specific industry instead of the whole business 
environment as in (i) above, they could go a long way in evolving sound 
policies that are genuinely consumer oriented. They will be better placed to 
address core consumer problems and provide solutions to them. This is so 
because the intricacies technicalities and complexities of the industry (the 
areas where consumer centrcd initiatives are considered necessary and how 
best to approach them to ameliorate the lot of consumers, dc void of cosmetic 
consumerism) would have been better appreciated. 
This framework also address the public good aspect of consumer protection. 
Schelling, (1974, p. 104), has argued that the reason why most enterprises are not 
forthcoming with genuine and sustained efforts for consumer protection is 
the fear that they might be incurring costs which arc avoidable to others in 
the industry. This strategy therefore imposes mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon, and preparedness to act because the line of action is common to 
all. 
The major shortcoming is its anti-competitive implications. it is generally 
held that anti competitive tendencies arc by and large anti-consumers. This 
level, because it could be open to charges of collusive behaviour holds little 
promise of being transformed into an effective vehicle for structuring 
management discretionary approach to consumer protection. Fears may be 
deeply entrenched that industry based management approach, however 
plausible its initial rationale, will eventually degenerate into industry 
protectionism 
- 
thereby sacrificing consumer protectionism which ought to 
be the cardinal thrust. 
(iii) Entergrise Level 
At this level, management discretion is a matter for each enterprise and its 
conscience. This level may be considered appropriate for the national 
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enterprise market market place. It is dictated by the unavoidable fact that 
most national enterprises are themselves the industry, some of them 
controlling anything from 70% to 100% share of the market. Those without 
overwhelming control of their market have the potentials to dictate the trend 
of events in such markets. Thcrcfore, in consideration of the size, visibility, 
and the grip on the market, management under such a setting is more 
appropriately positioned to influence the cause-cffect equation in consumer 
protection. The tighter the grip of an enterprise on its market, the better the 
management is disposed to under-takc self-induced consumer protection 
strategies without consideration to any external, impeding influences. For the 
enterprises in question, it is a matter of self interest that they should come 
up with socially acceptable packages of consumer policy. The more successful 
they are in achieving this objective, the more room management will have to 
attend to core functions of the enterprise. Signs of failure will only help to 
speed up more regulation and other forms of political control. 
As elaborately put forward by Maitland, (1985), the larger the fraction of 
public interest an enterprise serves, the higher the probability that it will be 
expected to oppose self-serving behaviour that inflicts external costs on the 
society. By virtue of its circumstance, viz-a-viz, market realities, it will 
necessarily internalize many of the resulting external costs, cg., cost of 
pollution, bad product policy, faulty and inarticulate consumer policy. 
According to Olson, (1982), organizations of this type own so much of the 
society that they have an important incentive to be actually concerned about 
how productive the society is, the effect of its policies on the efficiency of 
the society and also an incentive to bargain with other substantial organized 
groups in the interest of more productive socicty, (p. 47-48). If Olson is 
correct, then it is not out of place to expect management of national 
enterprises to promote, when not directed by regulation, convergence between 
enterprise interests and those of the societal institutions so as to lesscn the 
need for coercive regulations. In the atomistic market, management can 
af ford to take a partial or parochial view of its behaviour and consequences. 
In the national enterprise market place, such consequences could be fatal and 
far reaching. 
In consequence therefore, it seems that consumer protection based on 
management discretionary behaviour is a veritable and assured form of 
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protection. This dimension has not been accommodated in known consumer 
protection theories. This is the foundation of our fifth thesis. Responsible 
conduct of the national enterprise can not only be willed or exhorted by 
appeals to the political processes, it could also depend on the creation and 
maintenance of appropriate institutional conditions under which the 
enterprise can behave responsibly 
- 
as a matter of self interest in particularly, 
and those of consumers in general. 
Summarily, this chapter has tried to relate theoretical concepts broadly 
discussed in preceding chapters to the national enterprise framework. It 
presents a macro perspective of the subject-matter, taking particular interest 
in the taxonomy, external factors inf lucricing or likely to inf lucnce consumer 
policy processes. In the next chapter, the internal dynamics will be 
considered, concentrating on management processes. 
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CHAPTER5 
MANAGEMENT VARIABLES AND METHODS 
5.0. OVER-VIEW 
This chapter addresses the critical variables - dýýý 
measurement, and implementation They provide the basis for appraising 
management orientation to the concept of consumer protection. In the absence 
of any known normative framework to guide the analysis of managerial 
behaviour towards consumer protection, it is hoped that the variables will 
provide a platform for appraising and answering such questions as: what 
does consumer protection mean to the national enterprise managers? How 
sensitive are they to the concept? What managerial actions demonstrate the 
level of sensitivity? Is it measured, and if so, how? Based on the variables, we 
would attempt to build a management response model. 
In the second part of the chapter, a number of issues relating to the 
methodological framework will be explored. In a nut-shell, the aim is to 
provide an insight into what methods we shall apply in the analysis of field 
data. 
5.1. THE MANAGEMENT VARIABLES 
Variables considered relate to the concepts of definition, sensitivity, 
measurement and implementation. They can be influenced, determined and 
controlled by management. They, in turn, can guide the determination of 
managerial stance and perspectives on consumer protection as relatcstothc 
specific enterprise. These controllable elements constitute an important 
framework in the analysis of managerial approach. When behaviour is 
guided regulations, the genuineness of intentions are obfuscated and this will 
make it difficult to discern what obtains in practice from what could have 
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been., In such circumstances, management reaction to specific cues will be 
obscured by the conformity syndrome or 'band-wagon effect' since enforced 
behaviour will not provide wide enough room for assessing managerial 
actions in terms of policy inadequacies. 
5.1.1. DEFINITION 
in the preceding chapter, we explored the basis for defining the concept of 
consumer protection, which proved inconclusive. Its complex nature within 
the domain of the national enterprise rcndcrcd it more of a matter for value 
judgment. Taken on the face value, it -could mean that the concept can be 
defined and stretched along a continuum. The task of an observer will 
therefore be to determine where the enterprise management is positioned 
along that continuum. This task will not be easy unless there is a kind of 
guide or parameter 
- 
which is why an exploratory research of this nature is 
very timely. In terms of both consumer input to, and feedback on marketing 
activities, managers should ask and provide answer to such question as ; 
where is the consumer on the organization chart? This could be ascertained 
through managerial orientation, efforts to reach and be reached by 
consumers. Genuineness and seriousness required in this regard can not be 
ovcr-cmphasized because cosmetic consumerism could be worse than none. 
To provide the necessary guide, we prof f er a bi-polar standpoint on which to 
base the definition These are (a) consumer specific factors and, (b) corporate 
specific factors. 
(a) Consumer Sr)ecif ic Factors: This, in essence, connotes consumer centered 
definition, ie., using consumer factors and characteristics as guide to dcf ining 
consumer protection. Enterprises that are likely to adopt a consumer centered 
definition will likely have clear ideas about their conception and meaning of 
consumer protection. It is therefore possible to define consumer protection 
from the standpoint of the consumer, in which case, the definition will 
recognize the behavioural nature and consequences of consumption. The 
question that may arise will boarder on what aspects of the consequences of 
consumption are to be included. Assuming that consumers' needs arc 
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determined by the enterprise, how does one conclude that those needs have 
been adequately met? Satisfaction in this sense could be generic 
- 
not just 
satisfaction with the core product but such that take a bird's-eye-view of the 
complex position of the consumer. Given this situation, fulfillment can be 
divided into two broad categories, functional and subjective fulfillment. 
Functional fulfillment is basic and central to a consumption situation. it 
might involve choice among competing brands. Since choice element is not 
so crucial and highly constrained in the national enterprise marketplace, 
f unctional f ulf illment could be achieved through cf f cetive creation of time 
and place utility 
- 
the right product is made available to the consumer at the 
right time and place, and at affordable price. It also means that consumers 
are protected from the functional hazards of products they are exposed to. 
This type of fulfillment, to a great extent, is taken as given because of the 
peculiar regulatory regimes faced by the national enterprise. Often, the duty 
to ensure place and time utility is statutorily guaranteed, usually 
complemented with price ceiling. 
Subjective fulfillment on the other hand harps on consumers' own perceptive 
judgment. It tries to explore the extent to which the consumer feels that his 
interests arc protected 
, 
either from personal standpoint or from that of those 
who arc the watch-dog of his interests. There arc some inherent complications 
in this line of reasoning. Problems associated with measuring subjective 
surrogates have been highlighted in the preceding chapter, as well as 
dif f iculties in using them as a generalized rcf crcncc f ramc. In spite of these 
odds, subjective fulfillment remains crucial as a framework for defining 
consumer protection on grounds of consumer specific factors. 
(b) Corgorate SDecific Factors: Many corporate entities tend to think that 
by emphasizing the objective needs of consumers and perhaps, functional 
fulfillment, they are in essence being consumer oriented. Functional 
fulfillment could be less crucial because they are predictive, determinable, 
universal and ascertainable without much difficulty. The national enterprise 
which adopts above approach is simply relying on corporate specific factors 
in its definition of consumer protection. This is so because the parameters are 
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forced down through the regulatory institutions, over which the enterprises 
do not have much control. 
Thcref orc, defining consumer protection on the basis of company perspective 
tend to take bearing from the end of the behaviour chain. The presumptions 
could be that consumers may not be too sure about their needs, sometimes 
irrational in the expression and means to gratify those needs. Therefore, 
the company has a duty to protect them. On this basis, formal definition of 
consumer protection is not necessary, and if required, must reflect such 
surrogate variables that arc more or less self-serving to the company. 
Enterprises that are genuinely interested in consumer protection should not 
only define it in consumer spccif ic terms but should also pay more attention 
to subjective fulfillment rather than functional fulfillment. This does not 
suggest that the later is not important. Rather, it is so fundamental that it is 
the minimum requirement which would have been catered for by the 
regulatory regime. Consumer centered definition aimed at subjective 
fulfillment will address the following objectives: 
i) Set specific consumer objectives: ic., objectives in regard of consumer and 
management aspirations and their intcr-rclationships should be probed. 
ii) Consumer information and education: This will entail increased 
knowledge of consumer behaviour. There should be careful delineation 
between consumer education and consumer indoctrination. Consumer 
in forma tion/cd uca tion may be thought of in terms of what Thorelli, (1978), 
referred to as "Consumer Civics". This will provide the foundation knowledge 
necessary to develop citizens into intelligent consumers or at least make their 
self development into informed consumers possible, generating fact based 
data about markets and offerings in terms of product and consumer 
characteristics. 
iii) Consumer Feedback: ie., listening to consumers themselves. Consumers' 
voice need not be solely transmitted through consumer organizations, which 
act as pressure group more often than as consumer representatives. In terms 
of both the importance of certain issues and the postures on those issues, more 
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input directly from consumers themselves could be vital and needed 
ingredient in defining and formulating consumer policy. 
iv) Genuine concern for marketplace pluralism: Maintenance and 
enhancement of pluralism in the market place should be a strong criterion in 
considering, assessing and defining consumer policy proposals. Interest and 
concern in preserving pluralism among the consuming public have at inge of 
public service obligation which enterprises must identify with. Consumer 
centered definition must recognize and provide expression for the variations 
in terms of classes and needs of the heterogeneous marketplace. 
5.1.2. SENSITIVITY 
If an organization is to address the fundamental issues in consumer 
protection instead of the symptoms, it must identify and analyze them. Such 
a task is most formidable for two reasons: 
First, the basic issues are inherently complex and difficult to understand. 
They tend to be dynamic and inter-rclated. The Teal problems are frequently 
not very visible. Even significant symptoms of ten lie dormant until a startling 
report, usually journalistic expositions, highlights the unwholesome situation 
and consequently serve to focus on consumer predicament. 
Secondly, information systems of most enterprises arc neither oriented to nor 
effective in olitaining information that will enable the organization to detect 
and predict underlying consumer issues. Management efforts are usually 
directed at short term projects with relatively limited objectives. They 
essentially research symptoms. 
Level of sensitivity could therefore determine management orientation and 
company's attitude to consumer protection. Ordinarily, most companies 
would claim that the consumer is the focal thrust of their activities. 
Thcrcf ore, the question of sensitivity to consumer protection should not arise. 
Even on the face value, it has to be accepted that it may not be possible to 
have a common stance, hence dispositions of enterprises varies amongst one 
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another. To show that sensitivity could be expressed in various forms, some 
symptomatic and self-serving to the organization while some arc genuinely 
attuned to consumer plights; we provide a two-state schema for categorizing 
levels of sensitivity, viz. pro-active and reactive sensitivity. 
A company that exhibits reactive sensitivity will define consumer protection 
in corporate specific terms, addressing functional fulfillment and 
symptomatic factors rather than the underlying issues, reacts to occurrences 
rather than being anticipative and preventative. Being reactive describes the 
more mechanical approach to'consumer policy, rcacting backward from the 
market place in response to the requirements of the market. Organizations 
with reactive sensitivity may be characterized by the following: 
- 
reaction to consumer issues is often passive, confused and misguided. 
- 
defensive responses to consumer problems. 
- 
consumer problems arc identified by those outside the organization. 
- 
management attention/action is coerced, ic. forced to act under pressure. 
- 
management is guidcd by 'band-wagon ef f cct', desire to do just what others 
are doing or what the regulation enjoins and more often, counting the 
negative effects of consumerism. 
Pro-activc sensitivity arise from genuine concern of the organization for 
consumer protection and emphasizes the subjective f ulf illmcnt. it is based on 
the recognition that in the absence of effectively competitive system, the 
need arises to integrate consumer interests into the decision mechanisms of 
the organization. Pro-activc sensitivity could be discerned through the 
following: 
- 
management makes effort to identify consumer problems. 
- 
management adopts anticipative and preventative behaviour. 
- 
views consumers as marketing opportunities, not just market opportunities. 
- 
create monitoring departments which define tasks, rcsponsibili tics with 
corresponding authorities. 
- 
consumer departments assumes the role of representatives and advocates of 
consumers' interests, and actively involved in corporate policy making 
process. 
137 
- 
being pro-activc involves developing consumer policy based on perceptive 
marketing research. 
5.1.3. MEASUREMENT 
Most organizations have well developed planning processes that involve both 
short and long time horizons, but the extent to which they explicitly include 
consumer goals in their planning efforts, and corresponding programmes to 
measure them can not be taken for granted. There is a clear need for 
consumer programmes to be guided by operational objectives with 
accompanying short and long term measures. The questions which comes to 
mind and which management should gnaw at are : what is the level of the 
company's consumer protection performance? What should be used as 
standards for corporate performance measures? Is the present performance 
acceptable, to whom, in what ways and what are the deviations from target? 
An organization may embark on measuring its consumer policy performance 
in response to the following influences: 
- 
Legal requirement, cg., regulation by government or any body/agency 
statutorily empowered so to do. 
- 
Public pressure, cg., government agency hearing, increasing public concern 
as expressed in attitudc/opinion surveys, publicity in the media, reports by 
consumer organizations, etc. 
- 
management initiative, ic., management motivated to improve a particular 
situation, strong feelings of consumer concern by the executive cadre. 
Management initiative is very crucial. As argued in the preceding chapter, 
genuine measurement should be predicated on management initiative because 
it expresses consumer centered definition and pro-activc sensitivity. 
Measurement can therefore be effectuated through the use of formal or 
informal technique. 
(a) Formal Measurement Tcchniguc: The importance of measuring consumer 
protection must be seen not just in its symbolic meaning but in terms of what 
it seeks to achieve. Naturally, the genuinely sensitive enterprise which 
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defines the concept on consumer specific factors will also be concerned with 
monitoring the shifts in consumer perceptions on the amount of protection 
they can expect to enjoy from the enterprise. 
Formal Measurement technique requires careful planning. It might involve 
attitudinal studies and aspects of consumer research. Consumer perception 
should be ascertained and the measures should be able to reveal the true 
perception as well as uncover those aspects of corporate practices which 
might be objectionable to the consumer. Future measures would indicate the 
success or failure of any corrective actions hitherto taken. 
The problem with formal measurement technique is that very often, 
organizations concentrate on measuring consumer satisfaction with the core 
offerings, emphasizing the surrogate variables such as complaint behaviour. 
We have already dealt with the theoretical under-pinnings. However, what is 
important is that a set of parameter exist to guide and gauge corporate 
actions, alerting management when performance diverges from standards. 
Formality in measurement techniques implies that those parameter must be 
verifiable, standardized, and capable of replication. 
(b) Informal Measurement Techniguc: Reactively sensitive organizations 
rely on corporate specific factors and hazy measurement standards. Very 
often, mcrc existence of complaint analysis is taken as evidence of consumer 
orientation. When measurement techniques arc informal, standards for 
performance appraisal becomes very fluid, blurrcd and lacking in objectivity. 
Informal techniques, when they show any discernible direction, are oriented 
towards explicit market behaviour, thereby ovcr-looking a lot of critical 
issues which should be considered in order to evolve a balanced consumer 
policy. For example, informal measurement disregards many imperfections 
in the market system. The result is that periodic business statistics arc used 
as measurement parameter, cg., profit/salcs volume, new accounts/scrviccs, 
volume of complaints. 
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5.1.4. IMPLEMENTATION 
What is becoming apparent in our discussion so far is that there tend to exist 
a dichotomous relationship among the components of management variables 
considered. Pro-activc sensitivity, definition based on consumer specific 
factors and formal measurement techniques arc directly correlated. 
implementation is also related in a similar way. More than any other area, 
implementation strategy should be more revealing of corporate philosophy. 
Policy statements could proclaim sensitivity, consumer oriented definition 
and elaborate measurement techniques, but it is actually company practices, 
what the company does in practical setting that really rcf lect true values and 
beliefs of corporate decision makers. 
Of course, most organizations have learnt that it is not enough to have a well 
defined corporate strategy in place or have it eloquently articulated on paper. 
Equally important is the ability to translate those ideals into practicality by 
way of implementation. The study conducted by Murphy, (1988) is revealing 
in this respect. It was discovered that companies, in practice, only implement 
about 10% of items enunciated in the policy proposals. Therefore, if there 
should be any meaningful attitude towards implementation in such a way 
that the company can achieve greater proportion of what it sets out to 
accomplish, the entire organization should be committed to the strategy and 
even the minutest details should not be ovcr-lookcd. The same is true with 
respect to other aspects of consumer protection strategies. It is not enough for 
a company to over-cmphasize those aspects that are self-serving to the 
organization. More so, implementing consumer protection programmes should 
not be the exclusive preserve of managers. Senior managers may set the 
over-all strategic direction but when it comes to the delivery, which is what 
implementation strives to achieve, all level of the organization should be 
effectively involved. 
Interest in corporate sensitivity to the concept of consumer protection, its 
definition and measurement arc incomplete without an examination of the 
consequences on corporate policies and practices. An appropriate orientation 
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towards basic problem is necessary but not sufficient condition for an 
effective response programme. Moreover, programme development requires 
a compatible decision-making process with a sympathetic organizational 
structure. Public pronouncements and policy statements may give a false 
impression of management concern for consumer protection. Elegant 
dcf initions and sophisticated measurement techniques may not be a suf f icient 
evidence for genuine concern, for consumer protection, nor is there absence 
enough evidence of reactive awareness. Taken together, they may indicate a 
level of awareness, but the most conclusive evidence is in managerial 
practices. It is possible for an organization to believe that it is genuinely 
sensitive to consumer protection and yet fail to reflect such sensitivity in 
practical terms. It is equally possible for an organization to have very 
lackadaisical views on consumer protection but exhibit practices that arc 
attuned to consumers' interests. 
There is therefore a clear need for consumer programmes to have operational 
measures which will serve to rcf Icet long-run and indirect bcncf its. Without 
such measures, chances for real impact arc slim, and resources devoted to 
such response programmes can not be held accountable for any short-comings, 
as some managers arc wont to. Implementation and pcrf ormancc measurement 
could provide four benefits: 
. 
Organizational efforts will become more integrated and focused. 
- 
Greater possibility that programmes would be targeted to core problem 
areas instead of symptoms. 
. 
Potentials of providing rational means of allocating resources to 
alternative programmes arc created. 
. 
Development of performance bcnch-mark and targets are stimulated. 
It is pertinent to mention that implementation, like other components, have 
two broad categorization. As alluded to earlier, it is not enough to have the 
structure and culture that support consumer protection initiatives. They must 
combine with (a) imMementation rcsr)onsibilities and (b) tasks o ensure that 
the enterprise is truly consumer oriented in policy execution. 
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Imolementation Resnonsibilities: Consideration here is on such factors as the 
quality of leadership, delegation, communication and motivation. Leadership 
is important in all aspects of business operations and very crucial in the 
implementation. of consumer protection responsibilities. Effective 
involvement and integrity of line managers are indispensable ingredients. 
Delegation f ollows f rom leadership as an essential responsibility f or cf f cctivc 
implementation. Middle and lower managers are sometimes placed in dif f icult 
situationý because high level executives arc unclear in their delegation of 
consumer policy responsibilities. In recognition of the role of middle 
management in policy implementation, delegation of responsibility should be 
dispatched properly and made very explicit in regard of what arc acceptable 
practices and standards. 
Communication is also an essential part of implementation responsibility. 
Formal communication dealing with consumer issues can be effectuated in 
many ways such as through codes 
, 
seminars, training programmes, etc. 
Motivation is also important because if companies are to be successful in 
executing consumer policies, individual staff will be motivated to do the 
right thing. This means that those in the high echelon must look closely at 
how performance is measured. 
Imi)lemcntation Tasks: These relate to specific functional areas within the 
enterprise. One area that is conspicuous is Marketing. The posture of an 
organization on consumer protection could be inferred from the importance 
it attaches to Marketing, not Sales department. Marketing functions to relate 
the organization to its clientele. The department therefore serves to direct 
research and developments in consumer policy, breaking through scientific 
and technical barriers. Implementation tasks in this realm arc effectuated 
through the marketing mix variables. in reactively sensitive organizations, 
marketing departments are installed as misnomer of traditional Sales 
department, with little or no role in consumer policy. 
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There are other aspects of business practices which could help explain 
management orientation on consumer protection 
. 
These include: 
Consumer Research: Any company interested in consumer protection must 
know its customers. The irony is that because of lack of effective competition 
in the national enterprise market place, some people may be tempted to argue 
that consumer research can not be very essential. Consumer research 
programmes enables an organization to evaluate and refine its consumer 
policy, and increase the possibility that such policy and corporate position 
will be more def cnsible in future both to internal and external challenges. it 
can also help to test overtly optimistic predictions of public interest. 
Therefore, for an enterprise that engages in consumer research, indications 
are that on the balance of probability, it will also adopt pro-active sensitivity, 
consumer centered definition and formal measurement techniques in 
developing consumer programmes. 
Consumer Affairs Dcpartment: This type of organizational design will only 
have meaning when its efforts arc reinforced with top management 
commitment. General belief has been that organizations create such structures 
to gain public relations advantage or to present an aura of concern for 
consumer interest. To be able to provide the needed impetus, there should be 
clearly defined set of responsibilities and corresponding authority. Specific 
functions will depend on a number of factors but should be generally dcf incd 
to incorporate these four related actions: 
1. Receive consumer complaints and problems, and have sufficient authority 
to resolve them. 
2. Develop and operate an information system with such functions as 
- 
monitoring the extent to which consumers are satisfied or dissatisfied with 
each clement of the marketing system. 
- 
detecting and predicting areas of basic consumer discontent which may 
possibly have negative impact on the company or to which the company may 
be uniquely qualified to respond to. 
3. Be a representative an and advocate of consumer interest during policy 
making process. Be able to provide independent appraisal of company's 
marketing programme. The basic principle here is that monitoring and 
143 
control functions should be distinct from operating management. This 
suggest that consumer affairs department or by whatever name it is 
designated, ought to report to the chief executive officer who is ultimately 
responsible for company's performance 
. 
It has been argued that above 
functions tend to be generally compromised when carried out by operating 
groups. 
4. Contribute to the development of corporate consumer programme 
objectives, programmes to implement those objectives, and operational 
measures by which the programmes can be evaluated. 
5.2. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MODEL 
From the foregoing, there emerges a consistent pattern of relationship 
amongst corporate sensitivity levels to the concept of consumer protection, its 
definition, measurement and implementation as reflected by corporate 
policies and practices. The type of sensitivity associated with an enterprise 
is likely to be directly correlated with the type of definition, measurement 
techniques and implementation strategies which the enterprise will adopt. 
Pro-active sensitivity to the concept of consumer protection will of necessity 
require that the concept be defined on consumer specific terms, and because 
of the underlying orientation, it becomes imperative that formal measurement 
techniques will be applied. Pattern of behaviour regarding implementation 
strategies will also be consistent with the posture of other elements in the 
mix. This is the rudimentary premise of our sixth thesis 
- 
it is an 
advancement on the fourth. Taken together, they imply that (a) situational 
constraints to facing the enterprise will determine how management dcf ines, 
implements, measures, and the level of sensitivity it shows towards consumer 
protection and (b), that the dichotomous dimension of management approach 
exhibit a functional/correlative relationship. 
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The figure below is an attempt to present the model in a tabular form. 
Table 5.0: A DICHOTOMIZED MODEL OF MANAGEMENT 
RESPONSE BEHAVIOUR. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
MANAGEMENT RESPONS 
------------------------------- 
E BEHAVIOUR 
VARIABLE. A: 
------------------------------------------------------- 
B: 
------------------------------- 
SENSITIVITY> PRO-ACTIVE: REACTUVE: 
Anticipates & identifies 
-defensive, passive responses 
consumer problcms; secs -relics on regulation as 
consumers as marketing guide to action 
opportunities; creates 
-acts mainly under external 
monitoring dcpts, with pressure. 
defined tasks, 
-aims to counter effects of 
responsibilities and consumerism, and suspicious 
corresponding authority; of consumer advocates. 
opens up to consumer 
advocatcs/organizations. 
DEFINITION > CONSUMER FACT ORS COMPANY FACTORS: 
Distinguishes between Relies on surrogate 
functional & subjective variables cg. technical 
fulfillment; identifies efficiency, sales volume, 
expectation & importance; production and profits; 
concern for market unclear consumer goals 
pluralism; consumer but clear on company 
education, information feedback. 
and foals arc specified. 
MEASUREMENT> FORMAL: 
Careful planning, 
attitudinal studies, 
integrated consumer 
studies, measurable and 
verifiable parameters. 
INFORMAL: 
Relics on overt market 
behaviour, complaint and 
ordinary business 
statistics. 
IMPLEMENTATION> ACTION ORIENTATE!!: STATEMENT OF INTENT 
Actionable programmes, 
-Commitments are unclear 
appoints specialists, 
-Score cards lacking. involvement of CEO and 
entire organizational 
apparatus, institu- 
tionalizes consumer policy 
by working it into the 
whole process of resource 
allocation and career 
decisions. 
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5.3. ' METHODS 
This section describes the research design and procedure. The methodological 
f ramcwork is exploratory and thcrcf ore, qualitatively based. It involved small 
number of subjects who were not sampled on probabilistic basis. It may have 
been expected that this section should have come in the introductory chapter. 
The reason for not addressing it earlier than now is quite obvious. As 
eloquently stated by Glaser and Strauss, (1967), qualitative studies begin with 
minimal commitment to a priori assumptions and theory. It was not therefore 
possible to start describing procedures and designs at a stage when none was 
obvious. 
5.3.1. Whv Oualitative Method 
At the inception, we had thought about developing a self- completion 
questionnaire as a primary source of data collection. The method would have 
lent itself susceptible to quantitative evaluation, perhaps applying more 
rigorous statistical techniques. This would have also meant that respondents 
could take a definite stand on most of the issues by being outwardly positive, 
negative or neutral in such a way that respondents' attitudes can be scaled 
statistically. 
However, in the preliminary phase, during which the method was used to 
obtain responses from members of the Gas and Electricity Consumers' 
Councils who could not be reached physically for preliminary interviews, 
most of them wrote in the 'general comment'column of the questionnaire that 
the issues being explored were such that could not be adequately addressed 
by a yes or no response. It therefore became obvious to us that if we arc to get 
meaningful responses, we should have to design the main research instrument 
to allow full participation of respondents by removing most of the 
restrictions inherent in the highly structured processes. 
Although the approach has its fair share of criticisms, particularly from 
quantitative researchers, there is enormous stack of literature urging that 
when some research are carried out even by the most rigorous methods of the 
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prevailing conception of science, the results have been known to bear remote 
or no relevance to the real world or actual issues. As an example, Nicosia and 
Rosenberg, (1972), have expressed great concern for attempts to quantify what 
may best be left qualitative: "... blind research for quantifiable regularities 
in society can lead to ignorance of those aspects of man 
- 
the most important 
ones 
- 
that are intrinsically non-quantitative", (p. 246; see also Robin, 197 l, p. 25; 
Gopal, 1970, p. 205). Suaman and Evercd, (1978) identify this phenomenon as a 
crisis in organizational science and argue that the principal symptom is that 
as research methods and techniques become more sophisticated, they tend to 
become increasingly less useful for solving the practical problems that face 
the organization and its clientele. These considerations impelled us to 
consider and adopt qualitative approach. 
5.3.2. PRELIMINARY PHASE 
In contrast to most methods in which the researcher's hypotheses and 
procedure are determined beforc-hand, we followed a general research 
interest, specifies of the approach evolved as we proceeded. There was less 
certainty as to what questions to ask or how to ask them, what spccif ic issues 
to explore etc. Moreover, there was a bit of naivity, more aptly, misconception 
in the initial categorization of enterprises of interest. A dichotomized 
approach of public versus private monopolies was considered but eventually 
dropped when it was discovered, during the preliminary phase, that there arc 
no remarkable differences in their market characteristics. A common 
platform was therefore evolved vide the theory of the national enterprise. 
The preliminary survey phase was a kind of 'snowballing' strategy to get a 
feel of the research area. In order to have a concrete grasp of major and 
subterranean issues, preliminary contacts were made with consumer 
organizations and regulatory agencies for the captive enterprises. Besides 
brochures sent by those bodies to explain their functions and responsibili tics, 
interviews were held with their principal officers, cg., GCC. ECC, OFGAS 
and OFTEL. Interviews were conducted between the months of June and 
September of 1988. Sclf-completion questionnaire 
, 
(see appendix 2A), were 
sent to counýil members of GCC and ECC because it was not possible to get 
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personal interview appointments. Insights gain from these immensely helped 
to shape the course of the research. 
5.3.3. THE CONTEXT 
British Gas, British Telecom and Nigerian Telecommunications were chosen 
as the contextual base for the study. It was not considered necessary to 
expand the scope because virtually all shades of enterprises within the 
category face somewhat similar socio-political and economic environment. 
What was needed was to identify those which presented some-kind of 
variation in the structure of environmental factors facing them. The three 
enterprises chosen satisf y this criterion. Further inclusions would have meant 
re-inventing the wheel or re-stating a scenario already accommodated in one 
of the three state schema. Apart from variations in the structure of the 
regulatory institutions, the enterprises present basic commonalities in terms 
of market characteristics and public policy orientations. 
As a result, a single case study approach was decided upon, using the tclccom 
industry. Multiple case study, targeted at each enterprise would appear 
repetitive because of reasons already stated. However, even though a single 
case study is considered appropriate, attention would be drawn to areas where 
variations occur or where certain issues are considered peculiar to an 
enterprise. In deciding on the single case study approach, we recognize that 
an organization could be legitimate object of scientific inquiry only as 
single cases without considering whether such individual cases are 
subsumable under general laws. " Knowledge about what actions arc 
appropriate for problem-solving need not be derived by rcf crence to a general 
category of similar organizations from which we know what the best action 
to take is on average", (Susman & Evercd, 1978, p. 585). 
5.3.4. DATA COLLECTION 
Data for the study was collected primarily through unstructured, in-depth 
interview, complimented with soft data from anecdotal materials, 
observations and ephemeral materials. 
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Interview guide, comprising of 43 items was designed to provide insight into 
managerial approaches to a number of issues with consequences for consumer 
protection, focusing on areas such as management attitude toward the 
philosophy of business, consumer responsibilities, consumer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction, regulation, philosophy on consumer protection, responsiveness, 
and reaction to market processes. 
Even though interview questions were standardized, open-ended, carefully 
worded, and arranged to take each respondent through the same sequence, 
(see appendix IA), there was need for flexibility because some questions had 
to be adapted to the realities of the specific enterprise. By this method, we 
aimed to achieve appreciable degree of particularization. 
To ensure accuracy in data recording, as well as necessary interaction with 
respondents which will help make the interview decidedly conversational, 
tape recorder was used 
- 
all the respondents but two obliged. Notes were 
taken in the process of interviews and they helped a great deal to formulate 
new questions, particularly where it was felt necessary to check out 
something that was said earlier. Average of two sessions were held with each 
respondent, each session lasting about an hour and a half. Normally, after the 
first interview session, appreciable level of rapport would have been 
established between the interviewer and intcrviewee so that it was possible 
to arrange or conduct subsequent interviews on telephone. For example, 
during or after transcription of initial interviews, the need arose to call some 
of the respondents to clarify some statements or respond to issues that 
emanated from earlier responses. Interviews were held from the month of 
June to September of 1989. 
5.3.5. SAMPLE SELECTION IR-E-SPONDENTS) 
Technique for selecting respondents was not probabilistically determined and 
therefore, judgmental 
. 
Respondents were chosen in consideration of their 
official positions in the organizations, knowledge and involvement in the area 
being studied. Mayor and Brown, (1966), remark that " in a judgmental sampic, 
the researcher's judgment is used in selecting items from the f ramc which arc 
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in some sense representative of the population than a randomly selected 
sampIc". 
- 
It was dif f icult to determine how many people to interview, no literature on 
methodology could of f er any guide on this. What stood out among researchers 
is a consensus that actual number of cases is relatively unimportant. " What 
is important is the potential of each case to aid the researcher in developing 
theoretical insights into the area of social life being stud icd", (Ta ylor and 
Bogdan, I 984, p. 83; see also Canncll and Kahn, 1966). 
What we did was to identify two managerial levels within each captive 
enterprise, the first level representing policy formulation stratum and the 
second, policy implementation echelon. This implied that we were able to 
interview respondents at the directorate cadre, ( ie. those who are functional 
directors of the enterprise, eg. Director of Corporate Affairs, usually second 
or third stratum of line managers in the organization), and also middle 
managers who are more accessible to consumers. By so doing, we were able to 
follow consumer policy processes from formulation stage right through to the 
implementation stage. Since respondents were carefully chosen, random 
sampling error is reduced to a minimum. 
5.3.6. PILOT TEST 
Research instrument was tested using subjects drawn from British Telecom 
and Electricity Consumers Council. Two manager f rom British Telecom (both 
alumni of the City University Business School), obliged to assist in the pilot 
test. The third subject is a sectional head in the Electricity Consumers 
Council. 
The essence of the pilot test was not to appraise interviewer's competence or 
skill as those teething problems had been over-come during the preliminary 
stage. At issue was to determine the suitability of interview guide, its 
preciseness, smoothness and to ensure that confusion likely to arise from 
interpretation of questions are reduced to a minimum. At the end of the 
exercise, five questions were discarded; three were considered too bogus and 
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difficult to tackle given the limitation of time; remaining two were 
considered trivial, ie. re-stating what was obvious or substantially 
accommodatcd in othcr qucstions. 
Originally, interview duration for each case was estimated to last one hour. 
The pilot test revealed the flaw inherent in this estimation because it turned 
out that average duration was two and half hours. In real setting, not many 
people would be happy to talk for that length of time. This was the reason 
why we entreated the respondents to make allowance for a follow up session. 
5.3.7. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
There is tacit agreement among researchers that there arc no formal and 
universal rules to follow in analyzing, interpreting and evaluating 
qualitative data, (Paton, 1980; Tynan and Drayton, 1988; Bcllcnger, Bernhardt 
& Goldstucker, 1976; Calder, 1977; Cartwright, 1966; Vidich & Beusman, 1960; 
Becker & Geer, 1960). 
Our approach is directed toward developing an in-depth understanding of the 
subject matter. This approach has many parallels with the grounded theory 
method of Glaser and Strauss, (1967). As preceding discussions indicate, 
insights are grounded in, and developed from data; propositions (theses) 
developed within the context of their application. In contrast to Glaser and 
Strauss, though, we are less concerned with emphasis on development of 
elaborate concepts and theories than with understanding the settings of the 
subject under research. We do this through description and building up theses 
to guide the study. At the beginning, general of postulates were advanced to 
provide boundaries for the study, from which a number of theses were 
developed and subsequently rc-defincd as working hypotheses. 
Responses are inferred to be indicative of respondents attitude and opinion. 
Analysis of data is, of course, predicated on the validity of this inference. 
Information resulting from sample data is presumed to be an insight into the 
behaviour of managers' and consequently, the organization. Recorded 
interviews were transcribed and since raw data are quotations, content 
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analysis was applied 
- 
to analyze not just the verbal responses but also the 
manifest content of other forms of secondary data. Analysis thereof aimed 
at converting interview notes and observations into systematic categories so 
that it could be possible to figure out what things fit together. This was 
achieved by looking at recurring regularities in the information obtained. 
Those regularities were taken to represent patterns judged by two critcria: (a) 
internal homogeneity and, (b) external heterogeneity. The first concerns the 
extent to which data belonging to a certain category hold together in a 
mcaningf ul way, ie. consistency of relationship in responses given by subjects 
in a subject catcgory, (eg. managers interviewed in BT). The second criterion 
concern the extent to which differences among categories arc bold and clear 
in such a way that no consistency could be inferred, (eg. OFTEL/BT; 
BT/British Gas; OFTEL/OFGAS; OFGAS/GCC). 
Preliminary interview data were coded and scored, based on the adaptation 
of 'Marketing Effectiveness Audit', (Kotler, 1977). Responses were classified 
according to themes, so that each had to be placed in one of three categories, 
viz. high attitude (favourable); low attitude (unfavourable), neutral attitude 
(unclassified). There arc no hard and fast rules about this categorization. It 
all depends on the nature of the question and its ramifications. Hence, it may 
be possible to use 5,6 or even 7 scale categorization, eg. (1) unqualified 
confidence; (2) confidence; (3) confidence and mistrust equally balanced, (4) 
qualified mistrust; (5) unqualified mistrust; (6) question not asked; (7) 
question asked but not answered cg. no comment responses. 
5.3.8. STATEMENT OF FORMAL HYPOTHESES 
In the introductory chapter, a number of Postulations were made which in 
essence became the bed-rock of theses subsequently enunciated. Although it 
is generally accepted that qualitative research should primarily aim at 
generating hypotheses and not the proof per sc; it is equally important that 
whatever the intention, whether generating hypotheses or providing proof, 
such hypotheses should be sharp and succinct. This would make it easier for 
their boundaries to be delineated and limitations better appreciated. 
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Based on the concepts explored and postulations/thcscs enunciated, the 
following hypotheses have been developed. 
I. The determinants of consumer protection will vary depending on the 
dimension of management interpretation. 
2. A set of evaluative variables can be identified which will relate in 
characteristically the same pattern to the dimension of management 
interpretation. 
3. Pattern of management response, (management response behaviour) is 
shaped by the structure of situational constraints; such that the aggrcgativc, 
rather than the disaggrcgative structure, will more likely induce pro-active 
management response behaviour. 
4. Cross adoption of consumer policy frameworks between industries or 
across countries will more likely prove countcr-productive in real terms. 
5. The greater the effect of the national enterprise policy on protecting 
consumers' interests, the greater the managerial emphasis on minimizing 
consumer dissatisfaction rather than maximizing consumer satisfaction. 
5.3.9. LIMITATIONS 
It is difficult trying to enumerate all the problems encountered in the course 
of the research or meticulously itemize all the limitations. Nonetheless, a 
number of them stand out very glaringly and one can not escape giving them 
a mcntion. 
In the first place, providing a framework in which to assemble and discuss 
the literature from the wide range of sources and disciplines utilized in this 
research has been particularly difficult. No framework was obvious, since 
there is not yet a comprehensive theory of consumer policy under the 
circumstances we studied. It is therefore possible that in the discussion and 
application of some of the concepts and theories, particularly those borrowed 
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from other disciplines, we may not have gone into the depth expected of 
specialists in those areas. However, we are confident that the much we did in 
those areas are enough to established whatever principles were explored. 
There are also general limitations associated with qualitative research 
methodology. It has been said that since it is non-quantitativc, it could as well 
be non scicntif ic, non objective, judgmental, and theref ore valuc-laden. These 
give immense deal of jitters to a researcher using qualitative methodology 
because even though he may be quite convinced about what he is doing, he 
will need to pass on the same level of conviction to others. This may not be 
easy, particularly for non qualitative researchers, but the option arc not that 
much. As Smith and Bloom, (1989) emphasized, some phenomena are not easy 
to study using empirical approaches, "and the result has been that much of 
the writing about the consumer movement has been either conceptual or 
journalistic". The approach of this study did not deviate much from that 
observation. Whether it should be considered a limitation or not may not be 
easy to settle. The issue of 'valuc-ladcn' has been variously addressed in 
research f ora and the consensus is that no research methodology is value-f rcc. 
On the subjective aspect, questions regarding reliability and validity have 
been raised. Lack of ramdomness in sample selection also raises questions 
regarding representativeness of the sample. We feel that if important 
characteristics regarding the subjects are known and readily discernible, the 
question of validity would have been greatly over-come. However, we do 
accept the possibility that interviewer's role may have some inherent 
limitations in the gathering and interpretation of data. Since raw data arc 
quotations obtained from transcription of interviews, some may have been 
unwittingly lost in editing. Transcription is a highly frustrating job and 
time guzzling as well. It took more than ten hours to transcribe a case tape. 
For highly experienced researchers or professionals, the ratio according to 
a study is about 4: 1 (see Paton, I 980, p. 248). Moreover, because the sample is 
characteristically small, there might be some limitations if precise inferences 
are to be made from the sample to a larger, more diverse population. 
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Not all organizations are studied easily and the upper echelon arc notoriously 
difficult to infiltrate. It was not possible to gain the audience of chief 
executives of British Telecom and British Gas 
- 
we had intended to use them 
to present a bird's-cyc-view of the organization in consumer policy arena. 
Furthermore, all the respondents acted on the basis of their positions in the 
enterprises, experience and knowledge. It may never be known to what extent 
their personal values were brought to bear on their official values. 
However, all the limitations mentioned must be put alongside the general 
perspectives of qualitative research and should be evaluated in view of the 
purpose and type of research undcr-taken. In view of this role, most of the 
limitations described here appear to be at least as acceptable as those inherent 
in any research methodology. 
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